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Record linkage, the task of linking multiple databases with the aim to identify records
that refer to the same entity, is occurring increasingly in many application areas.
Generally, unique entity identifiers are not available in all the databases to be linked.
Therefore, record linkage requires the use of personal identifying attributes, such as
names and addresses, to identify matching records that need to be reconciled to the
same entity. Often, it is not permissible to exchange personal identifying data across
different organizations due to privacy and confidentiality concerns or regulations.
This has led to the novel research area of privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL).
PPRL addresses the problem of how to link different databases to identify records
that correspond to the same real-world entities, without revealing the identities of
these entities or any private or confidential information to any party involved in the
process, or to any external party, such as a researcher. The three key challenges that
a PPRL solution in a real-world context needs to address are (1) scalability to large
databases by efficiently conducting linkage; (2) achieving high quality of linkage
through the use of approximate (string) matching and effective classification of the
compared record pairs into matches (i.e. pairs of records that refer to the same entity)
and non-matches (i.e. pairs of records that refer to different entities); and (3) provision
of sufficient privacy guarantees such that the interested parties only learn the actual
values of certain attributes of the records that were classified as matches, and the
process is secure with regard to any internal or external adversary.
In this thesis, we present extensive research in PPRL, where we have addressed
several gaps and problems identified in existing PPRL approaches. First, we begin
the thesis with a review of the literature and we propose a taxonomy of PPRL to char-
acterize existing techniques. This allows us to identify gaps and research directions.
In the remainder of the thesis, we address several of the identified shortcomings.
One main shortcoming we address is a framework for empirical and comparative
evaluation of different PPRL solutions, which has not been studied in the literature
so far. Second, we propose several novel algorithms for scalable and approximate
PPRL by addressing the three main challenges of PPRL. We propose efficient private
blocking techniques, for both three-party and two-party scenarios, based on sorted
neighborhood clustering to address the scalability challenge. Following, we propose
two efficient two-party techniques for private matching and classification to address
the linkage quality challenge in terms of approximate matching and effective classi-
fication. Privacy is addressed in these approaches using efficient data perturbation
techniques including k-anonymous mapping, reference values, and Bloom filters.
Finally, the thesis reports on an extensive comparative evaluation of our proposed
solutions with several other state-of-the-art techniques on real-world datasets, which
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter provides an introduction to the research problem addressed by this
thesis in Section 1.1, real-world applications of the problem in Section 1.2, the aim of
the research study in Section 1.3, the contributions of this work in Section 1.4, and
the methodology of how the problem is addressed in Section 1.5. An outline to the
organization of the thesis is also given at the end of the chapter, as are the notation
and terminology used throughout this thesis.
1.1 Problem Statement
In recent times the world has seen an explosion in the volume of data that is being
collected by organizations as well as individuals. Much of these data are about
people, or they are generated by people. Examples of the former include financial
data such as shopping transactions, telecommunication records, or electronic health
records. Examples of the latter include emails, tweets, blog posts, and so on. It has
been recognized that analyzing large data collections through the use of data mining
and analytics techniques can provide a competitive edge to a commercial enterprise,
can allow improved crime and fraud detection, can lead to better patient outcomes
in the health sector, and can be of vital importance to national security [29, 80].
Analyzing and mining large datasets often requires information from multiple
data sources to be integrated in order to enable more sophisticated analysis. Inte-
grating data also improves the quality of data by allowing the identification (and
possible automatic correction) of conflicting data values, the enrichment of data, or
the imputation of missing values [86]. The analysis of integrated data can, for exam-
ple, facilitate the detection of adverse drug reactions in particular patient groups, or
enable the accurate identification of terrorism suspects [24, 63].
The process of matching and aggregating records that relate to the same entity
from one or more datasets is known as ‘record linkage’, ‘data matching’ or ‘entity res-
olution’ [63, 86]. In computer science, a long line of research has been conducted in
record linkage, based on the theoretical foundation provided by Fellegi and Sunter
in 1969 [65]. Today, record linkage not only faces computational and operational
challenges due to the increasing size of datasets, but also privacy preservation chal-
lenges due to growing privacy concerns. Generally, record linkage is a challenging
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task because unique entity identifiers are not available in all the databases that are
linked. Therefore, the common attributes available which are sufficiently well cor-
related with entities, known as quasi-identifiers (QIDs) [47], need to be used for the
linkage. For databases that contain personal information about people, these QID at-
tributes generally include names, addresses, dates of birth, and other details. Using
such personal information often leads to privacy and confidentiality concerns.
Record linkage aims to classify the pairs of records from different databases into
matches (i.e. pairs of records that refer to the same entity) and non-matches (i.e.
pairs of records that refer to different entities) based on the matching / comparison
results of the QIDs [33]. The presence of real-world data errors makes this classifi-
cation task more challenging. In practice, the matching of two records is generally
determined by applying similarity comparison functions between QID attributes to
calculate how similar the records of a pair are. We outline the three key challenges
that are associated with the record linkage problem in the following.
1. Scalability: The first challenge of record linkage is the scalability to large
databases which is generally dependent on the complexity of the process. As-
sume two databases that are to be linked, DA and DB, contain nA = |DA| and
nB = |DB| records, respectively. In order to classify the record pairs (a, b) from
these two databases (a ∈ DA and b ∈ DB) into matches and non-matches, in a
naïve approach the number of comparisons required is the product of the size
of the two databases (nA × nB) which is the bottleneck of the whole linkage
process [13, 33]. This quadratic complexity makes naïve linkage not scalable
to large databases. Blocking techniques can be used to overcome this prob-
lem [29] as will be discussed further in Chapter 2. The complexity of record
linkage also depends on the techniques employed. Complex techniques for
linkage, such as secure multi-party computation techniques [41, 78, 135] or
advanced classification techniques including machine learning or graph-based
approaches [15, 85, 153], generally have higher computational complexity and
therefore they might not be scalable to large databases.
2. Linkage quality: It is commonly accepted that real-world data are ‘dirty’ [84],
which means they contain errors, variations, values can be missing, or can be
out of date. Therefore, even when records that correspond to the same real-
world entity are being compared using the values of their personal identifying
details (QIDs), the variations and errors in these values will lead to ambiguous
matches [23]. The exact comparison of QID values is therefore not sufficient
to achieve accurate linkage results. Approximate matching as well as accu-
rate classification techniques are needed to achieve accurate linkage quality in
record linkage applications [23, 44].
3. Privacy: When personal information about people (contained in QIDs) is used
for the linking of databases across organizations, then the privacy of this in-
formation needs to be carefully protected. Individual databases can contain
information that is already highly sensitive, such as medical or financial de-
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tails of individuals, or confidential business data. When linked, detailed infor-
mation about individuals that is even more revealing might become available,
such as for people who have certain chronic diseases and who also have finan-
cial problems; or confidential business information like the amount a company
owes to all its suppliers. It is therefore paramount that the privacy of data
used for record linkage across organizations, as well as the sensitive details of
the matching results of such a linkage, are preserved throughout the linkage
process [40].
The privacy requirements in the record linkage process led to the development of
a new research avenue called the ‘privacy-preserving record linkage’ (PPRL), ‘blind
data linkage’, or ‘private record linkage’ problem [37, 58, 78, 194]. In this thesis, we
use the name ‘PPRL’ to state this problem. PPRL is the problem of how to identify
matching records in different databases that refer to the same entities without com-
promising privacy and confidentiality of the entities represented by these records.
In today’s organizations it is often not legally and ethically allowed in many coun-
tries to share data across organizations due to the growing concerns of privacy and
confidentiality. The recently established program by the Office for National Statis-
tics (ONS) in the UK, ’Beyond 2011’, for example carries out research to study the
options for production of population and socio-demographics statistics for England
and Wales, by linking anonymous data to ensure that high levels of privacy of data
about people are maintained [68]. The Data-Matching Program Act in Australia 1,
the European Union (EU) Personal Data Protection Act in Europe 2, and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the USA 3 are few examples
that describe the legal restrictions of disclosing private or sensitive data.
In a PPRL project, the database owners (or data custodians) agree to reveal only
selected information about matched records among them, or to an external party,
such as a researcher. However, to identify the matched records, generally the QIDs
need to be revealed between the parties involved in the PPRL process. Personal infor-
mation contained in the QIDs is often not allowed to be shared or exchanged between
different organizations due to privacy concerns or legal requirements. Therefore, the
linkage has to be conducted on an encoded and / or perturbed version of the QIDs
to preserve the privacy of entities. Encoding and / or perturbation is also known
as ‘masking’, i.e. the original data are transformed in such a way that there exists a
specific functional relationship between the original data and the masked data [67].
Generally, two approaches are adopted to conduct the linkage on the masked
data: (1) two-party linkage where only the database owners participate in the pro-
tocol and (2) three-party linkage where a third party is involved to perform the
linkage. The advantages and drawbacks of these two types of protocols will be dis-
cussed in Section 1.3 (and in detail in Chapter 5). At the end of the linkage process,





that were classified as matches. However, the PPRL process is required to guaran-
tee that any information regarding the non-matching records (that could be used to
identify or infer the non-matching entities) is not revealed during or after the pro-
cess. In Section 1.2 we describe several example scenarios where PPRL is required in
real-world applications. We formally define the problem of PPRL as follows.
Definition 1.1. Privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL):
Assume O1, . . . , Om are the m owners of the databases D1, . . . , Dm, respectively. They
wish to determine which of their records R1i ∈ D1, R2j ∈ D2, . . ., Rmk ∈ Dm match
based on their (masked) QIDs according to a decision model C(R1i , R
2
j , . . . , R
m
k ) that
classifies record pairs into one of the two classes M of matches, and U of non-
matches. O1, . . . , Om do not wish to reveal their actual records R1i , . . . , R
m
k with any
other party. They however are prepared to disclose to each other, or to an external
party, the actual values of some selected attributes of the record pairs that are in class
M to allow analysis.
A viable PPRL solution that can be used in real-world applications should ad-
dress all three challenges (or properties) of scalability, linkage quality, and privacy.
There have been many different approaches proposed for PPRL as recently surveyed
in [184, 193]. As described in these surveys, some attempts to address the problem
of PPRL fall short in providing a sound solution, either because they are not scal-
able to large databases, because they do not provide sufficient privacy guarantees, or
because they are unable to provide high linkage quality. A review of existing PPRL
techniques is presented in Chapter 3.
1.2 Applications of PPRL
Linking records from different databases with the aim to improve data quality or en-
rich data for further analysis and mining is occurring in an increasing number of ap-
plication areas including healthcare, government services, crime and fraud detection,
and business applications [29]. For example, health researchers are interested in ag-
gregating health databases from different organizations for quality health data min-
ing such as epidemiological studies or to investigate adverse drug reactions [21, 139].
Linked health databases can also be used to develop health policies in a more ef-
ficient and effective way compared to the use of small-scale and time-consuming
survey studies which traditionally have been used for this purpose [39, 110].
Another application of record linkage is the linking of census data to provide an
easy platform for compiling data for different studies, which can then be further ana-
lyzed statistically [205]. Record linkage is increasingly being required by social scien-
tists in the field of population informatics to study insights into our society from the
’social genome’ data (i.e., person-level data about social being) [120]. Record linkage
techniques are also being used by national security agencies and crime investigators
to effectively identify individuals who have committed fraud or crimes [98, 156, 195].
Many businesses take advantage of record linkage techniques for deduplicating their
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list of customers, which helps them to reduce the cost of running an advertising cam-
paign or conducting other types of marketing activities. Businesses which collaborate
often need to link records across their databases for successful collaborations.
When record linkage is applied within a single organization (i.e., only data owned
by the same organization are linked), then generally privacy and confidentiality are
not of great concern (assuming there are no internal threats within the organization).
However, when data from several organizations are linked, then privacy and confi-
dentiality need to be carefully considered, as the following scenarios illustrate.
1. Public health research: Assume a group of public health researchers aims to
investigate the types of injuries caused by car accidents, with the objective to
uncover correlations between types of accidents and the resulting injuries [24].
Such research can have significant impact on policy changes that potentially
save many lives [39]. This research requires data from hospitals, the police, as
well as public and private health insurers. Neither of these parties is willing
or allowed by law to provide their databases to the researchers [176]. The re-
searchers only require access to some attributes of the records that are matched
across all the different databases, such as the medical details and basic bio-
graphic information, like age and gender, of people who were involved in ac-
cidents. An effective governance model has recently been proposed for health
data linkage that specifies privacy policies, guiding principles, best practices,
and roles and responsibilities of participants of such linkage project [176].
2. Health surveillance: Preventing infectious diseases early before they spread
widely around a country or worldwide is important for a healthy nation. Such
prevention can be done by continuously monitoring early occurrences of infec-
tious diseases. Such early outbreak detection systems require data from several
sources to be collected and linked on an ongoing basis, such as human health
data, consumed drugs data, and animal health data [40]. Privacy concerns arise
when such data are linked and stored at a central location [139]. Techniques
are needed to ensure that private patient data, as well as the confidential data
collected from healthcare organizations, are kept confidential and secure.
3. Business collaboration: Collaboration benefits businesses for example in im-
proving efficiency and reducing the costs of their supply chains. However, busi-
nesses generally are not willing to share confidential data, such as strategies
and competitive knowledge. Linking the supplier and customer databases be-
tween two businesses needs to be conducted without revealing any knowledge
besides the suppliers and customers that are present in both databases [40].
4. Plagiarism detection: Plagiarism detection, another related PPRL application,
is useful in many real-world applications [127, 146] to detect copyright viola-
tions, research work duplications, and copied text segments within documents.
In many of these cases, this information is confidential and cannot be shared to
detect plagiarism. However, without having access to the confidential source,
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violations and duplications cannot be identified. PPRL techniques can solve
this problem by performing the matching of long texts (considered as records)
without disclosing the confidentiality to any parties.
5. Serious and organized crime: Imagine a national crime investigation unit
which is tasked with fighting against crimes that are of national significance,
such as organized crime syndicates. Such a unit will likely manage various
national databases which draw from many different sources, including law en-
forcement agencies, Internet service providers, and financial institutions. Such
data are highly sensitive. The collection of such data in one place for retrieval
and analysis makes them vulnerable to both outsider attacks and internal ad-
versaries, such as employees who access certain records without authoriza-
tion. Generally employees are asked by the organization to sign disclosure
agreements for accessing confidential data in order to reduce internal threats.
Employing techniques that facilitate linking without the need of all data be-
ing given to the crime investigation unit would mean that only linked records
(such as those of suspicious individuals) are available to the unit. This would
significantly reduce any risks of privacy and confidentiality breaches.
1.3 Aim of Research
An optimal PPRL solution should balance all three properties of scalability, linkage
quality, and privacy, as described in Section 1.1, which have a trade-off among each
other. While various approaches have been proposed to deal with privacy within the
record linkage process [193], a practical solution that is well applicable to real-world
conditions needs to address the major challenge of scalability of linking very large
databases while preserving privacy and achieving high linkage quality.
Privacy needs to be preserved in the linkage process by calculating the similarity
of the encoded and / or perturbed (also known as ‘masked’, as will be described
in Chapter 5) attribute values of two records without revealing the actual attribute
values of the record pair. Linkage quality can be defined by both the degree of fault-
tolerance to real-world data errors (measured by the ability to perform approximate
linkage in the presence of typographical errors and other variations in real-world
data) and the accuracy of classification. High linkage quality can be achieved by
using approximate similarity comparison functions to compensate for data errors,
and by using an effective classification model to accurately classify the compared
record pairs into matches and non-matches.
Developing approximate and scalable PPRL algorithms without compromising
privacy and quality of linkage is an emerging research problem. The primary aim of
this study is to conduct extensive research on scalable and approximate PPRL, and
the following is a list of research questions that the thesis aims to address.
1. Extensive survey of PPRL: Various techniques have been developed for PPRL
over the past two decades. An extensive survey of current PPRL techniques is
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required to provide insights into the shortcomings of current techniques and
directions for future research. PPRL techniques involve many different dimen-
sions and hence characterizing existing PPRL techniques according to such dif-
ferent dimensions for analysis and comparison is challenging, yet very useful.
2. Efficient privacy techniques: The approaches proposed for PPRL in the lit-
erature can be classified into two based on the privacy techniques employed:
(1) data perturbation privacy techniques [108, 109, 199] and (2) Secure Multi-
party Computation (SMC) privacy techniques [41, 133, 135]. The first category
of techniques perturb private data by attributes reduction, generalization, or
transformation, to prevent re-identification of individual records. The privacy
and quality of linkage provided by these perturbation-based solutions have a
trade-off, in that increasing one often means lowering the other, and vice versa.
On the other hand, SMC-based solutions provide highly secure solutions with
high linkage quality, but they generally are very expensive in terms of runtime
and memory space required, and thus they are impractical in many real-world
scenarios. Hence, efficient data perturbation-based privacy techniques with
high linkage quality and sufficient privacy protection need to be developed
and employed for practical PPRL applications.
3. Two-party efficient algorithms: Existing PPRL techniques can also be cate-
gorized based on their need (or not) of a third party for performing record
linkage [24, 28, 194]. In three-party protocols, a (trusted) third party is involved
in conducting the linkage, while in two-party protocols only the two database
owners participate in the PPRL process. Three-party protocols would often
not suffice in real-world applications since they have the risk of collusion be-
tween one of the database owners and the third party with the aim to learn
the other database owner’s sensitive data. However, two-party protocols gen-
erally require more complex techniques to ensure that the two database owners
cannot infer any sensitive information from each other during the linkage pro-
cess. Most of the two-party solutions proposed for PPRL in the literature are
SMC-based techniques and are not scalable and practical in real-world settings.
Thus, developing efficient two-party protocols that employ cost-effective pri-
vacy techniques and preserve the privacy of sensitive data at the same time
with less accuracy loss is an important research question.
4. Private blocking techniques: There have been various advances with regard to
the quality of linking and privacy of PPRL in recent times [102, 184]. Scal-
ability for PPRL, however, is still a major concern, and scaling the linkage
process to real-world databases that contain many millions of records with-
out compromising privacy and quality is a challenging task. Similar to block-
ing techniques that have been used in traditional record linkage [30], private
blocking techniques can be used in PPRL to reduce the large number of com-
parisons required between records by removing potential non-matching record
pairs before comparing them in detail using private matching and classification
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techniques. Private blocking techniques not only provide a trade-off between
complexity and quality, but they also have a trade-off with privacy.
5. Evaluation framework for PPRL: The evaluation of PPRL techniques in terms
of the three properties of scalability, linkage quality, and privacy is important
to allow the assessment and comparison of different solutions. Measuring pri-
vacy is difficult compared to quality and scalability for which widely accepted
and used measures exist [30, 161]. A general framework with numerical and
normalized measures for all three properties of PPRL will provide a baseline
for comparison and analysis of PPRL solutions. Developing such a framework
is therefore important for PPRL research.
1.4 Contributions of this Work
This thesis provides a detailed study of PPRL techniques. Specifically, it proposes
new algorithms for scalable and approximate PPRL addressing several gaps in ex-
isting PPRL research. Contributions of the study are visualized in Figure 4.2 on
Page 43 (which we will discuss in detail in Section 4.3). We categorize the contribu-
tions into three, which are (a) conceptual, (b) methodology, and (c) evaluation. The
thesis mainly covers:
(a) Conceptual:
1. A taxonomy of PPRL techniques (Chapters 3 and 4): As discussed in Sec-
tion 1.3, conducting an extensive survey of PPRL techniques with regard to
different dimensions of PPRL is important to analyze the shortcomings in the
current approaches. We are the first to carry out such a large-scale survey in
PPRL. We present a taxonomy of PPRL techniques that characterizes existing
PPRL techniques along 15 dimensions of PPRL in Chapter 4. These 15 dimen-
sions are categorized into five main topics which are privacy aspects, linkage
techniques, theoretical analysis, evaluation, and practical aspects. We then char-
acterize around 40 PPRL techniques that have been proposed in the literature
in the last two decades (as surveyed in Chapter 3) along the proposed taxon-
omy, and we analyze the gaps that exist in existing techniques that will provide
directions into future research.
(b) Evaluation:
2. An evaluation framework for PPRL (Chapter 5): One main shortcoming (iden-
tified in our survey) we address in this thesis is an evaluation framework for
PPRL solutions. We propose a general framework with normalized measures
to practically evaluate and compare different PPRL solutions with regard to the
three properties of scalability, linkage quality, and privacy. While the scalabil-
ity and linkage quality properties can be assessed based on available standard
measures (such as precision, recall, reduction ratio, pairs completeness, etc.)
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that will be discussed in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, respectively, the privacy pro-
tection provided by a PPRL technique is comparatively more difficult to assess.
The proposed evaluation framework introduces a novel set of numerical privacy
measures to quantify the amount of privacy provided by a privacy-preserving
solution based on a linkage attack, as will be described in detail in Chapter 5.
(c) Methodology:
3. An efficient private blocking technique (Chapter 6): As discussed in Sec-
tion 1.1, private blocking techniques are needed to make PPRL applications
scalable to large databases by reducing the number of candidate record pairs.
There have been several private blocking solutions proposed in the literature in
recent times [3, 18, 56, 104, 124, 172] that adapt existing blocking techniques into
a privacy-preserving context. Among different blocking techniques the sorted
neighborhood approach is the most efficient in terms of number of candidate
record pairs generated, as we will discuss in Section 6. However, only limited
work has investigated sorted neighborhood-based private blocking [106]. We
propose an efficient three-party private blocking technique based on the sorted
neighborhood approach [52, 84]. Our approach uses a combination of two
privacy techniques which are k-anonymous mapping [72] and reference val-
ues [154] to adapt the sorted neighborhood approach in a privacy-preserving
context. The previously proposed sorted neighborhood-based private block-
ing approach by Karakasidis et al. [106] uses k-nearest neighbor (or k-medoids)
clustering to group similar (candidate) records into the same block individually
by the database owners (which is less efficient than the sorted neighborhood
approach in terms of computation complexity), followed by using the sorted
neighborhood approach by the third party to group candidate blocks from both
database owners. In contrast, our approach only uses the sorted neighborhood
approach for the private blocking of databases. This results in more efficient
blocking than several other existing private blocking solutions, as we will em-
pirically validate in Section 10.
4. An efficient two-party private blocking technique (Chapter 7): Another im-
portant shortcoming we identified is that most of the private blocking solutions
and private matching and classification solutions in PPRL are three-party ap-
proaches that require a trusted third party to perform the blocking and / or
linkage. Since three-party solutions are often not suffice in many real-world
applications due to the risk of parties colluding, we study how the three-party
private blocking solution proposed in Chapter 6 can be converted into a two-
party solution by eliminating the need of a third party to perform blocking
between databases. Similar as in the three-party solution, we use a combina-
tion of privacy techniques which are k-anonymous mapping [72] and reference
values [154]. As we will empirically evaluate in Chapter 10, our proposed
two-party private blocking approach outperforms several other existing private
blocking approaches in terms of all three properties of PPRL.
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5. An efficient two-party private matching and classification technique based on
reference values (Chapter 8): We develop efficient two-party private matching
and classification algorithms that have low computational burdens and allow
high quality approximate matching while still preserving the privacy of the
databases that are matched. Low computational burdens can be achieved by
using perturbation-based privacy techniques such as public reference values.
Reference values have previously been used by Pang et al. [154] as an efficient
perturbation-based privacy technique for private matching and classification
in PPRL. This approach requires a trusted third party to perform the linkage
which might not be available in a real-world application. We propose a novel
two-party solution for private matching and classification in PPRL using refer-
ence values. Pang et al.’s approach [154] is based on the triangular inequality
property of distance metrics on the actual similarity values calculated between
private attribute values and public reference values. Our approach, on the other
hand, uses the reverse triangular inequality property of distance metrics on the
binned similarity values.
6. An efficient two-party private matching and classification technique based
on Bloom filters (Chapter 9): The second efficient two-party private matching
and classification technique we propose is based on Bloom filters. Bloom filters
is another efficient perturbation-based privacy technique that has been success-
fully used for PPRL [59, 174, 175]. However, Bloom filters in a two-party context
has so far not been studied. Our approach performs an iterative classification
of the Bloom filters by exchanging certain bit positions at each iteration without
compromising privacy and complexity. Any Bloom filter encoding methods in-
cluding those proposed by Schnell et al. [174, 175] and Durham et al. [56, 59]
can be used in our approach. In Chapter 10 we will empirically compare dif-
ferent Bloom filter encoding methods in our two-party solution.
(b) Evaluation:
7. Empirical study (Chapter 10): Finally, we conduct a comprehensive empirical
evaluation of our proposed solutions for PPRL on large real-world and syn-
thetic datasets in terms of the three properties of PPRL. We provide compara-
tive evaluation results of our proposed solutions with several other state-of-the-
art techniques [56, 59, 104, 124, 175] using the evaluation framework proposed
in Chapter 5.
Parts of this thesis have been published in refereed journals [193, 190] and confer-
ences [188, 189, 191, 192]. In particular, compared to our published survey [193] we
cover more recent publications to update the survey and we study the trends in PPRL
research over the years, as will be illustrated in Figure 3.1 on Page 32. Compared to
our work published in [191, 188, 189, 192], we present an extensive empirical study
of our proposed algorithms on several realistic datasets (corrupted with real-world
data characteristics using our GeCo tool [183], as will be explained in Section 5.4).
We use our evaluation framework based on linkage attack methods we propose on


















Figure 1.1: The proposed research methodology (adapted from [115]).
those solutions for empirical privacy evaluation. We also include a detailed analysis
of the solutions with respect to complexity, linkage quality, and privacy. In addition
to the Bloom filter-based two-party private matching and classification solution pub-
lished in [188], we include several Bloom filter encoding methods and different noise
addition techniques.
1.5 Research Methodology
The preliminary approach of this study is to review the literature and understand
the basic concepts and current approaches in PPRL research. From this initial under-
standing, the followed research methodology (adapted from [115]) for the research
study is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
1. Define or identify the research problem.
2. Design new algorithms for PPRL that address the research problem.
3. Theoretically analyze the PPRL techniques in terms of the three properties,
scalability (based on complexity), linkage quality, and privacy.
4. Prototype the algorithms to be used as proof of concepts (POC) for experimen-
tal study.
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5. Design experimental study with datasets and evaluation measures to be used.
6. Conduct the experimental study.
7. Validate the theoretical analysis of the solution using experimental evaluation.
8. Reflect the experimental results with regard to experimental design, dataset
selection, or algorithm design.
1.6 Thesis Outline
We begin by discussing the preliminaries of record linkage and PPRL in Chapter 2,
and we survey existing PPRL techniques in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we propose a tax-
onomy of PPRL techniques, and we characterize existing PPRL techniques along the
proposed taxonomy to identify research directions. In Chapter 5 we present an evalu-
ation framework for PPRL techniques that can be used for evaluation and comparison
in the following chapters. We then propose a three-party private blocking technique
based on the sorted neighborhood approach in Chapter 6 to address the scalability
challenge, and convert this three-party solution into a two-party private blocking
technique by eliminating the need of a third party in the next chapter. In Chapters 8
and 9 we present efficient two-party private matching and classification algorithms
based on reference values and Bloom filters, respectively. In Chapter 10 we com-
pare our proposed algorithms with several existing state-of-the-art techniques using
the evaluation framework proposed in Chapter 5. Finally, we conclude the study by
summarizing our findings and discussing future research directions in Chapter 11.
1.7 Notation and Terminology
The following table provides the general notation (symbols) and terminology used
throughout this thesis. Further notation specific to individual chapters will be intro-
duced at the beginning of the relevant chapters.
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Table 1.1: General notation and terminology used in this thesis.
DA, DB Databases held by database owners Alice and Bob, respectively
D, DM Original databases, encoded and / or perturbed (masked) databases
G Global database that contains values in the same domain of database D
which is used for a frequency linkage attack for privacy evaluation
GM Masked global database with the same masking function as used in DM
R Publicly available reference dataset
RAi, RBj A record in DA and DB, respectively
A, a Attributes common to DA and DB that are used for linking, an attribute a ∈ A
m Number of attributes used to link records (m = |A|)
R A record in the original database D
RM A masked record in the masked database DM
aM A masked attribute value in DM
v, vi, vj An individual attribute value
r, ri, rj A reference value
bA, bB A Bloom filter of each record in DA and DB, respectively
[] An empty list
enc(·, h) Function and key used to hash-encode values
block(·, ·) Function used to block/index a database
dist(·, ·) Distance measure used to calculate distances between two values (0 ≤ dist(·, ·) ≤ 1)
sim(·, ·) Function used to calculate similarity between two values (0 ≤ sim(·, ·) ≤ 1)
st Minimum similarity threshold value to determine a pair of values as similar
nA, nB Number of records in DA and DB, respectively
nR, n Total number of reference values used, and number of records in databases
ng Number of global values in GM that match a certain masked value in DM
nB Number of blocks in a database generated by a block(·, ·) function
q Number of characters that make a q-gram
Ps(·) Probability of suspicion function of a value
S Scalability score calculated for scalability evaluation (0.0 ≤ S ≤ 1.0)
LQ Linkage quality score calculated for linkage quality evaluation (0.0 ≤ LQ ≤ 1.0)
DR Disclosure risk score calculated for privacy evaluation (0.0 ≤ DR ≤ 1.0)
SNC-3PSize Three-party private blocking based on sorted neighborhood clustering (SNC)
with size-based merging proposed in Chapter 6
SNC-3PSim Three-party private blocking based on sorted neighborhood clustering (SNC)
with similarity-based merging proposed in Chapter 6
SNC-2P Two-party private blocking based on sorted neighborhood clustering (SNC)
proposed in Chapter 7
HCLUST Private blocking based on hierarchical clustering (HCLUST)
proposed by Kuzu et al. [124]
k-NN Private blocking based on k-nearest neighbor clustering (k-NN)
proposed by Karakasidis et al. [104]
HLSH Private blocking based on hamming-based locality sensitive hashing (HLSH)
proposed by Durham [56]
2P-Bin Two-party reference values-based binning solution for private matching
and classification proposed in Chapter 8
2P-BF Two-party Bloom filter-based private matching and
classification solution proposed in Chapter 9
CLK Cryptographic Longterm Key (CLK) encoding for Bloom filters
proposed by Schnell et al. [175]
RBF Record-based Bloom filter (RBF) encoding proposed by Durham et al. [59]




Building on the introduction to the privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) prob-
lem in Chapter 1, in this chapter we summarize the background material that con-
tributes to the understanding of basic concepts and techniques of record linkage in
general in Section 2.1, and then describe the challenges involved in introducing pri-
vacy requirements into the record linkage process in Section 2.2.
2.1 Record Linkage
Record linkage is a general classification problem where record pairs from two dif-
ferent databases (with one record from each database) are classified as ‘matches’ if
the records in pairs refer to the same entity, or as ‘non-matches’ if they don’t [26, 65].
This is a simple SQL-join problem if the databases to be linked contain common
unique entity identifiers [32]. However, often unique entity identifiers are not avail-
able in all the databases to be linked, and thus common quasi-identifying attributes
(QIDs) such as names and addresses need to be used as linkage attributes to iden-
tify matching records. The record linkage solutions that can be practically used in
real-world applications need to address scalability and linkage quality.
1. Scalability: The number of comparisons required for the classification task
equals to the product of the size of the two databases. This is a performance
bottleneck in the record linkage process since it requires detailed comparison of
all the record pairs in the databases using expensive comparison functions [13,
33]. Due to the increasing size of data collections in organizations, comparing
all record pairs is not feasible and this would render record linkage solutions
impractical in real-world applications. Hence, record linkage applications need
to address the requirement of linking very large databases more efficiently.
2. Linkage quality: The frequency of typographical errors and other variations
in real-world data makes the linkage problem more challenging. The exact
matching of identifying attribute values is not sufficient to meet the need of
fault-tolerance to real-world data errors. Also record pairs need to be classi-


















Figure 2.1: Outline of the general record linkage process as discussed in Section 2.1
(taken from [193]).
and thus increasing the accuracy of the classification model used. Hence, tech-
niques that provide both approximate matching for fault-tolerance and effective
classification are required for practical record linkage applications.
The record linkage process consists of several steps [30, 63], as Figure 2.1 illus-
trates. The first step of data pre-processing (data cleaning and standardisation) is
crucial for quality record linkage outcomes, because most real-world data contain
noisy, incomplete and inconsistent data [12, 162]. This step includes filling in missing
data, removing unwanted values, transforming data into well-defined and consistent
forms, and resolving inconsistencies in data representations and encodings [38].
The second step in record linkage is blocking [30], which is aimed at reducing
the number of comparisons that need to be conducted between records by remov-
ing as many record pairs as possible that are unlikely to correspond to matches [13].
Only pairs that are potentially matching, the so called ‘candidate record pairs’ among
which we expect to find matches, are brought together to be compared in detail in
the next step, the comparison step. The record pairs that are excluded by a block-
ing technique are classified as non-matches without being compared explicitly. The
process of blocking is discussed further in Section 2.1.1.
Candidate record pairs are compared in detail in the comparison step using a
variety of similarity functions [27]. If a linkage is based on using name and address
details, for example, then approximate string comparison functions need to be em-
ployed which take typographical errors and variations into account [23, 43]. Linkage
based on date, age and numerical values needs to employ comparison functions spe-
cific to such data [26]. Section 2.1.2 describes several popular comparison techniques
in more detail. Several attributes are normally used for comparing records, resulting
in a vector that contains the numerical similarity values of all compared attributes.
In the classification step, the similarity vectors of the compared candidate record
pairs are given to a decision model which will classify record pairs into matches
(where it is assumed the two records in the pair correspond to the same entity),
non-matches (where it is assumed the two records in the pair correspond to differ-
ent entities), and possible matches (where the classification model cannot make a
clear decision) [33, 65, 76]. Various classification techniques have been developed for
record linkage, and Section 2.1.3 discusses these in more detail.
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If record pairs are classified as possible matches, a clerical review process is re-
quired where these pairs are manually compared and classified into matches or non-
matches [204]. This is usually a time-consuming and error-prone process which
depends upon experience of the experts who conduct the review. The manually clas-
sified record pairs can also be used as training data for training supervised classifi-
cation techniques [30]. Alternatively, collective entity resolution techniques [15, 100]
can be employed that analyze not only attribute values of records but also relation-
ships between records to determine the match status of pairs or groups of records.
Measuring the complexity, completeness, and quality, of a record linkage study
is the final step in the record linkage process before the results of a linkage study
can be used in an application, or the linkage approach can be implemented into an
operational system. A variety of evaluation measures have been proposed [30, 33].
More details of these measures are provided in Chapter 5.
In what follows we discuss the steps of the record linkage process in more detail,
and present techniques that have been used in each of the steps. As we will discuss
in Chapter 4, however, many of the state-of-the-art techniques developed for record
linkage have not been investigated so far within a privacy-preserving context.
2.1.1 Blocking
If the two database tables DA and DB which are to be linked contain nA and nB
records, respectively, then potentially each record from DA has to be compared with
all records from DB, resulting in nA× nB comparisons. In large databases, comparing
all pairs of records is not feasible. It is also not necessary, because the majority of
these comparisons corresponds to non-matching records [30].
To reduce this large number of potential record pair comparisons, some kind of
filtering of the unlikely matches can be performed. Techniques that accomplish this
are generally known as blocking, searching, or indexing techniques [13, 30]. A single
record attribute, or a combination of attributes, commonly called the ‘blocking key’,
is used to decide into which blocks (or clusters) to insert a record. Records that
have the same value for the blocking key will be grouped into the same block, and
candidate record pairs are generated only from records within the same block. These
candidate record pairs are then compared in detail in the comparison step.
Blocking has a trade-off between the computational complexity and the quality of
the generated candidate record pairs [13]. Having many small blocks (b) or clusters
generated based on a more specific blocking key definition will result in a smaller
number of candidate record pairs and thus reduces the computation cost (though
communication cost will be increased with many blocks due to the start-up costs).
At the same time it is more likely that true matches are being missed. On the other
hand, a less specific blocking key definition will lead to larger blocks and more
candidate record pairs, but likely also to more true matches that are found [30].
Various blocking techniques for record linkage have been developed in recent
years, and several surveys of these techniques have been presented [13, 30, 151]. In
the traditional standard blocking approach used since the 1960s [65], all records that
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have the same blocking key value will be inserted into the same block, and only
the records within the same block will be compared with each other in detail in the
comparison step. This reduces the number of comparisons to (nA × nB)/b.
An efficient blocking technique is the sorted neighbourhood approach [83, 84],
where the database tables are sorted according to a ‘sorting key’ over which a sliding
window of fixed size w is moved. Candidate record pairs are then generated from
the records that are within the current window (results in (nA + nB)w comparisons).
We study this approach in a privacy-preserving context in Chapters 6 and 7.
In mapping-based blocking [96], the blocking key values are mapped to objects in
a multi-dimensional Euclidean space whereby the similarities (or distances) between
the blocking key values are preserved. A clustering or nearest-neighbour approach
is then applied on these multi-dimensional objects to extract candidate record pairs.
To overcome the issues with data that are of low quality, q-gram-based blocking
techniques can be used that insert each record into several blocks by generating
variations of the record’s blocking key value through the use of q-grams (sub-strings
of length q characters) [13, 30]. Related to q-gram-based and sorted neighbourhood
blocking is suffix array-based blocking [2, 49], where suffixes are generated from the
blocking key values, and blocks are extracted from the sorted array of suffix strings.
Canopy clustering [44, 142] generates overlapping clusters (canopies) using two
thresholds and an efficient similarity function (usually based on q-grams and Jaccard
or TF-IDF/Cosine similarity), such that each record is inserted into several clusters.
Each cluster then forms one block from which candidate record pairs are generated.
Locality sensitive hashing (LSH) [113] has recently been used for blocking that
allows similar values to be hashed into the same block with high likelihood. Multibit
trees [9, 117] is another recent blocking technique that first transforms records into
bit vectors and then filters pairs of vectors by using a binary array tree structure.
2.1.2 Comparison
Comparisons between two records can be conducted either at the record level or at
the attribute (field) level. Record level comparisons concatenate the attribute val-
ues in a record into one long string, and then compare these longs strings between
records. With comparisons at the attribute level, comparisons are conducted between
individual attribute values, with specialized comparison functions used depending
upon the type of data in these attributes.
The comparison of values can either be done exact or approximate. With the
former approach, a comparison function simply measures whether the values in two
attributes are the same or different. Approximate comparison functions, on the other
hand, measure how similar the values in two attributes are with each other. In many
real-world record linkage scenarios it is not possible to simply compare two strings
exactly because they can contain typographical errors and variations [23, 83].
Approximate matching of values requires a function that represents similarity as
a numerical value. Generally, exact agreement is represented as a similarity of 1,
total disagreement as a similarity of 0, and partial agreements as similarity values
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in-between 0 and 1. Many approximate comparison functions have been developed
for different types of data [29, 77, 97, 148, 157]. In the following, popular techniques
for approximate string comparison are described in more detail.
The Levenshtein edit distance [148] is a commonly used comparison method for
approximate string and sequence matching. It calculates the smallest number of edit
operations (character inserts, deletes and substitutes) that are required to convert one
string into another. Various modifications and extensions of the basic edit distance
approach have been developed. Some allow for different costs of different types of
edits, while others allow for gaps, or they are optimized for certain types of data.
Two surveys of edit distance-based approximate string comparison functions can be
found in [97, 148]. We use distance-based comparison function for PPRL in Chapter 8.
Another type of comparison function is based on the idea of comparing the sub-
strings, known as q-grams, that two strings have in common [111, 118, 186]. The
strings to be compared are first split into shorter sub-strings of length q characters
using a sliding window approach, and then the number of q-grams that occur in both
strings is counted. Three different normalized similarity scores can be calculated
using the overlap, Dice, or Jaccard coefficient [23, 29]. This is used in Chapter 9.
One string comparison technique that is commonly used in record linkage ap-
plications where names and addresses need to be compared is the Jaro-Winkler ap-
proach [93, 202]. This technique was developed at the US Bureau of the Census based
on the expertise gained in conducting large record linkage projects. The Jaro tech-
nique combines an edit distance and a q-gram-based approach [93] by counting the
number of common and transposed characters in two strings. Winkler later added
several improvements to this basic comparison function [202, 203], such as increased
similarity if the beginning of two strings is the same, or weight adjustments based
on the lengths of two strings and how many similar characters they contain.
The SoftTF-IDF string comparison technique developed by Cohen et al. [43] aims
at comparing strings that contain several words. It can therefore be used for record
level comparisons. Similar to the concepts of Term Frequency (TF) and Inverse Doc-
ument Frequency (IDF) [169], as used in information retrieval, it gives weights to
words according to their overall occurrence in a database. The similarity between two
strings is calculated as the highest similarity between pairs of words in the strings.
2.1.3 Classification
Assuming k attributes have been compared, the outcome of the comparison step is a
vector of similarity values (this is typically called ‘comparison vector’), [s1, . . . , sk], for
each candidate record pair. These vectors are used to classify record pairs as matches,
non-matches, or possible matches, depending upon the decision model used [76].
Record linkage classification techniques can be broadly grouped into four categories:
threshold-based, probabilistic, rule-based, and machine learning-based.
Threshold-based classification provides a simple way to classify record pairs
based on the calculated overall similarity values of the pairs [25]. The similarity
values contained in the comparison vector are summed into a single overall similar-
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ity, S = ∑ki=1 si, for each candidate record pair. This similarity value is then used to
determine into which class the record pair belongs to based on the threshold values.
A widely used approach to record linkage classification is the probabilistic method
developed by Fellegi and Sunter in the 1960s [65]. In this model, the likelihood that
two records correspond to a match or non-match is modelled based on a-priori er-
ror estimates in the data, as well as frequency distributions of individual attribute
values, and the approximate similarities si calculated in the comparison step [29].
Extensions to the basic Fellegi and Sunter approach include the use of the Expecta-
tion Maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate the conditional probabilities required
by the method in an unsupervised fashion [143, 200, 201, 203].
Rule-based classification techniques (also known as deterministic techniques [75])
use sets of rules to classify record pairs [42, 84, 147]. Generating rules is often a
time-consuming and complex process, since it requires manual efforts to build and
maintain rule systems. An alternative is to learn rules from training data [29].
To accurately classify record pairs, many recently developed classification tech-
niques for record linkage employ supervised machine learning approaches [16, 62,
63]. These supervised approaches require training data with known class labels for
matches and non-matches to train the decision model. Once trained, the model
can be used to classify the remaining unlabelled pairs of records. Support vector
machines and decision trees are two popular supervised learning techniques that
have been employed for record linkage [16, 25, 62]. One limitation with supervised
learning techniques is, however, that they require training data, which are not always
available in record linkage applications, especially in privacy-preserving settings [29].
Alternatively unsupervised learning techniques can be employed, such as clus-
tering, which do not require training data to classify record pairs [147]. Cluster-
ing groups record pairs that are similar, such that each cluster consists of records
that refer to one real-world entity [44, 142]. Recently developed collective [15, 100],
group [153], and graph-based [85, 147] classification techniques, while achieving high
linkage quality, are not scalable to very large databases due to their quadratic or
higher computational complexity. Active learning [6] is a semi-supervised learning
technique that is being used for manual classification required in clerical review.
2.1.4 Evaluation
Evaluating the performance of record linkage algorithms in terms of how efficient
and effective they are is the final step in the linkage process. The efficiency of the
linkage provides a measure of how scalable a linkage technique is on large real-
world applications with potentially millions of records, while the effectiveness of a
linkage exercise is measured by the accuracy of the classification model used. A
variety of evaluation measures has been proposed that can be used to assess the
scalability [30, 33] and quality [33] of the linkage process (as detailed in Chapter 5).
Scalability can be evaluated using measures that are dependent on the computing
platform and networking infrastructure used, or measures that are based on the num-
ber of candidate record pairs generated. The quality of a linkage can be measured by
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Figure 2.2: Outline of the general privacy-preserving record linkage process as de-
scribed in Section 2.2 (taken from [193]).
using the metrics commonly employed in both information retrieval, and in machine
learning and data mining [140, 161]. Accuracy, precision, recall, and F-measure are
such commonly used quality measures. However, accuracy is not a suitable quality
measure because record linkage is generally a very imbalanced classification prob-
lem with many non-matching record pairs compared to matching pairs [33] that can
significantly distort accuracy values. Precision, recall and the F-measure are more
suitable for measuring linkage quality [29].
2.2 An Overview of PPRL
As the scenarios in Section 1.2 have shown, the exchange of private or confiden-
tial data between organizations is often not feasible due to privacy concerns, legal
restrictions, or because of commercial interests. Databases from different organiza-
tions therefore need to be linked in such ways that no sensitive information is being
revealed to any of the parties involved in a cross-organizational linkage project, and
no adversary is able to learn anything about these sensitive data. The increasing
need of being able to link databases across organizations while, at the same time,
preserving the privacy of the entities stored in these databases, has introduced a new
research problem called privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) [37, 78, 194].
The privacy-preserving requirement in the record linkage process adds a third
challenge, privacy, to the two main challenges of scalability and linkage quality that
were discussed in Section 2.1. The question now arises how to conduct the steps in
the record linkage process (as was shown in Figure 2.1) in a privacy-preserving set-
ting. Privacy needs to be considered in all steps of the record linkage process, making
the task of linking databases across organizations more difficult. Figure 2.2 outlines
the record linkage process within a privacy-preserving context. Several privacy tech-
niques have been used for PPRL ranging from SMC-based techniques to perturbation
techniques such as k-anonymity, reference values, Bloom filters, differential privacy,
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and random noise, which we will discuss in detail in Chapter 4. Adversaries in PPRL
are assumed to follow different models including the most commonly used honest
but curious (HBC) and malicious models which will be described in Chapter 4.
Because data pre-processing can be conducted independently at each data source,
it is not part of the techniques that are required for PPRL. However, it is important
that all data sources conduct the same data pre-processing steps on the data they
will use for linking. Some exchange of information between the data sources about
what data pre-processing approaches they use, as well as which attributes they have
in common that are to be used for the linkage, is therefore required.
As was discussed in Section 2.1.1, the blocking step is crucial to make record
linkage across large databases scalable. This also applies to PPRL, but blocking for
PPRL needs to be conducted in such a way that no information that would allow to
infer individual records in the databases is revealed to any party or to an external
adversary. The scalability challenge of PPRL has been addressed by several recent
approaches using private blocking techniques, as we will discuss in Section 3.4.
The attribute values used for comparing records often contain variations and
errors, and therefore simply encoding these values with a standard cryptographic
technique and comparing the encoded values will not lead to high linkage quality
for PPRL [37, 152]. Since a small variation in an attribute value leads to a completely
different encoded value [37], only exactly matching attribute values can be identified
with such a simple approach. Therefore, an approach for securely and efficiently
calculating the approximate matching of attribute values is required. Several of the
approximate comparison functions described in Section 2.1.2 have been adapted into
a PPRL context as will be discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
As we discussed in Section 2.1.3, the output of the comparison step are the calcu-
lated similarity values for each compared record pair that will be used to classify the
pairs into matches, non-matches, or possible matches. In a PPRL context, this classi-
fication needs to be conducted in such a way that no party learns anything about the
records in the other parties’ databases that do not match, such as similarity values for
certain attributes of individual record pairs, which record pairs have low similarities,
or even the distribution of similarity values across all compared record pairs.
The evaluation of linkage quality in a privacy-preserving context is challenging,
because in PPRL access to the actual record values is unlikely to be possible as this
would reveal private or confidential information about these records. How to evalu-
ate linkage quality as well as privacy protection is still an open challenge, as we will
discuss further in Section 4.3.
2.3 Summary
We have presented the background material to understand the research problem by
outlining the process and techniques used in the record linkage process, and the
challenges posed when privacy is considered in the process. In the following chapter
we will review the literature in PPRL.
Chapter 3
Related Work
A study of related work in privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) is reviewed in
this chapter. We conducted a survey of around 40 existing PPRL techniques which
are then characterized according to the taxonomy (as described in Chapter 4) in
Table 4.1 on Page 42 in order to identify future research directions in PPRL.
3.1 Introduction
Research directions for PPRL were provided in [24, 40] stating the needs, problems
and current approaches in this area, while various techniques have been developed
addressing the research problem [58, 102, 184, 194]. In the following we provide a
review of existing PPRL techniques. We highlight important terms in the techniques
that relate to our taxonomy we propose in Chapter 4 in italic font.
We categorize PPRL techniques into three generations according to the factors
that have been considered. These three generations are (1) techniques that consider
exact matching of attribute values only; (2) techniques that can conduct approximate
matching to improve the quality of linkage; and (3) techniques that also address
scalability while conducting approximate matching. We present PPRL techniques
under each category in a chronological order to study how the techniques have been
developed developed over time. Each technique is given an identifier composed
of the first three letters of the first author and the last two digits of the year of
publication, which is then used in Table 4.1 to identify individual techniques.
3.2 Exact Matching PPRL Techniques
The first generation of PPRL techniques focus only on the exact matching of records.
Qua98: This is the first approach to PPRL proposed in the 1990s by Quantin et
al. [19, 60, 158, 159] within the framework of epidemiological follow-up studies. This
approach is applicable for linking more than two databases by using a third party for
conducting the linkage. One-way secure hash algorithms (SHA) are used with two pads
added in order to avoid dictionary attacks. The comparison is limited to likely pairs
of matches by using a blocking method based on phonetic encodings. Record linkage
is then performed using a statistical model (probabilistic classification) with weights
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estimated by the EM algorithm. An empirical evaluation conducted using real health
datasets showed high linkage quality of the approach.
Van00: A secure three-party approach proposed by Van Eycken et al. [187] in
2000, is based on creating a single hash pseudonym for maintaining privacy. In this
approach, both database owners merge the values of their linkage attributes into a
single string (record-based) which is then double-hashed using a secure hash function
and a public key encryption algorithm in order to prevent dictionary attacks. These
hash strings are then used by a third party to classify the records using a deterministic
classification technique. Experiments conducted on real health datasets showed that
the accuracy of the classification increases if the concatenated string includes the full
date of birth value.
OKe04: In 2004, a multi-party SMC-based approach was proposed by O’Keefe et
al. [152] for PPRL, as well as privacy-preserving extraction of a cohort of individu-
als’ data from a database, without revealing the identity of these individuals to the
database owners. The authors assumed an untrusted third party, in that the only
way for the third party to obtain identifying information is through collusion with
a database owner. The approach improves on the security and information leakage
characteristics of several previous protocols, including Agrawal et al.’s [1] two-party
secure intersection and equi-join protocols that use commutative encryption schemes.
However, variations and (typographical) errors in the linkage attributes are not con-
sidered (exact matching), and the protocol is computationally more expensive than
PPRL solutions that use perturbation-based privacy techniques (as will be discussed
in Chapter 5).
Fre05: Privacy-preserving information retrieval (PPIR) is a research area related
to PPRL, whereby PPIR employs a single query record while PPRL employs all
records as match queries. Freedman et al. [69] in 2005 presented an efficient two-
party privacy-preserving keyword search algorithm for PPIR. The proposed approach
assumes both HBC and malicious adversarial models. Their approach uses SMC tech-
niques (homomorphic encryption) and oblivious pseudo random functions. The server
holds a database of n pairs (xi, ri), each consisting of a keyword xi and its record
identifier (payload) ri. The client’s input is a search keyword w. If there is a pair
where the keyword xi is equal to the search keyword w (i.e., exact matching), then the
corresponding record identifier ri will be returned to the client.
Lai06: Lai et al. [125] in 2006 proposed a multi-party protocol that uses Bloom
filters for private matching without a third party for performing the linkage. In their
approach, all the records are first converted into a Bloom filter bit array, and each
party partitions its Bloom filter into the number of parties involved in the linkage
and sends a segment to the corresponding party. The segments received by a party
are combined using a conjunction (logical AND) operation. The resulting combined
Bloom filter segments are then exchanged between the parties. Each party checks its
own full Bloom filter with the result, and if the membership test is successful then it
is considered to be a match. Though the cost of this approach is low since the compu-
tation is completely distributed between the parties and the creation and processing
of Bloom filters are very fast, the approach can only perform exact matching.
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Kan08: A multi-party approach based on a generalization technique (k-anonymity)
for person-specific biomedical data was introduced by Kantarcioglu et al. [101] in 2008.
This approach performs efficient secure joins of encrypted databases by a third party
without decrypting or inferring the contents of the joined records. It is guaranteed
that each record can be linked to no less than k entities in the databases. The database
owners k-anonymize their databases and send the encrypted databases to the third
party. When the third party performs a join, it constructs buckets corresponding to
each combination of k-anonymous values. For each bucket, the third party performs
a secure equi-join. This approach is only applicable to categorical data.
Web12: Similar to Van Eycken et al.’s approach, a simple heuristic method for
privately linking medical data in a three-party protocol was presented by Weber et
al. [197] in 2012. The authors experimentally validated the hypothesis that using
a concatenated identifier made of the first two characters of the given name and
surname attributes along with the date of birth attribute as the linkage attribute
provides better results in terms of sensitivity and specificity, compared to performing
the linkage based on the identifier consisting of patients’ full names and date of birth.
This approach is useful when health policies preclude the full exchange of identifiers
that is commonly required by other more sophisticated algorithms.
3.3 Approximate Matching PPRL Techniques
Techniques in the second generation of PPRL techniques look into the approximate
matching of attribute values to remedy the problem of errors and variations in real-
world data.
Du01: Du et al. [53] in 2001 suggested a secure approach for private remote
database access with an untrusted third party that is assumed to not collude with
any of the two database owners. They propose four different SMC-based e-commerce
models for secure remote database access, all of which require privacy of customer
data. The four models are the Private Information Matching (PIM), the PIM from
Public Database (PIMPD), the Secure Storage Outsourcing (SSO), and the Secure
Storage and Computing Outsourcing (SSCO). Approximate record matching is per-
formed using distance functions and Monte Carlo techniques. Random values are
used to disguise the query and the intermediate results. The minimum value of the
final distance values of the records in the database, as compared with the query, is
computed to identify the closest match.
Ata03: A two-party protocol was proposed by Atallah et al. [7] in 2003 where the
edit distance algorithm, as presented in Section 2.1.2, is modified for providing pri-
vacy to genome sequence approximate comparisons in the area of bioinformatics. The
three types of edit operations are insertions, deletions and substitutions of characters
a and b, and each operation has an associated cost, namely I(a), D(a) and S(a, b).
The smallest overall cost of transforming one sequence into another is calculated as
the edit distance. The dynamic programming matrix M is split across the two parties
such that M = MA + MB. At each step, the minimum of three costs needs to be de-
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termined without revealing at which position the minimum occurred. This approach
is aimed towards sequence comparisons and has a considerable communication cost.
One communication step is required for each element in the matrix M, which is
quadratic in the length of the sequences that are compared. It is therefore unsuited
for tasks with large databases.
Rav04: In 2004, Ravikumar et al. [165] used SMC techniques for secure compu-
tation of several distance functions. In their work, they presented methods for ap-
proximate comparison of values using string distance metrics, specifically TF-IDF [169],
SoftTF-IDF [43] and the Euclidean distance. They use a secure stochastic dot product
protocol for secure computation of these distance metrics in a two-party setting. The
use of SMC techniques for achieving privacy makes the protocol computationally
intensive. To overcome this drawback, they use sampling techniques to control the
amount of communication between the two parties. Experiments on the public Cora
bibliographic dataset [29] showed high linkage quality with average precision of 0.85
after 1, 000 samples for vectors of length 10, 000 (0.1%).
Chu04: A token-based three-party approach suggested by Churches and Chris-
ten [37] in 2004 uses hash-encoded q-grams to achieve approximate private linkage. Sub-
sets of q-gram sets are used to calculate the Dice coefficient between attribute values.
All matching hash values are compared by a third party using extra information, such
as the number of q-grams contained in a subset and the total number of q-grams com-
prising an attribute value. A threshold-based classification is used for deciding which
record pairs are matches. This is a costly approach because of the power set gener-
ation of q-gram subsets it requires. Another drawback of this approach is that it is
susceptible to frequency attacks [184].
Sch09: An approach based on a combination of Bloom filters and q-grams (to fa-
cilitate approximate matching) was proposed by Schnell et al. [174] in 2009. The q-
grams of linkage attribute values of each record are mapped to one Bloom filter bit
array (record-based comparison) using multiple cryptographic hash functions. Then
the Bloom filters are compared in a bit-wise manner by a third party, and similarity
between Bloom filters is calculated according to the Dice-coefficient, because this sim-
ilarity function is insensitive to many matching zeros in long Bloom filters. Bloom
filters are efficient to generate and compare, and this approach supports approximate
matching of values as well, rendering it applicable to real-world conditions. How-
ever, due to the use of q-grams this approach is only applicable to matching of string
attribute values. This approach can be compromised by a cryptanalysis attack given
the knowledge of certain parameters, as shown by Kuzu et al. [122].
Dur10: Durham et al. [57] in 2010 adapted Schnell et al.’s Bloom filters-based
approach [174] in their work to evaluate three different PPRL approaches. They
investigated (1) deterministic classification techniques for exact comparison, (2) proba-
bilistic classification techniques for exact comparison, and (3) probabilistic classification
techniques for approximate comparison. Eleven attributes from a clinical dataset from
the Vanderbilt University Medical Center were used for this study. The empirical
evaluation of these three approaches indicated that approximate comparison using
probabilistic classification technique [65] outperformed the other two approaches.
§3.4 Scalable and Approximate Matching PPRL Techniques 27
Li11: An approach for privacy-preserving group linkage (PPGL) has been in-
troduced by Li et al. [128] in 2011 to measure the similarity of groups of records
rather than individuals. A threshold-based PPGL method is proposed to overcome
the problem of group membership inference attacks which could be employed to
learn the member records of the other party’s groups even though the groups are not
linked. K-combinations of records are first extracted from the groups and then SMC
techniques are used to privately calculate the set intersection of the k-combinations.
The Jaccard coefficient is used at group level to calculate the similarity between two
groups. In order to support approximate matching of groups of records, the Cosine sim-
ilarity is employed in a bipartite graph to calculate the similarity of pairs of records
between two groups. Both parties only learn the verdict of whether the two groups
are matched or not, instead of learning the group similarity value. However, this
approach has an exponential complexity in the size of the databases.
Jon13: A group level anonymous matching approach for two-party PPRL was
proposed by Jones et al. [99] in 2013. In their work only group level data (generaliza-
tion) are revealed between the database owners, not the individual level data. The
database owners concatenate the linkage attributes and generate a hash key for each
record, which is then used to calculate the group ID based on the predetermined
number of groups. They repeat this process several times with different salt values
added at the end of the concatenated string to generate a different hash key at each it-
eration and calculate the group ID for each record. Finally, the records are compared
based on the group IDs calculated at each iteration. If a record from one dataset is
matched with a record from the other dataset in more than a certain number of group
IDs, then the records are classified as a match. This method was empirically tested
on real-world data (to match voter data and Facebook data), and the results showed a
high accuracy of 95% while generating the same level of uncertainty about individual
records as theoretically predicted.
Kum13: An effective three-party human-machine hybrid system for PPRL was
recently introduced by Kum et al. [121]. Frequent human interaction is required in the
linkage process to improve the quality of linkage results. In human interactive record
linkage, people are involved in fine tuning the false matches as well as examining
the uncertain record pairs to make classification decisions [119]. In this work, the
authors adapted three privacy techniques which are decoupling sensitive data, adding
random values, and recoding the values to ensure that no sensitive values are disclosed
during any such human interaction. This is the first work in the direction of privacy-
preserving interactive record linkage and more research is required for investigating
on how much information is needed for tuning the linkage results by an expert
without any potential harm that can result from disclosing sensitive information.
3.4 Scalable and Approximate Matching PPRL Techniques
In this section, we survey the third generation of PPRL techniques that address scala-
bility to large databases while allowing the approximate matching of attribute values.
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Son00: The approach of Song et al. [178] in 2000 in a two-party context takes into
consideration the problem of approximate matching by calculating encoded permutations
of values using pseudo random functions for private searching of documents by certain
query values. The approximate comparison on advanced queries containing multiple
words is processed based on individual words (i.e., field-based). If an encoded query
value matches at least one of the encoded permutations (rule-based), then the pair of
values can be considered as a match since the permutation occurred due to a typo-
graphical error. The use of an encoded index data structure-based blocking provides
an efficient search when the data size is large. However, it is practically impossible
to predict all possible permutations by pre-computing all types of errors and varia-
tions that might occur in real-world applications. The approach is also susceptible to
frequency attacks if a certain number of words are being queried.
All05: Al-Lawati et al. [3] proposed a secure three-party private blocking proto-
col in 2005 for achieving high performance private record linkage by using secure
hash-encoding for computing the TF-IDF distance in a secure fashion. In their work,
three methods have been explored which are simple blocking, record-aware blocking,
and frugal third party blocking. Simple blocking arranges hash signatures in blocks
where the similarity of a pair may be computed more than once if they are in more
than one common block. Record-aware blocking solves this issue by using an iden-
tifier with every hash signature to indicate the record it belongs to. However, these
methods provide a trade-off between privacy, and computation and communication
costs. The third method, the frugal third party blocking, uses a secure set intersection
(SSI) SMC protocol to reduce the cost of transferring the whole databases to the third
party by first identifying the hash signatures that occur in both databases.
Sca07: Scannapieco et al. [170] in 2007 presented an approach that provides pri-
vacy for both data and schema matching without revealing any information. This
approach transforms records into objects in an embedding metric space using a set of
reference values, while preserving the distances between record values. These dis-
tances are then sent to a third party to perform the linkage. To achieve secure schema
matching, it is assumed that the third party holds a global schema to which the
schemas of the database owners are mapped. A greedy re-sampling heuristic based
on the SparseMap [87] algorithm allows the mapping of values into a vector space
at low computational costs. However, the experimental results presented in [170]
indicate the trade-off between a more efficient mapping and the resulting quality.
Ina08: A hybrid approach that combines generalization and cryptographic techniques
to solve the PPRL problem was proposed by Inan et al. [91] in 2008. This method uses
a blocking approach based on value generalization hierarchies and the record pairs
that cannot be blocked are compared in a computationally expensive SMC com-
putation step using cryptographic techniques. This approach manages to perform
approximate matching both due to the use of the generalization scheme in the blocking
step, as well as due to the SMC step. However, the blocking method is only useful
with attributes that can form hierarchies.
Pan09: Pang et al. [154] in 2009 suggested a protocol based on a set of reference
strings that are available to both the database owners. The database owners com-
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pute the distance between the reference strings and their attribute values (assumed
to be strings), and send the results to a third party that sums these distance values
and finds the minimum distance. Based on the triangular property of distance-based
measures [131], if this minimum distance value lies below a certain threshold, then
the two original strings are classified as a match. To reduce the size of the match-
ing space, nearest neighbour clustering is applied. The performance of the protocol
depends crucially on the set of reference strings. Increasing the size of the reference
table improves the linkage quality to some extent, but this leads to longer runtime.
Yak09: Based on the work by Scannapieco et al. [170], a similar approach was pro-
posed by Yakout et al. [210] in 2009 which uses Scannapieco’s vector representation of
attribute values and eliminates the need of a third party for performing PPRL. Com-
plex numbers are calculated to create a complex plane, and in the first step the likely
matched pairs are computed by moving an adjustable width slab within this com-
plex plane. Euclidean distance is used to measure the approximate similarity between
records. Based on these distances, similar record pairs are classified as those that are
within the slab width. These similar pairs are compared in detail in the second step
using a SMC-based secure scalar product protocol based on randomized vectors. This
is an improvement over Scannapieco’s work in the privacy and scalability aspects.
Ina10: Inan et al. [92] in 2010 presented a hybrid approach for PPRL that com-
bines differential privacy and cryptographic methods in a two-party setting. It uses multi-
dimensional blocking based on specialized tree data structure (kd-tree, BSP-tree, R*-
tree, etc.) to improve scalability. Previous work presented by Inan et al. [91] focused
on generalization based on k-anonymity to provide a scalable solution, which does
not provide sufficient privacy. The work based on differential privacy provides strong
privacy guarantees and a trade-off between accuracy, privacy, and scalability [92].
Haw11: Hawashin et al. [81] in 2011 proposed a private three-party approach for
semantic similarity joins using long string attributes (corresponding to record-based
comparison), such as paper abstracts, product descriptions, and user feedbacks. The
two database owners generate their term by long string value matrices, such that each
row represents a term (word) and each column represents a long string value, and
calculate TF-IDF weights to perform unsupervised feature selection. The list of selected
features along with some random features are sent to a third party that returns the
intersection of these two feature lists. The database owners then send the selected
feature values of the records with randomly generated records to the third party that
performs the semantic join operation using methods such as diffusion maps [45],
latent semantic indexing [51], and locality preserving projection [82], and classifies
the pairs as matches that have a Cosine similarity greater than or equal to a minimum
threshold value. The results of the experimental evaluation showed that the diffusion
maps method provided the best performance results in terms of F-measure [81].
Moh11: Mohammed et al. [145] in 2011 proposed a two-party approach for effi-
cient PPRL using k-anonymity-based generalization. This work is based on the secure
DkA framework proposed by Jiang and Clifton [94] for integrating two private data
tables into a k-anonymous table. However, the DkA framework is not scalable to
large databases. Mohammed et al. presented two scalable methods to securely inte-
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grate private data from multiple data sources based on the HBC and malicious adver-
sarial models. The database owners find the global winner candidate with the best
score that provides less information to the other party according to some criteria,
and then perform a top-down specialization on that candidate for generalizing the
databases. The well-known C4.5 classifier is used to recursively block (generalized
buckets) and classify the records. To prevent malicious parties from sending false
scores, game-theoretic concepts are used. Empirical studies conducted on real-world
census dataset [150] showed that this method outperforms DkA in terms of efficiency.
Kar11a: A three-party approach to PPRL consisting of a secure blocking compo-
nent based on phonetic encoding (Soundex [23]) algorithm and a secure matching
component where approximate matching is performed using a distance-based method
is presented by Karakasidis et al. [103] in 2011. This approach uses a secure version
of the Levenshtein edit distance [148] function on Bloom filters data structure. Field-
based comparisons between records are conducted and they are classified using a
threshold-based model. The experimental study conducted on a synthetic dataset gener-
ated using the Febrl [27] tool showed that the approach outperforms the original edit
distance algorithm in terms of complexity (due to the secure blocking component)
while preserving privacy, and it also offers almost the same matching accuracy.
Kar11b: Karakasidis et al. [105] in 2011 proposed three different faked random
values injection techniques for phonetic-based PPRL [103]. These techniques are the
Uniform Cipher Text/Uniform Plain Text, Uniform Cipher Texts by Swapping Plain
Texts, and k-anonymous Cipher Texts. In the first method, fake values are added such
that both the actual values and the Soundex [23] phonetic values exhibit uniform
distributions. This increases the complexity due to massively oversized datasets. The
second method overcomes this drawback by modifying the frequency of attribute
values such that all Soundex values occur equally frequent. This does not create
an excessive number of faked records as with the first method. However, the at-
tribute values that were removed will not participate in the linkage process. The
third method aims at creating datasets where each Soundex code reflects at least k
attribute values. This work is experimentally evaluated using a real-world Australian
telephone database. It is stated that in terms of information gain, using a Soundex-based
fake injection strategy offers adequate privacy for private blocking [105].
Dur12: Durham [56] in 2012 studied the Bloom filter-based approach pro-
posed by Schnell et al. [174, 175] in more detail. In this work the author proposed
how record-level Bloom filter encoding can be done effectively in order to overcome
the problem of cryptanalysis attack associated with field-level Bloom filter encod-
ing [122], and also used locality sensitive hash (LSH) functions for private blocking
to reduce the computational complexity. A single Bloom filter is used to encode the
entire record by using weighted random bits selection from each field-level Bloom fil-
ter. A probabilistic method based on agreement and disagreement weights is used for
classification. Empirical studies conducted on real datasets showed that this approach
outperforms existing Bloom filter-based approaches.
Bon12: Bonomi et al. [18] in 2012 proposed a new embedding strategy for PPRL
based on Scannapieco et al.’s [170] approach using q-grams and differential privacy. In
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contrast to using random strings to generate the common base among the parties,
this approach uses frequent q-grams mined from their own databases under the dif-
ferential privacy framework as a base for secure embedding. Frequent q-grams are
mined using a top-down approach on a prefix tree. The database owners then map
their attribute strings into this common base and send the embedded space to a third
party that can calculate the euclidean distance between vectors in the embedded space
to classify the record pairs using a threshold. Experiments conducted on real datasets
showed that the approach achieves better scalability and provides formal privacy
proof of differential privacy while resulting in comparable linkage quality.
Kar12: In 2012 a three-party private blocking approach based on k-anonymous
(generalization) and reference values was proposed by Karakasidis et al. [104]. Initially
clusters are created for a set of reference values that are shared by the database owners
using k-nearest neighbor clustering such that each cluster consists of at least k elements
in the reference set. Each database owner then assigns the blocking key values in
their data to the respective clusters according to their Dice-coefficient similarity. These
clusters are sent to a third party that merges the corresponding clusters to gener-
ate candidate record pairs. A main drawback of this approach is that it requires
calculation of similarities between each record and all the used reference values.
Kuz13: Recently, Kuzu et al. [124] introduced a private blocking approach based
on hierarchical clustering and differential privacy. Initially global clusters are generated
for a set of reference values using hierarchical clustering. Then each database owner
assigns their records into these global clusters based on their similarity. Differential
privacy is used by adding random noise drawn from a Laplace distribution to ensure
privacy when these clusters are released. A three-party SMC is then used in the
second step to compare and classify the candidate record pairs. This approach is
computationally expensive in terms of similarity calculations.
Sch13: A recent work by Schnell [172] demonstrated the scalability of their earlier
Bloom filter-based approach [174] by using a private blocking method based on multibit
trees [117]. Multibit trees work in three steps: First, the Bloom filter vectors in one
dataset (optimally the larger dataset) are grouped into bins depending on the number
of bits set to 1 in the vectors. A multibit tree is built within each bin in the second step
and finally the Bloom filters in the second dataset are searched in the trees based on
the Jaccard similarity to generate candidate vector pairs. Experiments were conducted
on synthetic datasets and the results showed the scalability of this approach. Schnell
et al.’s Bloom filter-based approach [174] was also empirically evaluated on large real-
world hospital admissions datasets (comprising over 26 millions records) combined
with a standard blocking method [65] in a latest work by Randall et al. [164] to
illustrate the feasibility of this approach on large scale datasets.
Kar13: PPRL in a distributed framework using LSH was studied by Karapiperis
et al. [107] in 2013. Data are first encoded into Bloom filters and sent to a trusted
third party that utilizes a map/reduce system in order to distribute the workload
efficiently. The third party maps Bloom filters into a low dimensional representation,
LSH, based on which Bloom filters are distributed into different reduce tasks. Bloom






























Figure 3.1: Research trends in PPRL. The arrows show the trends towards an optimal
solution represented by a circle in the center of the triangle. The techniques that are
proposed in this thesis are marked with an asterisk (*).
reduce task. Then pairs are formulated and compared using the Jaccard distance
metric in order to be classified as matched pairs or not according to a threshold. As
stated by the authors, optimizing workload distribution by measuring computational
cost without overhead in the distributed framework requires further research.
Wen14: The latest work in PPRL by Wen et al. [198] presents efficient two-party
protocols based on Oblivious Bloom filter intersection (OBI) and private set intersection
protocols for exact and approximate private linkage. In their work they extended the
OBI algorithm by including record identifiers in the garbled Bloom filter to enable the
identification of matching records. The second protocol is built on top of this to sup-
port approximate matching by incorporating LSH. They conducted experiments on
synthetic datasets and the results showed the efficiency and accuracy of the protocols.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a survey of historical and current state-of-the-art
techniques for PPRL. Figure 3.1 reflects our view of existing PPRL techniques and
the trends in the field of PPRL based on our research in terms of the three main
properties of PPRL which are privacy, linkage quality, and scalability. As the fig-
ure illustrates, more research in recent times starts focusing towards the center of
the triangle by addressing all three properties. We will next characterize the tech-
niques presented in this chapter according to the taxonomy we propose for PPRL
and analyze research directions in detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
A Taxonomy of Privacy-Preserving
Record Linkage Techniques
In this chapter we present a taxonomy of privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL)
that characterizes PPRL techniques along fifteen dimensions. We characterize exist-
ing techniques (surveyed in the previous chapter) along this taxonomy and summa-
rize them in Table 4.1. We then highlight shortcomings of current techniques based
on this characterization and discuss avenues for research in Section 4.3.
4.1 Introduction
Several surveys on privacy-preserving string matching have been presented in the
literature [58, 102, 184, 194]. Trepetin [184] theoretically analyzed four different tech-
niques for anonymized string matching and concluded that many existing techniques
fall short in providing a sound solution either because they are not scalable to large
databases, or because they are unable to provide both linkage quality and privacy
guarantees.
Similar conclusions were also drawn in [102] and [194], which both survey sev-
eral existing techniques for private matching ranging from classical record matching
techniques enhanced by SMC techniques to provide privacy, to advanced solutions
developed specific to solve the PPRL problem.
In Durham et al.’s [58] recent survey on privacy-preserving string comparators,
six existing comparators that can be used in PPRL for private comparison have been
experimentally evaluated in terms of their complexity, correctness, and privacy. The
results show the trade-offs of the six surveyed string comparators among the three
properties of PPRL.
While all these surveys analyze and compare several private comparison func-
tions, we aim to develop a taxonomy that characterizes all aspects of PPRL, and to
provide a comprehensive analysis of current approaches to PPRL along this taxon-
omy. Illustrating the gaps in current approaches to PPRL will help to identify future
research directions for PPRL.
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Comparison:
− Exact matching
− Approximate matching 
(approx) 
Classification:
− Rules based (rule)
− Probabilistic (prob)
− Ranking (rank)
− Threshold based (thresh) 
− Machine learning (ml)
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Figure 4.1: The fifteen dimensions used to characterize privacy-preserving record
linkage techniques (taken from [193]). Abbreviations shown in brackets are those
used in Table 4.1 on page 42.
4.2 A Taxonomy of PPRL Techniques
In this section we describe a taxonomy of PPRL techniques that includes fifteen di-
mensions of PPRL which we categorize into five main topics, as is illustrated in
Figure 4.1. Combined, these fifteen dimensions provide a comprehensive characteri-
zation of PPRL techniques. In the following subsections we discuss each dimension
in detail, and we provide an overview of the major methodologies or techniques
applied in these dimensions.
4.2.1 Privacy Aspects
The privacy requirements for linking databases across organizations consider the
assessment of three dimensions of PPRL techniques: how many parties are involved
in a cross-organizational linkage, the adversarial model assumed, and the actual
techniques employed in a PPRL approach to provide privacy and confidentiality.
4.2.1.1 Number of parties
Solutions to PPRL can be classified into those that require a third party for perform-
ing the linkage and those that do not. The former are known as ‘three-party pro-
tocols’ and the latter as ‘two-party protocols’ [24, 28, 194]. In three-party protocols,
a (trusted) third party (which we call the ‘linkage unit’) is involved in conducting
the linkage, while in two-party protocols only the two database owners participate
in the PPRL process. The advantage of two-party over three-party protocols is that
the former are more secure because there is no possibility of collusion between one
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of the database owners and the linkage unit. However, two-party protocols generally
require more complex techniques to ensure that the two database owners cannot in-
fer any sensitive information from each other during the linkage process. A further
characterization of PPRL techniques is if they can be extended to the efficient linking
of data from more than two data sources (multi-party) or not.
4.2.1.2 Adversarial model
PPRL techniques proposed in the literature generally consider one of the two adver-
sarial models that are commonly used in the field of cryptography, and especially in
the area of secure multi-party computation (SMC) [73, 78, 135].
1. Honest-but-curious behavior (HBC):
HBC parties are curious in that they try to find out as much as they can about
the other party’s inputs while following the protocol [78, 135]. A protocol
is secure in the HBC perspective if and only if all parties involved have no
new knowledge at the end of the protocol above what they would have learned
from the output, which is generally the record pairs classified as matches. Most
of the PPRL solutions proposed in the literature assume the HBC adversarial
model. Note that this adversarial model does not prevent parties from col-
luding with each other with the aim to learn about another party’s sensitive
information [135].
2. Malicious behavior: In contrast to HBC parties, malicious parties or adver-
saries can behave arbitrarily. In particular, malicious parties may refuse to
participate in the protocol, not follow the protocol in the specified way, choose
arbitrary values for their data inputs, or abort the protocol at any time [134].
Proving privacy under this model for evaluation of a privacy technique is more
difficult compared to the HBC model, because there exist additional and po-
tentially unpredictable ways for malicious parties to deviate from the specified
steps of the protocol that are undetectable by an outside observer [22, 73, 135].
4.2.1.3 Privacy techniques
A variety of privacy techniques has been employed to facilitate PPRL. The major
approaches are:
1. Secure hash-encoding: This technique has been one of the first to be used
for PPRL [19, 60, 158, 159]. One-way hash-encoding functions [171] convert a
string value into a hash-code (for example ‘peter’ into ‘51dc3dc01ea0’) such that
having access to only a hash-code will make it nearly impossible with current
computing technology to learn its original string value. The Message Digest
(like MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithms (like SHA-1 and SHA-2) are the most
widely known and used one-way hash algorithms [116].
In order to prevent dictionary attacks, where an adversary hash-encodes val-
ues from a large list of common words using existing hash-encoding functions
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until a matching hash-code is found, a keyed hash-encoding approach can be
used which significantly improves the security of this privacy technique. The
Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) function [116] is one such ap-
proach. Without knowing the secret key, a dictionary attack will not be success-
ful. However, frequency attacks are still possible, where the frequency distribu-
tion of a set of hash-codes is matched with the distribution of known attribute
values, such as surnames [136].
A major problem when using hash-encoded values for matching is, however,
that only exact matches can be found [60]. Even a single character difference in
a string that is encoded will lead to a completely different hash-code.
2. Secure multi-party computation (SMC): The basic idea of SMC is that a com-
putation is secure if at the end of the computation no party knows anything
except its own input and the final results of the computed function [41, 73, 135].
Yao [212] first proposed the secure two-party computation problem and devel-
oped a secure solution. Goldreich et al. [74] extended this approach to sev-
eral parties, and they developed a general framework for SMC. SMC employs
some form of encryption schemes to allow secure computation. The two major
cryptographic encryption schemes used for secure computation in the PPRL
literature are commutative [1] and homomorphic [114] encryption. The secure
set union, secure set intersection, and secure scalar product, are the most com-
monly used SMC techniques [41, 171]. A drawback of these SMC techniques is
that they are computationally expensive. Several works in recent times have de-
veloped efficient SMC techniques for privacy-preserving data mining [4, 5, 64].
3. Pseudo random functions: A Pseudo Random Function (PRF) is a determinis-
tic function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n which is efficient (computable in polynomial
time) and takes two inputs x, k ∈ {0, 1}n. A PRF is a secure algorithm that
when given an n-bit seed k, and an n-bit argument x, it returns an n-bit string
fk(x) such that it is infeasible to distinguish fk(x) for random k from a truly
random function [137]. In PPRL, PRFs that have a long period and that are
not predictable can be used to generate random secret values to be shared by a
group of parties [69, 152, 178].
4. Phonetic encoding: A phonetic encoding algorithm, such as Soundex, NYSIIS
or Double-Metaphone [23], groups values together that have a similar pronun-
ciation. The main advantage of using a phonetic encoding is that it inherently
provides privacy [105], reduces the number of comparisons and thus increases
scalability [23], and supports approximate matching by its tolerance against
data errors [23, 105]. However, they are language dependent and only a limited
work has been done on non-English phonetic encodings [160, 173].
5. Reference values: The use of reference values, which are common to all database
owners, has been applied in several PPRL approaches [104, 154, 170, 210]. Such
reference lists can be constructed either with random faked values, or values
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that for example are taken from a public telephone directory, such as all unique
surnames and town names. This list of reference values can be used by the
database owners to calculate the distances between their attribute values and
the reference values. Reference values are used in Chapters 6, 7, and 8.
6. Embedded space: Similar to mapping-based blocking as described in Sec-
tion 2.1.1, this technique embeds the attribute values into a multi-dimensional
metric space [18, 170, 210] while preserving the distances between these values.
It is often difficult to determine a good dimension of the metric space.
7. Generalization techniques: The idea behind data generalization techniques is
to overcome the problem of re-identification of individual records by general-
izing the data in such a way that re-identification from the perturbed data is
not feasible [130, 138, 182]. k-anonymity is one data generalization technique
that has been used as an effective privacy technique in PPRL [101, 104, 145]. A
database is k-anonymous mapped (satisfies the k-anonymity criteria) if every
combination of (masked) quasi-identifier values is shared by at least k records
in the database [182]. Different notions of k-anonymous mapping are explored
in [72, 129, 180, 208]. Other generalization techniques include value generaliza-
tion hierarchies [91], top-down specialization [145], and binning [132]. We use
k-anonymous mapping in Chapters 6 and 7 and binning in Chapter 8.
8. Bloom filters: A Bloom filter is a bit-string data structure of length l bits where
all bits are initially set to 0. k independent hash functions, h1, h2, . . . , hk, each
with range 1, . . . , l, are used to map each of the elements in a set s into the
Bloom filter by setting k corresponding bit positions to 1. The Bloom filter was
proposed by Bloom [17] for efficiently checking set membership [20]. Bloom
filters have been used in PPRL for private matching of records as they provide
a means of privacy assurance [56, 57, 103, 125, 174, 198], if effectively used [123].
We propose a Bloom filter-based two-party PPRL solution in Chapter 9.
9. Noise addition: Adding noise in the form of extra records to the databases
that are linked is a data perturbation technique [108] which can be used to over-
come the problem of frequency analysis attacks within PPRL protocols [53, 121].
However, when adding extra records there is generally a trade-off between link-
age quality (due to false matches), scalability, and privacy [105]. False matches
can also affect the privacy of the matched real values. Recently, differential
privacy [61] has emerged as an alternative to randomization noise addition
technique for PPRL. Initially, differential privacy was designed to support in-
teractive queries and aggregate results presentation by adding noise to each
statistical query result (such as Count or Sum) with the magnitude of noise
depending on a privacy parameter e and sensitivity of the query set Q. In
recent times, it has been adapted to address microdata publication as well as
PPRL [18, 92, 124].
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4.2.2 Linkage Techniques
The dimensions under this topic cover techniques used in each of the required steps
of the PPRL process, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
4.2.2.1 Indexing / blocking
The techniques employed in the blocking step to facilitate record linkage solutions
that scale to very large databases become more challenging if privacy concerns have
to be considered. In PPRL, there is a trade-off of the blocking step not only between
accuracy and efficiency, but also privacy. Several approaches have been proposed
that address the scalability of PPRL solutions by adapting existing blocking tech-
niques, such as standard blocking, mapping-based blocking, clustering, sampling,
and locality sensitive hash functions, into a privacy-preserving context, as discussed
in Section 3.4.
4.2.2.2 Comparison
Linkage quality is heavily influenced by how the values in records or individual
attributes are compared with each other [157]. As discussed in Section 2.2, the naïve
approach of exact matching of encrypted values does not provide a practical solution.
Several of the approximate comparison functions that were presented in Section 2.1.2
have been investigated from a privacy preservation perspective, as described in detail
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
4.2.2.3 Classification
The decision model used in PPRL to securely classify the compared record pairs
needs to be effective in providing highly accurate results, such that the number of
false negatives and false positives is minimized, while at the same time preserving
the privacy of all records that are not part of matching pairs. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.3, a variety of classification techniques has been developed for record linkage.
Details of which classification techniques have been used in PPRL were described for
individual approaches in Chapter 3.
4.2.3 Theoretical Analysis
Theoretical estimates for the three main properties of PPRL allow the comparison
of PPRL techniques, as well as an assessment of their expected scalability to large
databases, quality of linkage results, and privacy guarantees.
4.2.3.1 Scalability
This includes the computation and communication complexities that measure the
overall computational efforts and cost of communication required in the PPRL pro-
cess. Generally, the big-O notation is used to specify the computation and commu-
§4.2 A Taxonomy of PPRL Techniques 39
nication complexities [155]. Given n is the number of records in a database, the
big-O notation of O(log n) represents logarithmic complexity, O(n) linear complex-
ity, O(n log n) log-linear complexity, O(n2) quadratic complexity, O(nc) polynomial
complexity, O(poly log n) polynomial logarithmic complexity, and O(cn) exponential
complexity, where c > 1.
4.2.3.2 Linkage quality
The quality of linkage is theoretically analyzed in terms of fault-tolerance of the
matching technique to data errors and variations, whether the matching is based on
individual fields or whole records, and the types of data the matching technique can
be applied to. Fault-tolerance to data errors can be addressed by using approximate
matching or pre-processing techniques such as spelling transformations. Records can
either be compared as a whole (record-based) or by comparing the values of individ-
ual selected attributes (field based), as was discussed in Section 2.1.2. Approximate
comparison functions specific to different types of data are required to link different
data types, as was discussed in Section 2.1.
4.2.3.3 Privacy vulnerabilities
The privacy vulnerabilities that a PPRL technique is susceptible to provide a theoret-
ical estimate of the privacy guarantees of that technique. The main privacy vulner-
abilities include frequency attack and dictionary attack (as discussed in Section 4.2.1.3).
Bloom filter-based PPRL techniques are generally also susceptible to cryptanalysis at-
tacks. As Kuzu et al. [122] recently showed, depending upon the number of hash
functions employed and the number of bits in a Bloom filter, using a constrained
satisfaction solver allows the iterative mapping of individual hash-encoded values
back to their original values.
Another vulnerability associated with three-party and multi-party approaches is
collusion between parties. Parties involved in a PPRL protocol may work together
to find out another party’s data. These common privacy vulnerabilities of PPRL
techniques are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
4.2.4 Evaluation
The outcomes of a PPRL technique need to be experimentally / practically evaluated
in terms of the three properties: scalability, linkage quality, and privacy.
4.2.4.1 Scalability
The measures that were discussed in Section 2.1.4 (and that will be detailed in Sec-
tion 5.3.3) can be used to assess the scalability property of PPRL similar to those
assessing the scalability of non privacy-preserving record linkage approaches.
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4.2.4.2 Linkage quality
Assuming that truth data are available (which is not the case in many PPRL appli-
cations), the linkage quality can be assessed using the measures that are used for
record linkage in a non privacy-preserving setting as was discussed in Section 2.1.4
(and will be detailed in Section 5.3.2).
4.2.4.3 Privacy evaluation
Various measures have been used to assess the privacy protection that PPRL tech-
niques provide. Here we present the most prominent measures used.
1. Entropy, Information gain (IG) and Relative information gain (RIG): En-
tropy measures the amount of information contained in a message [105, 177].
The entropy H(X) and conditional entropy H(Y|X) form the basis for the IG
metric [177]. IG assesses the possibility of inferring the original message Y,
given its encoded version X [105, 177]: IG(Y|X) = H(Y)− H(Y|X). The lower
the value for IG is, the more difficult it is to infer the original value from its en-
coded value. The RIG measure normalizes the scale of IG (0.0 ≤ RIG(Y|X) ≤
1.0) with regard to the entropy of the original text Y [105], and is defined as
RIG(Y|X) = IG(Y|X)H(Y) . Since RIG values are normalized between 0.0 and 1.0,
they provide a marginal scale for comparison and evaluation.
2. Security / Simulation proof: The proof of privacy of PPRL solutions can be
evaluated by simulating the solutions under different adversarial models [22,
73, 135]. A party’s view in the execution of a PPRL technique needs to be
simulated given only its input and output to evaluate the privacy in terms
of what the party learns from the execution. If under a certain adversarial
model (honest-but-curious or malicious, as was discussed in Section 4.2.1.3) a
party learns nothing from the execution except its input and output, then the
technique can be proven to be secure and private.
3. Probability of re-identification: The probability of re-identification of values
can be used as a measure to evaluate privacy against several attacks such as
frequency attacks, dictionary attacks, and cryptanalysis attacks (as will be dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 5).
4.2.5 Practical Aspects
The final three dimensions cover practical aspects of PPRL techniques including the
datasets used for experimental evaluations, how a solution was implemented, and if
a proposed solution was developed with a specific application area in mind.
4.2.5.1 Implementation
This dimension specifies the implementation techniques, such as programming lan-
guages and computing platforms, that have been used to prototype a PPRL tech-
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nique in order to conduct its experimental evaluation. Some solutions proposed in
the literature provide only theoretical proofs but they have not been evaluated exper-
imentally, or no details about their implementation have been published.
4.2.5.2 Datasets
Experimental evaluation on one or ideally several datasets is important for the critical
evaluation of PPRL techniques. Due to the difficulties of obtaining real-world data
that contain personal information, synthetically generated datasets are commonly
used. Several tools are available to generate synthetic data [34, 88]. However, to
evaluate the practical aspects of PPRL techniques with regard to their expected per-
formance in real-world applications, evaluations should ideally be done on datasets
that exhibit real-world properties and error characteristics.
4.2.5.3 Application areas
This dimension describes if a PPRL technique has been developed with a certain
application area in mind, or if it is specialized to link data from a certain application
area. Some of the areas targeted include healthcare, census, e-commerce, information
retrieval (IR), and finance applications.
4.3 Discussion and Research Directions
We conducted an extensive survey of existing PPRL techniques along the proposed
taxonomy as summarized in Table 4.1. These PPRL techniques were described in
detail in Chapter 3. In this section, we analyze the surveyed PPRL techniques as
characterized in Table 4.1 with regard to the taxonomy proposed. This analysis high-
lights several areas of where future research in PPRL needs to focus on.
As our survey has shown, since the beginning of the development of techniques
that aim to provide solutions for PPRL, there has been a large variety of techniques
that have been investigated. There is a clear path of progress, starting from early
techniques that solve the problem of privacy-preserving exact matching, moving on
to techniques that allow approximate matching while keeping the attribute values
that are matched private, and finally in the last few years focusing on techniques
that address the issue of scalability of PPRL to large databases. This has also been
illustrated in Figure 3.1 on Page 32.
The gaps that are identified in existing PPRL research are illustrated in Figure 4.2
which follows the same five topics of our taxonomy shown in Figure 4.1. The research
questions that are represented by darker boxes with solid outlines are considered
within the scope of this research study and the remaining represented by lighter
boxes with dotted outlines are left out for future research which will be discussed
further in Chapter 11.
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Figure 4.2: The gaps identified in existing PPRL research to outline research direc-
tions. The research gaps represented by darker boxes with solid lines are addressed
in this thesis, while the lighter boxes with dotted lines are left for future work.
4.3.1 Privacy Aspects
With regard to privacy, several topics require further attention in order to make PPRL
more applicable for practical applications.
• Efficient two-party PPRL: Most work in PPRL require a (trusted) third party to
perform linkage which is not always available in real-world applications. The
two-party solutions proposed in the literature often use expensive SMC privacy
techniques to ensure that no private information can be inferred from the data
exchanged between the two database owners, which are not practical due to
computational cost. Therefore, two-party PPRL solutions that employ efficient
privacy techniques are required for practical PPRL applications where no third
party is available. We address this problem in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
• Efficient privacy techniques: As the characterization of PPRL techniques in
Table 4.1 has shown, many different privacy techniques have been explored
over the past nearly two decades to address the various challenges posed by
the requirements of PPRL. More advanced privacy techniques have been de-
veloped in the second and third generations while first generation techniques
are mainly based on secure hash-encoding only. More research is needed to
investigate the use of efficient and other advanced scalable privacy techniques
for private blocking and private matching and classification in PPRL that pro-
vide sufficient privacy protection to work in combination with or even replace
the expensive SMC-based techniques. This is addressed in our work by using
efficient perturbation-based privacy techniques such as reference values [154],
Bloom filters [17], and k-anonymous mapping [72] in Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9.
• PPRL on multiple databases: Most work in PPRL (and record linkage in
general) thus far has concentrated on linking data from two database owners
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only. Only a small number of approaches have investigated how to efficiently
link databases from more than two data sources [101, 125, 145, 152, 158]. As
the scenarios in Section 1.2 have shown, however, linking data from more than
two sources is commonly required. Recent work by Sadinle et al. [168] extends
the Fellegi and Sunter model to link more than two databases in a non privacy-
preserving context.
• PPRL for other adversarial models: Most solutions proposed so far assume
the HBC adversarial model. However, this is not sufficient in many real-
world applications. PPRL under different adversarial models such as the covert
model [8] and accountable computing [95] need to be developed.
4.3.2 Linkage Techniques
Research in non-PPRL in recent years has developed various advanced techniques
that provide improved scalability and linkage quality. Thus far, however, most of
these techniques have not been investigated in a privacy-preserving setting.
• Efficient blocking: Most work in PPRL that has investigated scalability through
some form of blocking (or indexing) technique has employed the basic stan-
dard blocking approach [65]. As explained in Section 2.1.1, this technique
is not efficient and has quadratic complexity when the databases are large.
Mapping-based blocking [96] is a second technique that has been employed in
PPRL [170, 210]. The use of locality sensitive hashing (LSH) has recently been
proposed to improve the scalability of PPRL techniques [56]. Other efficient
blocking techniques such as the sorted neighbourhood, or suffix-array-based
techniques, need to be explored in a privacy-preserving setting. Chapters 6
and 7 contribute to this problem by using the sorted neighborhood approach.
• Distributed PPRL: Distributing computations in PPRL among computational
resources can scale up the process with respect to large scale data volumes.
Distributed computing in PPRL needs to consider the privacy aspect, making
the task challenging. There has not been much work done in this direction.
Karapiperis and Verykios [107] proposed a distributed framework for PPRL
based on LSH. More work needs to be carried out addressing this aspect of
scalability to develop and implement practical PPRL solutions.
• Matching different data types: PPRL solutions in the second and third gen-
erations consider approximate comparison, mostly for string data type only.
Research is required to develop approximate comparison functions that are tai-
lored to numeric, date, age, and time attributes, and even for those containing
geographic and other complex types of information [29].
• Advanced classification: As Table 4.1 shows, most current approaches to PPRL
employ a simple threshold or rule-based deterministic approach to classify the
compared record pairs. Only limited work has been conducted that investigates
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the application of advanced classification techniques that have been developed
for record linkage in the past decade, such as machine learning or graph-based
collective classification approaches, in a privacy-preserving context [145, 209,
213]. This constitutes a significant gap between the state-of-the-art techniques
in non-PPRL techniques and those employed in PPRL, and provides ample
opportunities for research to significantly improve PPRL techniques.
4.3.3 Theoretical Analysis
Analyzing PPRL solutions in terms of privacy, linkage quality, and scalability in order
to understand the expected performances of the solutions with regard to these three
properties is important and has some theoretical challenges unaddressed.
• Theoretical privacy assessment: While the analysis of scalability of PPRL al-
gorithms with regard to their communication and computation requirements is
based on standard approaches such as the big-O notation [155], and the analy-
sis of linkage quality can be assessed by the type of data that can be matched,
and if matching is exactly or approximately, the theoretical assessment of the
privacy achieved within PPRL is currently the least matured aspect.
4.3.4 Evaluation
The evaluation of implementations of PPRL techniques with regard to their scalabil-
ity, linkage quality, and privacy preservation, poses some unique challenges.
• An evaluation framework for PPRL: There is currently no framework avail-
able for PPRL that facilitates the comparative evaluation of different PPRL tech-
niques with regard to privacy, scalability, and linkage quality. Researchers have
used a variety of evaluation measures and datasets (both real and synthetic),
which makes comparing existing techniques difficult. We address this gap by
proposing an evaluation framework for PPRL solutions in Chapter 5.
• Privacy measures: While the two properties of scalability and linkage quality
have standard sets of measures that have been widely used for evaluation, pri-
vacy does not have such a standard set of measures to allow for comparative
evaluation. A standard set of privacy measures is required that quantifies the
amount of privacy provided by a privacy-preserving solution. We propose a set
of measures for empirical privacy evaluation of PPRL solutions in Chapter 5.
• Clerical review in PPRL: Current PPRL techniques only address how to assess
linkage quality and completeness to a very limited degree. Given in a practi-
cal linkage situation the true match status of the compared record pairs are
unlikely to be known, and in a PPRL scenario even the actual record attribute
values cannot be inspected (because this would reveal private information),
measuring the linkage quality and completeness is difficult [11, 33]. Hence, re-
search directions are required for privacy-preserving interactive record linkage
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through active learning systems or crowdsourced systems [6, 141, 196]. Recent
work in PPRL proposes an interactive solution with human-machine interaction
to improve the quality of linkage results [121].
4.3.5 Practical Aspects
Several gaps exist in the PPRL literature regarding the practical aspects.
• Realistic (synthetic) datasets: Since real-world datasets are often not available
and/or accessible due to privacy and confidentiality concerns, researchers are
often dependent on synthetic datasets for evaluating their algorithms. While
there have been several tools developed that allow the generation of datasets,
a practical way of generating datasets that exhibit similar characteristics as real
data (such as data errors, variations, and dependencies between attributes) is
essential to conduct an effective empirical evaluation. We contribute to this
direction by developing a flexible data generation and corruption tool [35, 183]
to generate and/or corrupt synthetic datasets with realistic data characteristics,
which will be discussed in Chapter 5.
• A language for PPRL: Researchers have used various languages to prototype
their algorithms for evaluation, making it difficult to compare different algo-
rithms. A language for PPRL will need to facilitate the detailed specifications
of all building blocks of the PPRL process in the form of abstract represen-
tations, such as XML schemas. This will make it possible for researchers to
implement their novel algorithms and techniques, and integrate them so as to
evaluate them comparatively.
• Comprehensive PPRL evaluation: So far it seems that no single PPRL tech-
nique has outperformed all other techniques in the three properties of link-
age quality, privacy preservation, and scalability to large datasets. However,
the lack of comprehensive studies that compare existing techniques within the
same framework and on different types of data, means that it is currently not
possible to determine which technique(s) perform better than others on data
with different characteristics and of different sizes. We contribute to this re-
search avenue by conducting a comprehensive evaluation of several PPRL so-
lutions in terms of all three properties of PPRL in Chapter 10.
4.4 Summary
We have identified fifteen dimensions that allowed us to characterize PPRL tech-
niques, and to generate a taxonomy of such techniques. This proposed taxonomy
can be used as a comparison and analysis tool for PPRL techniques. Through this
taxonomy we have identified various shortcomings of current approaches to PPRL
that suggest several future research directions in this field. We will address some of
these identified shortcomings in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
Chapter 5
Evaluation Framework
As the research directions identified in the previous chapter (Section 4.3) stated, (1)
developing an evaluation framework for privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL)
with a standard set of measures for assessing the three main properties of scalability,
linkage quality, and privacy, and (2) using realistic datasets are the two important
research problems in order to practically evaluate and implement PPRL solutions
in real-world applications. Recognizing this, we propose an evaluation model in
Section 5.2 based on which we define evaluation measures for the three properties in
Section 5.3. We present details of the datasets in Section 5.4, the linkage studies in
Section 5.5, and the computing platform in Section 5.6 that will be used to evaluate
our proposed algorithms.
5.1 Introduction
Over the years, various solutions for PPRL have been proposed as reviewed in Chap-
ter 3. Privacy is addressed in these solutions using two different types of general ap-
proaches: (1) secure multi-party computation (SMC) techniques [41, 78, 135] and (2)
data perturbation techniques [108, 109, 199]. The former approach is generally more
expensive with regard to the computation and communication complexity though it
provides strong privacy guarantees, while the latter uses efficient techniques and, as
opposed to SMC techniques, in many cases it reveals a certain amount of information
without compromising the privacy of sensitive data. However, due to the presence
of partially revealed information, such perturbation techniques can be vulnerable to
various types of attack.
It is important to note that the objective of PPRL is different from that of privacy-
preserving data publishing [70, 179] or of statistical data disclosure [54, 90]. Privacy-
preserving data publishing masks a dataset in such a way that no identifying infor-
mation about individuals can be inferred from the published dataset, while PPRL
aims to identify matching records in two or more datasets without disclosing any
sensitive information that can be used to identify individual records (and thus the
entities they refer to) in the datasets. Therefore, in data publishing sensitive attributes
which may contain some (masked) sensitive values (for example, an attribute contain-
ing disease values) are disclosed possibly along with the (masked) quasi-identifiers
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(QIDs) that contain personal identifying information such as names and addresses.
In PPRL, on the other hand, only the (masked) QIDs are disclosed (only to the parties
involved in the process) to allow the identification of matching records.
Various privacy models have been used for data publishing and different attacks
have been studied in privacy preserving data publishing, including minimality at-
tacks [207], deFinetti’s theorem [112], and composition attacks [71]. However, most of
these attacks are not applicable to PPRL since they use information from the (masked)
sensitive attributes as well. Without sensitive attribute values disclosure, such attacks
would not be possible.
Several attack methods have been developed to investigate the privacy guarantees
of perturbation-based PPRL solutions. The main attacks and vulnerabilities of PPRL
defined in the literature include:
• Dictionary attack: In dictionary attacks, it is assumed that the adversary
knows the masking function (e.g. one-way hash function such as SHA and
MD5 [171]) and potential parameter values used in a PPRL protocol, so that
the adversary can mask a large list of common (global) values using the same
masking function and parameter values as used in the PPRL protocol until a
matching masked value is found. A keyed masking approach can overcome
this problem by using a secret key for masking [116]. The Hashed Message
Authentication Code (HMAC) function [116] is one such approach. Without
knowing the secret key, a dictionary attack is unlikely to be successful.
• Frequency attack: Frequency attacks are still possible on the keyed masking
approach (without knowing the secret key), where the frequency distribution
of a set of masked values matches with the distribution of known global val-
ues [136].
As is examined in [126], original values can be identified in a pseudo-anonymiza
tion-based PPRL solution by using frequency distribution analysis of anonymized
values. Experimental results showed that exact identification, without any prior
knowledge, is difficult but the characteristics of the dataset and the quality of
prior knowledge influence the likelihood of
• Cryptanalysis attack: Generally, Bloom filter-based PPRL techniques [56, 174,
188] are also susceptible to cryptanalysis attacks [122], where the bit distribu-
tion in a Bloom filter allows an adversary to learn the characteristics of hash
functions that are used to map the values from records (e.g. q-grams) into the
Bloom filter. This is similar to a frequency attack on bits and consequently on
the values or q-grams which are mapped to those bit positions.
Kuzu et al. [122] proposed a constraint satisfaction cryptanalysis attack on
Bloom filters in PPRL, where the Bloom filter encodings can be iteratively
mapped to values in a global dataset, and certain values can then be identi-
fied using the properties of the hash functions and the frequency distribution
of values.
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• Composition attack: Given auxiliary information (also called background
knowledge [71]) about the individual datasets that are linked and / or certain
records in the datasets, a composition attack can be successful by combining
knowledge from more than one independent masked datasets to learn sensitive
values of certain records [71].
An attack on distance preserving perturbation techniques is investigated in [185]
where the original data values can be re-identified with high level of confidence
if knowledge about mutual distances between data objects is available.
• Collusion: Another vulnerability associated with three-party and multi-party
solutions is the collusion between some of the parties involved in the protocol
(one of several or a set of database owners and the third party) with the aim to
learn the other database owner’s data. Different types of scenarios might occur
with regard to collusion, as they will be discussed in detail in Section 5.2.
Linkage studies or linkage attacks defined in the statistical disclosure commu-
nity [54] are general terms for attack methods, that link a masked dataset to an
external global dataset with known values using any subset of the previously dis-
cussed attacks in order to re-identify records and / or attribute values (known as
identity or attribute disclosure, respectively, as will be explained in Section 5.3.1) in
the masked dataset. We consider linkage attack methods based on frequency attack,
cryptanalysis attack, and collusion for privacy evaluation of PPRL solutions.
Based on such re-identification attacks, PPRL solutions can be evaluated for pri-
vacy guarantees. However, as characterized in Chapter 4, most of the PPRL solutions
developed so far have not been properly evaluated in terms of the privacy aspect.
Some PPRL solutions provide theoretical proofs of the privacy aspect which makes
the comparative practical evaluation of solutions difficult. As Rudin and Wagstaff
explained in [167], in the communities of machine learning, data mining, and statis-
tics, relatively little effort is made on practical evaluation and deployment of novel
algorithms, and these communities should prioritize applications of algorithms that
have impact to science and society. The same holds for the area of PPRL as well.
A general framework with a set of standard and normalized measures is there-
fore required to conduct such practical evaluation and comparison of PPRL solutions
with respect to the three main properties of PPRL, scalability, quality, and privacy.
Cormode et al. [46] recently proposed a unifying framework for evaluating empirical
privacy and empirical utility of several privacy techniques by using the measures
of prediction accuracy and relative query results, respectively. However, the predic-
tion accuracy measure used in this work provides only the average empirical privacy
based on the accuracy of the classifier that aims to find correlations between each
quasi identifier and the sensitive attribute (which is also not available in PPRL as dis-
cussed above). Given this lack of standard privacy measures and evaluation methods
for PPRL, we therefore propose a comprehensive evaluation framework that includes
a wide range of numerical measures for empirical evaluation of all three properties,
and that enables quantifying and interpreting the performances of different PPRL
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Figure 5.1: General three-party (left) and two-party (right) settings in PPRL solutions
with linkage databases DA and DB and the data flow between the parties (taken
from [190]). The numbers correspond to the order of the data flow in the protocols.
5.2 Evaluation Model
In this work, we consider an evaluation model for PPRL on two data sources only. As-
sume Alice and Bob are two database owners with their respective databases DA and
DB (generally referred as D), who participate in a PPRL protocol to identify match-
ing records in their databases that correspond to the same real-world entities under
the privacy-preserving setting. Existing PPRL techniques can be categorized based
on their need (or not) of a third party for performing record linkage [24, 28, 194].
General settings of three-party and two-party protocols are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
In three-party protocols, a trusted third party, Carol, is involved in conducting the
linkage, while in two-party protocols only the two database owners participate in
the PPRL process. As was discussed in Section 5.1, three-party protocols are often
not sufficient in many real-world applications due to the absence of a trusted third
party, since there is a risk of collusion between one of the database owners and the
third party with the aim to learn the other database owner’s sensitive data. Two-
party protocols do not rely on a trusted third party but they generally require more
complex techniques to ensure that the two database owners cannot infer any sensitive
information from each other during the linkage process.
The internal adversaries in a PPRL protocol are the parties involved in the process
(Alice, Bob, and / or Carol). We assume that the parties involved follow the honest
but curious behavior (HBC) [78, 135], in that they try to find out as much as possible
about the data of the other parties while following the protocol. So far most devel-
oped PPRL techniques adapt the HBC threat model, as surveyed in Chapter 4. It is
important to note that the HBC threat model does not prevent collusion between par-
ties [135]. There have been few PPRL techniques proposed for the malicious threat
model [135] as well, where adversaries may behave arbitrarily. Proving privacy un-
der the malicious model is more difficult because there exist several and potentially
unpredictable ways for malicious parties to deviate from the protocol [22, 73, 135].
Two different general philosophies are adopted to preserve privacy and confiden-
tiality of person-level data, which are restricted access and restricted data [54, 67]. To
obtain effective results of privacy-preserving tasks, it is often preferred to have un-
controlled access to restricted data rather than restricted access to data [67]. Often,
restricted data is achieved in PPRL by first decoupling personal (quasi-)identifying
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Figure 5.2: Overlaps of entities (left) and data (right) in the linkage databases DA and
DB and the global dataset G (taken from [190]). P is the total assumed population.
attributes (QIDs) from sensitive attributes [121] and then by transforming a database
(D) into a masked version (DM) in order to protect the actual sensitive values in the
database while preserving certain information to perform effective linkage.
Privacy evaluation requires assessing the risk of disclosure by calculating the
probability that an adversary can correctly identify a value in a released dataset [54].
Such re-identification studies can be done through a linkage attack, as described in
Section 5.1, using an available dataset, for example a publicly available global dataset
such as a telephone book or an electoral roll. In this thesis we assume the adversary
is using a linkage attack for evaluating the privacy of PPRL solutions.
We assume that the adversary has access to a global dataset G that contains N =
|G| unique values or combinations of values (for example, combinations of surname
and first name values) of the population P from which the databases DA and DB are
also drawn. This is reasonable because generally personal identifying attributes, such
as names and addresses, are used for linkage and in many countries this background
information is partially available in public resources (e.g. North Carolina (NC) voter
registration data [31]). The individual databases that are used for the linkage (DA
and DB) can be considered as horizontal partitions of G (i.e. records overlap), while G
can be a vertical partition of the linkage databases (attributes overlap). An overview
of the overlaps of records and attributes in the datasets G, DA, and DB is illustrated
in Figure 5.2.
We only consider insider attacks (which involve the internal adversaries who are
the database owners and / or the third party) for privacy evaluation. We deem
insider attacks to be the worst case because an insider adversary can be assumed
to have more information than any external adversary, including knowledge about
the PPRL protocol used, masking methods, and parameter values of the linkage
techniques and algorithms used. It is important to note that a frequency attack might
still be possible by an external adversary without this information. The possible
scenarios for insider attacks in three-party and two-party protocols are:
• Three-party protocols
1. In the first scenario, we assume that Alice, Bob and Carol do not collude
with each other. This case is much harder to attack because Carol does not
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know the encoding key and / or the parameter values used in the protocol
and Alice and Bob do not have access to the actual or masked values in each
other’s database. In this case, only a frequency attack might be possible
by Carol depending on the PPRL protocol used.
2. In the second scenario, one of the database owners (Alice or Bob) gets the
other database owner’s data (Bob’s or Alice’s, respectively) by colluding
with the third party Carol. This is a worst case assumption because if two
parties collude in such a way, then the privacy of the party that is not
involved in the collusion cannot be assured. However, many three-party
protocols assume a trusted third party (as reviewed in Chapter 3) to reduce
this risk of collusion. An alternative is to re-design a three-party protocol
into a two-party protocol, which is one of the important research aims of
this thesis.
3. Similar to the above scenario, Carol colludes with Alice or Bob in order to
get the (secret) encoding key. Thereby it can conduct a dictionary attack
using the key, and so can decode both Alice’s and Bob’s data. Instead of
one of the database owners, the third party gets both database owners’
data in this type of collusion. However, the colluding database owner in
many cases would not like to reveal the (secret) encoding key because that
would compromise the privacy of its own data as well.
4. The first scenario, where no collusion between parties happens, is the best
possible assumption. However, collusion can still happen in a HBC proto-
col [135]. The second and third scenarios are the worst case assumptions
and they may be too unrealistic. Therefore, in this fourth scenario we as-
sume that Carol knows only the masking function(s) and the parameter
values used (and not the encoding key), either by colluding with Alice or
Bob, or assuming or estimating parameter values with some background
knowledge. Carol can perform an attack depending on the protocol, for
example a cryptanalysis attack [122], with this knowledge to infer Bob’s or
Alice’s values.
• Two-party protocols
1. No collusion is obviously possible in two-party protocols. However, sim-
ilar to the fourth scenario in three-party protocols which was described
above, Alice and Bob know the masking function(s) and the parameter val-
ues used in the protocol, and as a result they can perform attacks on the
exchanged (masked) data between them to infer actual values from each
other’s data.
In the remainder of this thesis, we assume that Carol knows the masking func-
tion(s) used in a PPRL protocol and knows or predicts the parameter values used in
the protocol (fourth scenario for three-party protocols) to evaluate privacy of three-
party protocols, similar to any two-party protocols. This assumption of an adver-
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sary’s background knowledge (or partial knowledge) has been used in many attack
methods that have been proposed in the literature [71, 122, 126, 185].
5.3 Evaluation Measures
The evaluation of a PPRL technique needs to be conducted in terms of the three
properties of privacy, quality, and scalability. Quality and scalability correspond to
the effectiveness and efficiency of a linkage process and they can be assessed based
on available standard measures (such as precision, recall, reduction ratio, etc.) that
will be discussed in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, respectively. However, the privacy pro-
tection provided by a PPRL technique is comparatively more difficult to assess. In
the following Section 5.3.1, we present evaluation measures that can be used to eval-
uate the privacy aspect of PPRL. While the privacy measures based on information
gain (see Section 5.3.1.1) have previously been used in PPRL [56, 105], the statistical
disclosure risk measures based on probability of suspicion are novel.
5.3.1 Privacy Measures
Privacy is normally measured as the risk of disclosure of information to the parties
involved in a PPRL protocol. As defined in the glossary on statistical disclosure
control [89], if an entity’s confidential information can be identified in the disclosed
(masked) data with an unacceptably narrow estimation, or if it can be exactly iden-
tified with a high level of confidence, then this raises a privacy risk of disclosure.
A practical way of assessing disclosure risk is to conduct re-identification studies by
linking values from a masked dataset to an external global dataset G [54].
We categorize the types of disclosure into record level or identity disclosure, and
attribute level disclosure [55, 67, 89]. Identity disclosure occurs when a record with
multiple attribute values from the masked dataset DM can be linked to an entity
with the same masked attribute values in GM, which allows re-identification of the
entity. It is important to note that a rare value (that only occurs in one or a small
number of entities) for a single attribute could also lead to re-identification of the
entity represented by that value by spontaneous recognition [55]. On the other hand,
attribute level disclosure allows an attribute value (characteristics) of an entity from
DM to be accurately re-identified.
Our method to evaluate privacy is to simulate attacks (as described in Section 5.1)
on protected data in the masked dataset (DM) by linking them to the masked version
(GM) of the known unprotected (publicly available) data in G [149]. A disclosure
risk (DR) measurement that boils down to a numerical value to quantify the privacy
protection of a PPRL technique based on such a simulation attack allows to compare
the privacy guarantees of several PPRL techniques.
The resulting DR measures should be numerical values that are normalized be-
tween 0.0 and 1.0, where DR = 0.0 means no disclosure at all and DR = 1.0 means a
provable disclosure (i.e. exact and correct re-identification). These normalized values
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Figure 5.3: Degrees of privacy (adapted from [166]): Degrees range from absolute
privacy, where the adversary cannot re-identify the actual value from the masked
data, to provably exposed, where the adversary can provably re-identify the actual
value.
work on degrees of connectivity or routing anonymity proposed by Reiter et al. [166].
In the following, we first consider linkage using a single attribute in defining the pri-
vacy evaluation model, and then we extend the model to include multiple attributes.
5.3.1.1 Disclosure risk of linkage using a single attribute
If an attribute value aM of a record RM in a masked dataset (RM ∈ DM) matches
with exactly one value for the same attribute in GM, then there is a provably exposed
risk of disclosure of aM, because the masked value aM can be identified with this
one-to-one match. A value aM that matches with a small number of values in GM
has a risk of suspicion with a high probability, while a value aM that matches with
possibly many values in GM has a disclosure risk with a low probability. Absolute
privacy is attained with values aM that match with either no values in GM (i.e. no
background information is available), or with all the values in GM, or with a user-
specified acceptable number of values k (as discussed below).
Given ng is the number of global values in GM that are matched with an attribute
value aM in the masked dataset DM, the probability of suspicion of the corresponding
value aM is calculated as 1/ng. We then normalize this probability into the 0.0 to
1.0 interval, where 1.0 indicates provably exposed risk and 0.0 represents absolute




Statistical disclosure risk measures: Using the probability of suspicion (Ps) values
calculated for each of the values aM in an attribute in DM, we present five different
statistical disclosure risk (DR) measures to calculate the overall disclosure risk of the
entire masked dataset DM.
As a running example, Table 5.1 shows the Ps values for a small made-up dataset
of n = 50 values. This dataset contains, for example, five values of an attribute with
Ps = 1.0, which means that these five attribute values match with only one attribute
value out of 1, 000 in GM (we assume GM contains 1, 000 values of the same attribute),
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Table 5.1: Probability of suspicion (Ps) of values aM in an attribute in a small (fictional)
example masked dataset DM. The total number of aM values is n = 50, and the total
number of global values for the same attribute in GM is N = 1, 000. Values are sorted
according to their Ps(aMi ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n (adapted from [190]).
ID Ps ID Ps ID Ps ID Ps ID Ps ID Ps ID Ps ID Ps ID Ps ID Ps
1 1.0 2 1.0 3 1.0 4 1.0 5 1.0 6 0.5 7 0.5 8 0.5 9 0.5 10 0.5
11 0.5 12 0.5 13 0.5 14 0.5 15 0.5 16 0.33 17 0.33 18 0.33 19 0.33 20 0.33
21 0.33 22 0.25 23 0.25 24 0.2 25 0.2 26 0.2 27 0.2 28 0.2 29 0.2 30 0.1
31 0.1 32 0.1 33 0.1 34 0.1 35 0.1 36 0.01 37 0.01 38 0.01 39 0.01 40 0.01
41 0.002 42 0.002 43 0.002 44 0.002 45 0.0 46 0.0 47 0.0 48 0.0 49 0.0 50 0.0
ten attribute values that match with two global values (Ps = 0.5), and six attribute
values that match with either no values or all the 1, 000 values in GM (Ps = 0.0).
1. Maximum risk (DRMax): This measure allows us to define the maximum risk
of disclosure of the masked dataset. It corresponds to the maximum value for
the probability of suspicion Ps of attribute values aM in the masked dataset, as




In the example given in Table 5.1, the DRMax is calculated as DRMax = 1.0. This
explains that the masked dataset has a maximum risk of 1.0 of any sensitive
value being disclosed, i.e. there exists at least one attribute value in DM that
matches to a single value in GM.
2. Marketer risk (DRMark): It is important to know how many values in a masked
dataset can be exactly re-identified. This risk is known as marketer risk and
it evaluates the risk of disclosure from the perspective of a marketer adver-
sary who wishes to re-identify as many values as possible in the disclosed
dataset [48]. Marketer risk is measured as the proportion of values in DM that
have provably exposed risk of disclosure (Ps = 1.0) with one-to-one mapping
in GM. DRMark for the running example in Table 5.1 is 5/50 = 0.1 calculated
using Equation 5.3 (as there are five of the fifty values having Ps = 1.0).
DRMark = |{aM ∈ DM : Ps(aM) = 1.0}|/n (5.3)
where Ps(aM) is the probability of suspicion of a value aM in DM and n = |DM|.
3. Mean risk (DRMean): The mean risk calculates the average of probability of
suspicion values to evaluate the average disclosure risk. DRMean is calculated
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using Equation 5.4. A value in the example masked dataset illustrated in Ta-
ble 5.1 has an average probability of 0.28 of being re-identified, i.e. in average a





4. Median risk (DRMed): The median risk takes into account the distribution of
probabilities of suspicions in the masked dataset and it gives the center of
the distribution of disclosure risk values. DRMed is calculated as shown in
Equation 5.5, assuming Ps(aM) values are sorted in ascending order. DRMed
for the running example (with n = 50) results in 1/2× [Ps(aM25) + Ps(aM26)] =
(0.2+ 0.2)/2 = 0.2.
DRMed =

1/2× [Ps(aMn/2) + Ps(aMn/2+1)] n is even
Ps(aM(n+1)/2) n is odd
(5.5)
5. User acceptance (UA) mean risk (DRUAM): If the users / data respondents of
the linkage accept that the data will not be at a disclosure risk if a value aM
in their masked dataset matches with more than a certain number of values (k
unique values) in the global dataset, then we can eliminate the risk of disclosing
those masked values that are below the respective probability of suspicion, as
the probabilities of suspicion of those values would be in the low confidence
level, as shown in Figure 5.3. This approach is based on the concept of (k, 1)-
anonymization mapping [72], where any value in a masked dataset is consistent
with at least k original values and thus provides (k, 1)-anonymization privacy
constraints. Ramachandran et al. [163] and Ferro et al. [66] proposed similar
approaches to identify vulnerable records in a dataset that match with at most
k global records in public data.
The mean disclosure risk calculation can then be applied using Equation 5.4 af-
ter removing or setting to 0.0 the probabilities of suspicions that are acceptable
by the users. For our running example, if the acceptable minimum number
of global values that match with a single value in the masked dataset is set to
k = 4 (Ps = 0.25), then in Table 5.1 we can set the probability of suspicion for
the last 27 values (those with Ps < 0.25) to Ps = 0.0, and DRUAM would then be
calculated as DRUAM = 0.24 using Equation 5.4.
We illustrate the distribution of Ps values in the example dataset shown in Ta-
ble 5.1 and the calculated statistical disclosure risk measures in Figure 5.4. In Fig-
ure 5.5, we also present the distribution of Ps values in a real North Carolina (NC)
voter dataset [31] (to be described in detail in Section 5.4) and the disclosure risk
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of probability of
suspicion (Ps) values in the example dataset
shown in Table 5.1 and the calculated sta-
tistical disclosure risk measures (presented
in Section 5.3.1.1). The acceptable minimum
number of global values that match with a
single value is set to k = 4 (Ps = 0.25) for
DRUAM calculation (taken from [190]).
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of probability of
suspicion (Ps) of first name attribute values
in the hash-encoded NC voter dataset [31]
and the calculated disclosure risk measures
for a simple dictionary attack on hash-
encoded values using the same dataset as the
global dataset. We set k = 50 for DRUAM
calculation (taken from [190]).
measures calculated for a simple dictionary attack on hash-encoded first name val-
ues using the same original NC voter dataset as the global dataset. As can be seen
from these two figures, this set of statistical disclosure risk measures provide numer-
ical and statistical information (maximum, mean, median, marketer, and UA mean)
on the risk of disclosing a masked dataset.
Information theory measures: The standard information theory measures, such as
information gain (IG) and relative information gain (RIG) [177], can also be used as
DR measures based on a simulation attack on the masked dataset using the original
dataset as the global dataset. IG assesses the possibility of inferring values in the
original dataset D, given its masked version DM [177]. These information theory
measures have been used for privacy evaluation in PPRL before [56, 105]. However,
there are some limitations of these measures.
The first limitation is that the global dataset can only be assumed to be the same
as the original linkage dataset (G ≡ D), while our statistical DR measures, proposed
in the previous section, are independent of the choice of the global datasets. The
second is that the IG measures provide only the overall total information gain from
the masked dataset while our DR measures provide statistical summary information
of the disclosure risk. We use a small example dataset shown in Table 5.2 to illustrate
the calculation of IG and RIG.
Following the notation used by Durham [56] and Karaksidis et al. [105], the en-
tropy H(D) of a dataset D is defined as:
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Table 5.2: Disclosure risk calculation of a small example dataset using IG and RIG.
The global dataset is the same as the original dataset (G ≡ D) and the total number
of global values in G is N = n = 100 (taken from [190]).
Original Prob of values log2(ng/N) Masked Prob of values H(D|DM = aM)
values in D in G (ng/N) values in DM in GM (nMg /N)
peter 30/100 = 0.3 −0.522 p360 50/100 = 0.5 0.6× log20.6+
pete 20/100 = 0.2 −0.464 0.4× log20.4 = 0.48
smith 50/100 = 0.5 −0.5 s530 50/100 = 0.5 1.0× log21.0 = 0.0
H(D) = −∑(ng/N)log2(ng/N) = 1.48 H(D|DM) = −∑(nMg /N)×H(D|DM = aM) = 0.48
H(D) = − ∑
a∈D
(ng/N)log2(ng/N) (5.6)
where ng denotes the number of global values in G that match with a value a in
D, and N is the total number of values in G. H(D) is calculated for the example
dataset with three made-up values (shown in Table 5.2) to 1.48, as explained in the
left three columns in the table.
The conditional entropy of a dataset D given DM, H(D|DM), is defined as [105]:
H(D|DM) = − ∑
aM∈DM
(nMg /N)H(D|DM = aM) (5.7)
where nMg is the number of masked global values in GM that match with a masked
value aM in DM, and N is the total number of values in GM. H(D|DM) for the run-
ning example is 0.48, as shown in the right three columns in Table 5.2. The entropy
and conditional entropy form the basis for the information gain (IG) metric [177]. IG
between D and DM is defined as [105]:
IG(D|DM) = H(D)− H(D|DM) (5.8)
The running example results in IG = 1.48 − 0.48 = 1.0. The lower the value
for IG is, the more difficult it is for an adversary to infer the original dataset from
a masked dataset. The relative IG (RIG) measure normalizes the scale of IG (0.0 ≤
RIG(D|DM) ≤ 1.0) with regard to the entropy of the original dataset D [105], and is
defined as RIG(D|DM) = IG(D|DM)/H(D). This is calculated as RIG = 1.0/1.48 =
0.67 for the running example dataset. Since RIG values are normalized between 0.0
and 1.0, they provide a marginal scale for comparison and evaluation.
5.3.1.2 Disclosure risk of linkage using multiple attributes
Record level (or identity) disclosure is possible when multiple attributes are used for
linking, as it is generally the case. Disclosure risk calculation for linking on multiple
§5.3 Evaluation Measures 59
attributes can be done in three ways depending on the information available in the
global dataset G.
1. The first case is if the global dataset contains combinations of individual val-
ues for all attributes (m attributes) used in the linkage and / or blocking, and
each combination refers to one single entity, then the disclosure risk calculation
is similar to the single attribute disclosure calculation. For each record RM in
the masked dataset DM, the number of global records ng in GM that have the
matching (masked) values in the same attributes of RM is calculated and the
probability of suspicion of RM then is Ps(RM) = 1/ng. An example would be
if a combination of masked values of ‘amilia’ for the first name attribute and
‘smith’ for the last name attribute of a record RM in DM matches with ng = 2
combinations / records in GM that have the same masked values in the corre-
sponding two attributes, then the probability of suspicion of RM is calculated
as Ps(RM) = 1/2 = 0.5. This disclosure risk is higher than when only a sin-
gle attribute is used in linkage, since multiple attributes (more information) of a
record are compared with the entities in G that also have the same combination
of attribute values (which could likely allow for an identity disclosure).
The distributions of probability of suspicion values in a real NC voter dataset
[31] and the calculated disclosure risk measures for a dictionary attack on hash-
encoding of multiple attributes are shown in Figure 5.6. As the figure illus-
trates, when multiple attributes are used in linkage the disclosure risk becomes
higher compared to the risk when only a single attribute is used, as was shown
in Figure 5.5. The probability of suspicion and the disclosure risk values be-
come higher with more attributes used. The number of unique combinations
of attribute values of first name and city is smaller than the number of unique
combinations of first name and last name which results in lower disclosure
risk values for the former, as can be seen in Figures 5.6(a) and 5.6(b), respec-
tively. The probability of suspicion of the four attributes first name, last name,
city, and zipcode provide a marketer risk of DRMark = 0.84, as shown in Fig-
ure 5.6(d). This is similar to the results by Sweeney [181] which showed that
around 90% of the population of the USA have a unique combined value of the
three attributes zipcode, gender, and date of birth.
2. The second case is where the global dataset G contains combinations of at-
tribute values as in case 1, but a certain subset of attribute values of a record
RM in DM do not match with any values in the corresponding attributes in GM.
For example, a masked first name value of ‘amilia’ in DM matches with ng1 = 2
masked first name values in GM but the corresponding (masked) last name
value ‘dickson’ in DM does not match with any global values (ng2 = 0). In such
a case, we calculate the probability of suspicion as Ps(RM) = 1/(ng1 × N) =
1/(2× 1, 000) = 0.0005, by considering all the global values in GM as possible
matches (N = 1, 000 in this example) for masked values that match with zero
global values.
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Figure 5.6: Distributions of probability of suspicion (Ps) of (a) first name and city, (b) first
name and last name, (c) first name, last name, and city, and (d) first name, last name, city,
and zipcode attribute values in the hash-encoded NC voter dataset [31] and the calculated
disclosure risk measures for a simple dictionary attack on hash-encoded values using the
same dataset as the global dataset. We set k = 50 for DRUAM calculation (taken from [190]).
3. In the third case, the combinations of attribute values are not available in GM
(i.e. GM consists of individual lists of global values for each attribute, but not
the combinations of different attribute values). In this case, we multiply the
number of global values that match with each attribute of a record RM in DM
individually, in order to calculate the total number of global values that match
with the record RM. The probability of suspicion for RM in this case would
be Ps(RM) = 1/(ng1 × ng2 × · · · × ngm), where m is the number of attributes
used for the linkage. For example, if a record RM in DM with masked values
of ‘amilia’ and ‘smith’ for the first name and last name attributes, respectively,
matches with ng1 = 2 global records in G
M that have the same (masked) first
name value, and ng2 = 10 global records that have the same (masked) last name
value, then the probability of suspicion of that record is Ps(RM) = 1/(2× 10) =
1/20 = 0.05.
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5.3.2 Linkage Quality Measures
PPRL has to deal with the trade-off between privacy protection and the quality of
linkage. Achieving more privacy generally means losing more data quality due to
information lost in the protected / masked data as compared to the original data,
and thus losing more quality of the linkage results. In practice, measuring the link-
age quality is often difficult, because no truth data with known match status are
available in many real-world applications [33]. However, the linkage quality can be
assessed in a pilot study using synthetic data (representing real data characteristics)
with known match status [35], or using the manual classification results obtained by
clerical review in a record linkage process [29].
The quality of linkage in PPRL depends on both the quality of blocking as well as
the quality of comparison and classification results (the three main steps in the PPRL
process as is illustrated in Figure 2.2). The measures that are commonly used in infor-
mation retrieval and data mining, such as precision, recall, and f-measure [140, 161],
can be used to assess the quality of private matching and classification results. The
quality of blocking can be measured using the pairs completeness and pairs quality
measures [29, 62]. Based on the classification of the number of true matches (TM),
false matches (FM), false non-matches (FN), true non-matches (TN), true matches
included in the candidate record pairs generated by blocking (BM), and true non-
matches included in the candidate record pairs (BN), the quality of linkage measures
are defined as given below.
1. Precision: Precision is the fraction of record pairs classified as matches by a
decision model that are true matches: Precision = TM/(TM + FM).
2. Recall: Recall is the fraction of true matches that are correctly classified as
matches by a decision model: Recall = TM/(TM + FN).
3. F-measure: The F-measure or F-score is the harmonic mean of Precision and
Recall, calculated as F-measure = 2× (Precision× Recall)/(Precision+ Recall).
4. Pairs completeness (PC): Pairs completeness measures the effectiveness of a
blocking technique in the record linkage process: PC = BM/(TM + FN). This
measure is similar to Recall.
5. Pairs quality (PQ): Pairs quality measures the efficiency of a blocking technique
and is similar to the Precision measure: PQ = BM/(BM + BN).
5.3.3 Scalability Measures
The third aspect of PPRL that makes the linkage process scalable to large real-world
databases is dependent on the complexity of the protocol. The number of record
pairs that are compared and classified using a PPRL technique determines the com-
plexity of the protocol. A naïve pair-wise comparison of two databases is of quadratic
complexity in the size of the databases [30]. Private blocking techniques [56, 104, 124]
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are used in the first step of PPRL to reduce this large number of comparisons by re-
moving pairs that are unlikely to refer to matches without comparing them in detail
in the next step.
The efficiency of a blocking technique can be measured using reduction ratio
(RR) [29, 62], which provides a value that indicates by how much a blocking tech-
nique is able to reduce the number of candidate record pairs that are being generated
compared to all possible record pairs. A higher RR value means a blocking technique
is more efficient in reducing the number of candidate record pairs that are being gen-
erated. RR is calculated as RR = 1.0− (BM + BN)/(TM + FN + FM + TN).
The complexity of techniques (or algorithms) used in PPRL has also an impact
on the scalability of the protocol. Generally the complexity of algorithms is mea-
sured using the big-O notation [155] and practically evaluated in terms of efficiency
using measures that are dependent on the computing platform and the networking
infrastructure used, such as the total runtime, the memory space required to perform
the linkage, and the size of messages or data communicated between parties in the
protocol. The challenge with these platform dependent measures is how to normal-
ize them into the 0.0 to 1.0 interval, to allow comparison of several PPRL solutions.
A possible way to evaluate runtime, for example, is to calculate the average time
required for a candidate record pair to be compared and classified using the most
computationally intensive PPRL technique, and then multiply this value by the total
number of candidate record pairs (nA × nB, if no blocking is applied). This would
give an upper bound for expected runtime. Then we can run all the PPRL solutions
that need to be evaluated on the same computing platform, and measure their run-
time. Using the upper bound calculated, the resulting runtime values can then be
normalized between 0.0 and 1.0.
5.3.4 Overall Evaluation Score
A generic score can be calculated to evaluate PPRL techniques in terms of the three
properties using the measures discussed in the above sections. For example, given the
measures for disclosure risk (DR), linkage quality (LQ), and scalability (S), the overall
evaluation score can be computed as the weighted average of the three measures.
score = α(1− DR) + β(LQ) + (1− α− β)(S) 0 ≤ α+ β ≤ 1 (5.9)
Different weights for the three properties can be used depending on the impor-
tance of the properties with respect to application or user preferences. This final
numerical score indicates the viability of a specific PPRL solution in terms of pri-
vacy, linkage quality, and scalability. A graphical representation of the three prop-
erties of PPRL provides more insights into the analysis and comparison of different
PPRL techniques. Three-dimensional plots can be used to define the three properties
along the three axes of the graphs to compare PPRL solutions, as will be shown in
Chapter 10.
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Table 5.3: The number of records in the datasets used for experiments, and the num-
ber of records that occur in both datasets of a pair (i.e. the number of true matches).
Dataset Alice Bob Overlap
OZ-1730 No-mod / Mod 1,730 1,730 849 (50%)
OZ-17,294 No-mod / Mod 17,294 17,294 8,536 (50%)
OZ-172,938 No-mod / Mod 172,938 172,938 86,476 (50%)
OZ-1,729,379 No-mod / Mod 1,729,379 1,729,379 864,231 (50%)
NC 481,315 480,701 333,403 (70%)
5.4 Datasets Used
We used two real-world databases to empirically evaluate and compare the perfor-
mances of our proposed PPRL solutions and several existing state-of-the-art PPRL
solutions, as will be presented in the following chapters, using our proposed evalu-
ation framework.
1. OZ: The first dataset is a real Australian telephone database that contains
6,917,514 records. We extracted four attributes commonly used for record link-
age: given name (with 78,336 unique values), surname (with 404,651 unique
values), suburb (town) name (13,109 unique values), and postcode (2,632 unique
values). To generate datasets of different sizes, we sampled 0.1%, 1%, 10% and
100% of records in the full database twice each for Alice and Bob, and stored
them into pairs of files such that 50% of records appeared in both files of a pair.
The record pairs that occur in both datasets are exact matches. These datasets
are labelled as ‘No-mod’ for no modification. To investigate the performance
of PPRL solutions in the context of ‘dirty data’ (where attribute values con-
tain errors and variations), we generated another series of datasets where we
modified each attribute value by applying a randomly selected character edit
operation (insert, delete, substitute, or transposition) [34]. These datasets are
labelled as ‘Mod’ for modification. This leads to a much reduced number of
exact matching record pairs and allows us to evaluate the quality of solutions
in terms of the accuracy of approximate matching.
2. NC: The second dataset we used is a large real-world voter registration database
from North Carolina (NC) in the US [31], containing records of over 8 million
voters. We downloaded this dataset every two months since October 2011 to
build a longitudinal dataset. We extracted four attributes (first name, surname,
city, and zipcode) of 629,362 voters, such that 314,644 were represented by a
single record and 314,718 by two or more records (up-to 6), where duplicate
records contain both typographical errors, and actual variations and changes of
values. We split this dataset (randomly) into two containing 481,315 and 480,701
records for Alice and Bob, respectively. Because voter registration numbers iden-
tify unique voters we can calculate the linkage quality. Table 5.3 provides an
overview of the datasets we generated.
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Table 5.4: The number of records in the corrupted datasets used for experiments, and
the number of records that occur in both datasets of a pair (i.e. the number of true
matches). Three levels of corruptions are applied which are labelled as ‘Light-mod’,
‘Med-mod’, and ‘Heavy-mod’.
Dataset Alice Bob Overlap
OZ Cor-4,611 Light / Med / Heavy 4,611 4,611 2,305 (50%)
OZ Cor-46,116 Light / Med / Heavy 46,116 46,116 23,058 (50%)
OZ Cor-461,167 Light / Med / Heavy 461,167 461,167 230,583 (50%)
NC Cor-5,488 Light / Med / Heavy 5,488 5,488 2,744 (50%)
NC Cor-54,886 Light / Med / Heavy 54,886 54,886 27,443 (50%)
NC Cor-548,860 Light / Med / Heavy 548,860 548,860 274,430 (50%)
3. OZ Cor and NC Cor: To simulate real-world ‘dirty’ data [29, 83] that ex-
hibit data errors, such as data entry errors, phonetic variations, typographical
mistakes, measurement or format variations, scanning and Optical Character
Recognition (OCR) errors, and speech recognition errors of dictated values, we
applied several corruption functions to the two above described databases (OZ
and NC) and generated another set of corrupted datasets. These datasets allow
us to evaluate the performance of PPRL algorithms (especially the quality of ap-
proximate matching) in a real-world setting. We used our flexible data Genera-
tion and Corruption of personal data tool (GeCo) [35] to corrupt the OZ and NC
databases. The GeCo tool is available online: http://dmm.anu.edu.au/geco [183].
We applied four different corruption functions as given below:
(a) Character edit corruptor: This function applies one of the four edits at a
randomly selected position in an attribute value: insert a new character,
delete the character, substitute with a new character, or transpose the char-
acter with one of its neighboring characters. Probabilities are set as equal
for each of these edits except for the postcode / zipcode attribute where
only the substitute edit is applied with probability of 1.0 (since zipcode /
postcode values have fixed length of numerical characters).
(b) OCR corruptor: This function replaces a character sequence in an attribute
value with a new character sequence that has similar shape, such as ‘5’ and
‘s’ or ‘m’ and ‘rn’, to model OCR errors.
(c) Keyboard corruptor: This function simulates typing errors by randomly
replacing a character with a neighbouring character according to a key-
board layout matrix, such as ’a’ and ’s’ in QWERTY keyboard layout.
Probabilities for selecting a replacement in a row or column are set to
0.5 for each.
(d) Phonetic corruptor: This function simulates phonetic errors by replacing
a sequence of characters in an attribute value with a new sequence of
characters that sounds similar, such as ‘ph’ and ‘f’, or ‘rie’ and ‘ry’.
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We applied all four corruption functions with equal probability (of 0.25) to all
attributes except the postcode / zipcode attribute to which only the character
edit corruptor and OCR corruptor are applied with probabilities set to 0.5.
For each dataset, we generated three variations with three different levels of
corruptions, which are lightly modified (that corrupts only one attribute), mod-
erately modified (corrupts two attributes), and heavily modified (corrupts all
four attributes). The attributes are selected for corruption randomly with 0.25
of probability. The different levels of corruptions in the datasets allow us to
evaluate how these corruptions affect the performance of the solutions. The set
of corrupted datasets we generated for the experimental study are shown in
Table 5.4.
It is important to note that we assume in this study that the datasets do not con-
tain any missing values in the attributes used for linkage and / or blocking. However,
real-world datasets do contain missing values due to various reasons [29]. Address-
ing the problem of missing values by preprocessing the datasets before conducting
PPRL is out of the scope of this study.
5.5 Linkage Attacks
We present the methods for linkage attacks on our proposed solutions using an ex-
ternal global dataset, for privacy evaluation of the solutions, in the relevant chapters.
As explained by Duncan et al. [54], a drawback of using external datasets for risk
calculation in disclosure control, is that the results are dependent on the choice of
global datasets. Conducting linkage studies using a very large external dataset as
the global dataset would require longer runtime and more computational resources
which might not be practical for empirical evaluation. In addition, an external global
dataset might not be available for privacy evaluation. In the worst case scenario, the
global dataset G can be considered to be equivalent to the linked database D (i.e. G ≡
D). Conducting linkage studies of attacks such as frequency attacks, cryptanalysis
attacks, and collusion using the masked dataset (DM) and the original dataset D
as the global dataset would provide the highest disclosure risk in this worst case
scenario. If a specific privacy technique provides sufficient privacy guarantees under
such a worst case assumption, then the privacy technique would provide sufficient
privacy in a real-world setting as well, because the global dataset available to an
adversary is highly likely to be different from the original dataset. If G is larger than
D, then there would possibly be many global values in GM that match a masked
value in DM, which therefore results in lower disclosure risk. On the other hand, if
G is smaller than D, there might be masked values in DM that do not match with
any global values in GM, again resulting in lower disclosure risk.
We consider the worst case assumption of G ≡ D (though they are not practical in
real applications, they provide a baseline for privacy comparison of PPRL techniques)
in this thesis for privacy evaluation and comparison of several PPRL techniques in
Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. However, the proposed framework can be used with
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any choice of global datasets (as long as all the techniques are compared for privacy
against attacks using the same global dataset).
5.6 Computing Platform Used
We prototyped all the solutions presented in the remaining chapters using the Python
programming language (version 2.7.3), due to its flexibility and efficiency for rapid
prototype development model. We also used the Freely extensible biomedical record
linkage (Febrl) [32] tool for implementing the approximate string comparison func-
tions and phonetic encoding function. All tests were run on a compute server with
two 64-bit Intel Xeon (2.4 GHz) CPUs, 128 GBytes of main memory and running
Ubuntu 12.04. The programs and (the small) test datasets are available upon request.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have provided the details of the experimental setup used to con-
duct an effective and practical empirical study of our PPRL solutions which will be
presented in the next four chapters. We have proposed a comprehensive evaluation
framework for PPRL solutions that enables assessment and comparison of different
solutions in terms of the three main properties of PPRL, which are scalability, linkage
quality, and privacy.
Scalability and quality of PPRL solutions can be assessed using the standard mea-
sures that have been used in the literature. However, numerical measures to quantify
the privacy guarantees provided by a solution need to be defined. We have defined
five different disclosure risk measures that can be used to measure the privacy by
simulating frequency linkage attacks using an external global dataset. Then we pre-
sented the details of datasets and computing platform used for the empirical study
of our research.
Future work includes extending the evaluation framework to address the problem
of privacy-preserving linking of multiple sources and to consider different adversar-
ial models such as the covert model [8] or accountable computing [95] for privacy
evaluation. A limitation with the proposed disclosure risk measures for privacy
evaluation is that they strongly depend on the attack methods used and the fine tun-
ing of parameters of those attack methods. More research is required in the direction
of developing efficient and effective attack methods for privacy evaluation.
Chapter 6
Three-Party Private Blocking
Addressing the scalability aspect of privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) using
efficient private blocking techniques has been identified as one of the important re-
search directions in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we propose an efficient three-party
private blocking solution based on the sorted neighborhood approach that combines
the k-anonymous mapping and reference values privacy techniques, as will be de-
scribed in Section 6.2. We analyze the solution in Section 6.3 with respect to com-
plexity, privacy, and quality, and in Section 6.5 we validate these analyses through
an empirical study based on a linkage attack proposed in Section 6.4. Finally we
summarize our findings in Section 6.6.
6.1 Introduction
The scalability challenge of PPRL has been addressed by several recent approaches
that adapt existing blocking techniques, such as standard blocking [65], mapping-
based blocking [96], clustering [44], and locality sensitive hashing [113], into a privacy-
preserving context. One popular blocking technique used in traditional record link-
age is the sorted neighborhood approach [52, 84], where database records are sorted
according to their sorting key values (SKVs - values of an attribute or a combina-
tion of attributes used to sort the records) over which a sliding window is moved.
Candidate pairs are generated from the records that are within the current window.
The sorted neighborhood approach is very efficient compared to other blocking
techniques in that its resulting number of candidate record pairs is O((nA + nB)w),
compared to O((nA · nB)/b) for other blocking techniques [30], where nA and nB are
the respective number of records in the two databases DA and DB to be linked, b is
the number of blocks generated, and w is the size of the window. However, the use
of sorted neighborhood methods for blocking has only received a little attention in
the PPRL context [106].
Karakasidis et al. [106] proposed a sorted neighborhood-based private blocking
approach using k-nearest neighbor (or k-medoids) clustering to group similar (candi-
date) records into the same block individually by the database owners (which is less
efficient than the sorted neighborhood approach in terms of computation complex-
ity), followed by using the sorted neighborhood approach by the third party to group
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Table 6.1: Notation used in this chapter.
DA, DB Databases held by database owners Alice and Bob, respectively
R Publicly available reference dataset
R′ Lists of reference values selected from R by Alice and Bob
nA, nB Number of records in DA and DB, respectively
nR, n Number of reference values in R′, and number of records in databases
k Minimum number of records in a block
SA, SB Set of sorted neighborhood clusters (SNC) in Alice’s and Bob’s databases, respectively
OA, OB Set of k-anonymous clusters in Alice’s and Bob’s databases, respectively
C Set of candidate record pairs
sim(·, ·) Function used to calculate similarities between two reference values (0 ≤ sim(·, ·) ≤ 1)
st Minimum similarity threshold value to determine a pair of reference values as similar, 0 ≤ st ≤ 1
candidate blocks from both database owners. In contrast, we aim to develop more
efficient technique by using only the sorted neighborhood approach for the private
blocking of databases.
In this chapter, we propose an efficient three-party blocking technique for PPRL
based on the sorted neighborhood approach using a combination of two privacy tech-
niques: k-anonymous mapping [72, 182] and public reference values [154]. The aim
of this approach is to efficiently create k-anonymous blocks represented by reference
values from which candidate pairs are generated, without revealing any information
that can be used to infer individual records and their attribute values. We propose
two versions of k-anonymous mapping to generate k-anonymous blocks. The first
is based on similarity between reference values (which we call SNC-3PSim) and the
second on the size of blocks (SNC-3PSize). In the following section we describe our
protocol in detail.
6.2 Proposed Solution
In this section we describe the steps of our sorted neighborhood clustering (SNC)-
based three-party private blocking protocol. Assume Alice and Bob are the two own-
ers of their respective databases DA and DB, and Carol is the trusted third party. Alice
and Bob share the sorted reference list R′ containing nR reference values selected from
the publicly available reference dataset R.
Reference values have been used in PPRL as a privacy technique for mapping the
attribute values in a database into a masked version such that the distances between
the actual values are preserved in the masked version [104, 154, 170, 210]. Such
reference values can either be constructed with random faked values, or they can be
extracted from a publicly available dataset, for example, all unique surnames taken
from a public telephone directory or electoral roll (such as the NC voter dataset [31]
as described in Section 5.4).
Figure 6.1 illustrates the three-party setting for private blocking, and Table 6.1
summarizes the notation we use in this chapter. We illustrate the steps with an ex-
ample consisting of two small databases with given names and surnames, as shown
in Figure 6.2. The two database owners Alice and Bob perform the following steps, as
illustrated in Figures 6.2 to 6.4 (taken from [189]).












(1) agree on parameters
Figure 6.1: Outline of the proposed three-party private blocking protocol (taken
from [189]). The numbers given correspond to the protocol steps described in Sec-
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Figure 6.2: Example databases held by Alice (DA) and Bob (DB) with surname and
given name attributes and their SKVs, and a list of reference values (R′) along with
their position values, used to illustrate the protocol described in Section 6.2.
1. They agree upon the list of attributes to be used as the sorting keys, the ref-
erence dataset R, the number of reference values to be used nR, the minimum
number of records in a block k, a similarity (approximate string comparison)
function sim(·, ·) to compare reference values (0 ≤ sim(·, ·) ≤ 1), and the min-
imum similarity threshold st used to decide if two blocks are to be merged in
the SNC-3PSim approach described in Step 4.
2. Alice and Bob each randomly selects and sorts nR (nR ≤ |R|) reference values in
lexicographical order. The value for nR can be chosen as nR = min(|DA|, |DB|)/k,
so that each block will contain roughly around k database records. It is impor-
tant to note that both Alice and Bob have the same list of sorted reference values
R′ at the end of this step and Carol does not know R′. A secret random seed
shared by Alice and Bob (but not known to Carol) can be used to select the same
set of values from R into R′ by both Alice and Bob.
3. Alice and Bob individually insert their records based on the records’ SKVs into
the sorted list of reference values to create SNC blocks, as shown in Figure 6.3.
An inverted index data structure can be used to efficiently insert records where
the keys are the reference values and the corresponding values contain a list of
SKVs that are lexicographically sorted before the reference value.





















































SNC blocks SNC blocksk−anonymous blocks k−anonymous blocks
Figure 6.3: Insertion of SKVs into the sorted list of reference values (protocol step 3)
where each block is represented by one reference value (shown in italics font), and
merging of blocks to create k-anonymous blocks (protocol step 4) where each block
is represented by one or more reference values (in this example, k = 3).
Algorithm 6.1 : Size-based merging
Input: S: Set of SNC blocks (b : [v1, . . . , vl ])
k: Minimum number of elements in a block
Output: O: Set of k-anonymous blocks
(‘b_x . . . _(x + y)′ : [v1, . . . , vk ])
1: ids = []; sizes = [] {[] is an empty list}
2: for (r, c) ∈ S do
3: ids+ = [r]; sizes+ = [len(c)]
4: end for
5: min_size = min(sizes)
6: while min_size < k and len(ids) > 1 do
7: min_size_block = S.getID(len(b) =min_size)
8: block_vals = S[min_size_block]
9: i = ids.getindex(min_size_block)
10: prev_block = ids[i-1]; next_block = ids[i+1]
11: if len(S[prev_block]) < len(S[next_block])
then
12: block_id =min_size_block +prev_block
13: block_vals += S[prev_block]
14: else
15: block_id = min_size_block + next_block
16: block_vals += S[next_block]
17: end if
18: update(sizes); min_size = min(sizes)
19: O[block_id] =block_vals
20: end while
Algorithm 6.2 : Sim-based merging
Input: R′: List of sorted reference values
[r1, . . . , rnR ]
S: Set of SNC blocks (b : [v1, . . . , vl ])
k: Minimum number of elements in a block
st: Minimum similarity threshold
sim(·, ·): Similarity comparison function
Output: O: Set of k-anonymous blocks
(‘b_x . . . _(x + y)′ : [v1, . . . , vk ])
1: i = 0
2: while i < nR do
3: block_vals = []; block_id = ‘b’
4: num_vals = 0; j = 0
5: sim_val = 0.0
6: while (num_vals < k and i + j < nR)
or (sim_val ≥ st and i + j < nR) do
7: ri = R′[i + j]; b = S[ri+j]
8: num_vals += len(b)
9: block_vals += b
10: sim_val = sim(ri+j, ri+j+1)
11: block_id += str(i + j) + ‘_’
12: j+= 1
13: end while
14: O[block_id ] = block_vals
15: i+= j
16: end while
4. The next step is to create k-anonymous blocks. After inserting records into the
sorted list of reference values there will be nR SNC blocks each represented by
one reference value. However, to provide k-anonymous privacy characteristics,
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each database owner has to perform k-anonymous mapping [182] by merging
their blocks in such a way that each block contains at least k database records.
Block IDs are assigned to the merged (k-anonymous) blocks such that they
consist of the position values of the reference values that reside in the merged
blocks. We use block IDs of the form ‘b_x_(x+1) · · · _(x+y)’, where x is the
position value of the first reference value in the corresponding block, and (y +
1) is the number of reference values in that block. The merging of blocks
to create k-anonymous blocks is shown in Figure 6.3. This merging process
can be done in two different ways, as illustrated in Algorithms 6.1 and 6.2
(individually by Alice and Bob).
(a) SNC-3PSize: Blocks are merged until the minimum size of the blocks
becomes greater than or equal to k by iteratively identifying the smallest
block. Algorithm 6.1 provides an overview of this method. In lines 2-5, we
find the block with the smallest number of elements, and if this number
is less than k (line 6) we merge it with the smaller of its two neighboring
blocks. getID(.) and getIndex(.) are functions used to get the ID and the
index of a block in the set of SNC blocks (S), respectively, while len(.) is
a function used to calculate the length of a block. We repeat this merging
(lines 6-20) until the size of the smallest block is at least k. The values
in the merged block are stored in the output set of k-anonymous blocks
(O) in line 19 along with the block ID. This method results in similar
number of records in most blocks. However, true matches might be missed
depending on the value for k, because the similarity between reference
values is not considered.
(b) SNC-3PSim: Blocks are merged until the number of elements in each
of them becomes greater than or equal to k and the similarity between
reference values of adjacent blocks becomes less than the threshold st.
This approach follows recent work on adaptive sorted neighborhood for
duplicate detection [52]. Algorithm 6.2 shows the main steps involved in
this method. The blocks are merged until their size becomes greater than
or equal to k (line 6 in Algorithm 6.2). If the size of the (merged) block
is at least k, we compute the similarity of the next block’s reference value
ri+j+1 with the current block’s reference value ri+j, and if this similarity
value sim(ri+j+1, ri+j) is greater than or equal to st, then we continue to
merge the next block with the current block. Lines 6-13 show this loop
of merging. In line 14, the values in the merged block are stored in the
output set of k-anonymous blocks (O) with the block ID. This method is
more likely to insert similar values into one block, at the cost that the
resulting larger blocks will generate more candidate record pairs.
5. Once the k-anonymous blocks are created, they need to be sent to a third party,
Carol, to generate candidate record pairs. The values in the blocks are replaced
by their (encrypted) record IDs.
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Figure 6.4: The merging of corresponding blocks from Alice and Bob to generate
candidate record pairs as conducted by Carol in Step 6 of the protocol.
Carol receives the k-anonymous blocks from Alice and Bob and performs the following
steps:
Algorithm 6.3 : Generating candidate record pairs
Input: OA: Alice’s set of k-anonymous blocks
OB: Bob’s set of k-anonymous blocks
Output: C: Set of candidate record pairs
1: for (iA, bA) ∈ OA do
2: ref_pos_vals_alice = get_re f _pos_vals(iA)
3: bob_blocks = []; bB = []
4: for ref_pos ∈ ref_pos_vals_alice do
5: bob_blocks += OB.getIDs(ref_pos)
6: bB += OB[bob_blocks]
7: end for
8: for alice_rec_ID ∈ bA do
9: for bob_rec_ID ∈ bB do




6. Carol finds corresponding blocks from Alice and Bob based on the reference
position values in the block IDs to generate candidate record pairs, as illustrated
in Figure 6.4 and Algorithm 6.3. From the block IDs, Carol extracts the position
values of the reference values that reside in the corresponding blocks using
get_re f _pos_vals(·) (line 2). In lines 3-7, Carol finds for each of Alice’s blocks all
of Bob’s blocks that need to be merged by extracting the position values from
Alice’s block IDs. Carol then performs a nested loop (lines 8-12) over Alice’s
blocks and Bob’s corresponding blocks, and stores the record pairs from Alice’s
and Bob’s records in the output set of candidate record pairs C.
7. Carol sends the record IDs of the candidate pairs C back to Alice and Bob which
then employ a private matching and classification protocol on the generated
candidate record pairs [56, 154, 174] (as will be proposed in Chapters 8 and 9).
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6.3 Analysis of the Protocol
In this section we analyse our SNC-based three-party private blocking approach in
terms of complexity, privacy, and quality of blocking.
6.3.1 Complexity
Assuming both databases contain n records (n = nA = nB) and nR reference val-
ues are selected from the reference dataset, sorting these nR reference values is of
O(nR log nR) complexity, and inserting the n database records into the sorted list of
reference values is of O(n) complexity. At the end of this step (step 3), there will
be nR SNC blocks each represented by one reference value. Merging these blocks to
create k-anonymous blocks in step 4 requires a loop over nR blocks, which results to
O(nR) merged blocks. Sending the k-anonymous blocks to Carol is of O(n) commu-
nication complexity. Carol performs a loop over the blocks (a maximum of nR blocks)
in step 6 to merge and generate candidate record pairs from Alice’s and Bob’s records.
The computation complexity of this step is O(n2R).
The overall complexity of our approach is linear in the size of the databases n and
quadratic in the number of reference values nR. The number of generated blocks will
be on average n/k. Assuming each block contains k records, the number of candidate
record pairs generated by our approach is nk × k2 = n k.
6.3.2 Privacy
We assume that all parties that participate in the protocol follow the honest but
curious (HBC) adversarial model [78], in that they follow the protocol while trying
to find out as much as possible about the data from the other party. We analyze
the privacy of the protocol, by evaluating what can be learned by each of the parties
from the data they communicate with each other during the protocol.
In step 5, Alice and Bob send their k-anonymous blocks (with encrypted record
identifiers) to Carol to generate candidate blocks. Since each block consists of at least
k records, it is difficult for Carol to perform a frequency linkage attack (as will be
presented in Section 6.4) to infer individual records. This is because each record in a
k-anonymous block is consistent (or similar) with at least k records in the same block
resulting in a maximum disclosure risk of DRMax = 1/k (as was discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3.1). The value for k has to be chosen carefully. A higher value for k provides
stronger privacy guarantees but more candidate record pairs will be generated.
Furthermore, Carol does not know the list of reference values used (R′), and
therefore she cannot learn the blocking details such as k-anonymous mapping. Alice
and Bob cannot learn anything about each other’s data as they do not communicate
any data between them. However, as with other three-party protocols, collusion
between the third party and one of the database owners with the aim to identify the
other database owner’s data, is a privacy risk in this approach as well [78].
In step 7, Carol sends back the candidate record pairs to Alice and Bob to perform
linkage using a private matching and classification technique [56, 154, 174], which
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(using G = D )
1/7(4x1/4+3x1/3) = 2/7 = 0.28
Figure 6.5: An attack method for three-party private blocking solutions [56, 104, 124, 189]
using G ≡ D and the statistical disclosure risk (DR) measures (presented in Section 5.3.1)
calculated for the linkage attack. The example dataset is made-up for illustrative purposes.
Records r1 . . . r4 are consistent with 4 records in the same block b1 of size t1 = 4 resulting in
probability of suspicion of Ps = 1/4, while records r5 . . . r7 are consistent with 3 records in
the same block b2 of t2 = 3 resulting in Ps = 1/3. The total number of records in D is n = 7
(taken from [190]).
should not reveal any sensitive information (this step is outside of our protocol).
6.3.3 Quality
A good blocking technique should be able to group all similar records into the same
block - i.e., effectiveness measured by pairs completeness (PC), while keeping the
number of candidate record pairs generated as small as possible - i.e., efficiency
measured by reduction ratio (RR) [30]. SNC-3PSim retrieves more similar records
compared to SNC-3PSize as the similarity between reference values is used in SNC-
3PSim to determine the maximum size of a block. This results in higher PC and
lower RR for SNC-3PSim compared to SNC-3PSize.
The value of k also determines the PC and RR of blocking. A higher value for k
results in higher PC but lower RR. An optimal k needs to be set such that high values
for both PC and RR are achieved while k guarantees sufficient privacy as well.
6.4 Linkage Attack
Based on the evaluation model proposed in Chapter 5, we now describe the fre-
quency linkage attack for our SNC-3P approaches using an external global dataset G
(which is assumed to be the same original dataset D in the worst case as discussed
in Section 5.5) for privacy evaluation.
Generally in three-party private blocking techniques, only the number of blocks
(nB) and the size of each block (ti = |bi|, 1 ≤ i ≤ nB) are revealed to the third party
that participates in the protocol. In the masked (blocked) database DM, a record r is
consistent or similar with ti − 1 other records in the same block bi where r resides.
For our SNC-3P approaches, ti ≥ k. If r is consistent with ti records (including r) in
the local (masked) database then there would be at least ti global matching values
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(a) Total time for database owners - OZ datasets
SNC-3PSim
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(d) Total time for the blocking - NC Cor datasets
SNC-3PSim
SNC-3PSize
Figure 6.6: Total time of the SNC-3P blocking approaches required by (a) database owners,
and (b) third party on the OZ datasets, (c) total blocking time on the OZ Cor datasets, and
(d) total blocking time on the NC Cor datasets averaged over the results of all variations of
each dataset.
ng (≥ ti) in G. Therefore the probability of suspicion (Ps) of a record r in private
blocking is Ps = 1/ti (≥ 1/ng) under the worst case assumption (G ≡ D).
The general attack method and disclosure risk calculation for three-party private
blocking solutions on a small made-up (of 7 records) dataset with two blocks b1 of
size t1 = 4 and b2 of t2 = 3 are illustrated in Figure 6.5. The maximum disclosure risk
is DRMax = 1/min(ti) = 1/3, because each masked value in the blocked database
DM is consistent with at least 3 values in the database. Lower DR values calculated
under the worst case validates that a specific private blocking solution would provide
sufficient privacy guarantees against frequency attacks in the actual setting.
6.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present and discuss the results of the experimental evaluation
study of our SNC-3P based approaches conducted on the datasets described in Sec-
tion 5.4 using the evaluation framework proposed in Chapter 5. The default param-
eters were set as st = 0.9 and k = 100 (this gives best results in terms of all three
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properties of PPRL, as will be shown in Figure 6.9). Different values for k in the
range of [3, 10, 20, 50, 100] were also used to evaluate the performance of the SNC-3P
blocking against k. A combination of two attributes was used as the sorting key:
given name / first name, and surname / last name.
Figure 6.6 shows the total blocking time required for private blocking of the SNC-
3P approaches on different datasets. As can be seen from the figure, the SNC ap-
proach (both variations of SNC-3PSim and SNC-3PSize) is very efficient (in terms of
blocking time) and is also almost linear in the size of the databases. SNC-3PSim is
faster in blocking the databases by the database owners, as shown in Figure 6.6 (a),
because the SNC-3PSize involves several iterations until the minimum bock size be-
comes at least k, as was explained in Algorithm 6.1. Both SNC-3PSim and SNC-
3PSize require almost same runtime by the third party, as shown in Figure 6.6 (b).
Hence SNC-3PSim requires shorter time in total than SNC-3PSize, especially on the
largest datasets (see Figures 6.6 (c) and 6.6 (d)).


































































Figure 6.7: A comparison of reduction ratio (RR) against pairs completeness (PC) of the (a)
SNC-3PSim and (b) SNC-3PSize solutions on the OZ Cor-46,116 and NC Cor-54,886 datasets
with No-mod, Light-mod, Med-mod, and Heavy-mod variations.
A comparison of the efficiency and effectiveness of the SNC-3P blocking mea-
sured by reduction ratio (RR) and pairs completeness (PC), respectively, is presented
in Figure 6.7 on the OZ Cor-46,116 and NC Cor-54,886 datasets with different levels
of data modifications (corruptions). Different levels of corruptions applied to the
datasets (as was described in Section 5.4) allow us to evaluate the performance of
approximate matching of our solutions in the presence of data errors. As shown in
the figure, both approaches achieve high RR and PC when no modification is applied
to the datasets, and then the values decrease as the level of modifications increases.
Both approaches of SNC-3P achieve similar values for RR and PC. However, as we
discussed in Section 6.3.3, a slightly higher PC and a lower RR are achieved by the
SNC-3PSim approach, comparatively.
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Figure 6.8: A comparison of probability of suspicion (Ps) values of the blocked NC dataset
generated by the (a) SNC-3PSim and (b) SNC-3PSize approaches and the calculated disclo-
sure risk (DR) measures on the NC dataset.
We next study the distribution of Ps values in the masked and blocked NC dataset
by the SNC-3P blocking solutions, and the DR measures (proposed in Section 5.3.1)
calculated for the frequency linkage attack (described in Section 6.4). The DR results
illustrated in Figure 6.8 show the privacy aspects of both SNC-3P approaches by
providing lower values for the disclosure risk even in the worst case assumption.
Finally, we investigate the performance of our solution against different values
of k in Figure 6.9. The SNC-3P approaches achieve high values for both PC and
RR even when k = 100, which gives a strong privacy guarantee (Figure 6.9 (a)).
As discussed in Section 6.3.3, the effectiveness of blocking (PC) increases with k
while efficiency (RR) decreases. PC is slightly higher for SNC-3PSim compared to
SNC-3PSize (though the difference is not significant) due to the effectiveness of SNC-
3PSim as was discussed in Section 6.3.2.
Figure 6.9 (b) shows the scalability (in terms of blocking time) of our approach
with different values of k. Interestingly, the total time required for blocking decreases
with k. This is because when k gets larger, a smaller number of larger sized blocks
are generated, and thus it takes shorter time for k-anonymous mapping and for gen-
erating candidate record pairs. The difference in total time against k is considerable
with the SNC-3PSize approach, as illustrated in Figure 6.9 (b).
The DR measures calculated based on the linkage attack given in Section 6.4
against different values of k is illustrated in Figure 6.9 (c). As discussed in Sec-
tion 6.3.2, disclosure risk decreases when k becomes larger, because a masked value
in the blocked dataset will have at most 1/k of probability of suspicion and this value
decreases with k. These empirical results show that privacy (measured by DR) and
quality (measured by PC) of the SNC-3P approaches increase with k while scalability
or efficiency (measured by RR) decreases with k, though at a smaller cost.
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Figure 6.9: (a) Reduction ratio (RR) and pairs completeness (PC) values for the SNC-3P
blocking approaches on the OZ-17,294 Mod dataset, (b) total blocking time against the dataset
size averaged over the results of all variations of each dataset, and (c) disclosure risk values
on the OZ-17,294 Mod dataset, for different values of k.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed an efficient three-party private blocking technique
that can be used to make privacy-preserving record linkage applications scalable to
large databases. Our method is based on the sorted nearest neighborhood clustering
approach, and uses a combination of the privacy techniques reference values and k-
anonymous mapping. Experiments conducted on large real-world databases validate
that our approach is scalable to large databases and effective in generating quality
candidate record pairs while preserving k-anonymous privacy characteristics.
However, as discussed earlier, three-party solutions are often susceptible to collu-
sion between parties. In the next chapter, we aim to study how the sorted neighbor-
hood clustering can be used for private blocking in a two-party context.
Chapter 7
Two-Party Private Blocking
As discussed in the previous chapters, one main threat with three-party solutions
is the possibility of collusion between parties to identify the private data of another
party. In this chapter, we introduce a novel two-party private blocking technique for
privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) based on the efficient sorted neighborhood
clustering, as will be described in Section 7.2. Similar to the SNC-3P private blocking
approach proposed in the previous chapter, privacy is addressed by k-anonymous
mapping and public reference values. We analyze our two-party solution in Sec-
tion 7.3 and empirically evaluate in Section 7.5 based on a linkage attack presented
in Section 7.4. Finally we summarize our work in Section 7.6.
7.1 Introduction
Private blocking aims to generate candidate record pairs from two databases without
revealing any sensitive information that can be used to infer individual records and
their attribute values in the databases. As discussed in Chapter 6, the sorted neigh-
borhood approach is considered to be a very efficient technique compared to other
blocking techniques in terms of the number of candidate record pairs generated [52].
As reviewed in Chapter 3, majority of the proposed private blocking solutions
require a trusted third party to perform the blocking. Such three-party solutions
are often not reliable due to the privacy risk of collusion between the third party
and one of the database owners with the aim to learn about the other database
owner’s private or confidential information. We therefore propose an efficient two-
party private blocking technique based on the sorted neighborhood approach using a
combination of two privacy techniques: k-anonymous mapping [72, 182] and public
reference values [154].
7.2 Proposed Solution
As we did in the previous chapter, we assume again two database owners, Alice and
Bob, with databases DA and DB, participate in the protocol to perform private block-
ing on their databases. Alice and Bob have access to a publicly available reference
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Table 7.1: Notation used in this chapter.
DA, DB Databases held by database owners Alice and Bob, respectively
R Publicly available reference dataset
RA, RB Lists of reference values independently selected from R by Alice and Bob, respectively (RA 6= RB)
k, w Minimum number of records in a block, and size of the window
nA, nB Number of records in DA and DB, respectively
nAR , n
B
R Number of reference values in R
A and RB used by Alice and Bob, respectively
nR, n Total number of reference values used, and number of records in databases
nr , ne Number of reference values in each block, and number of reference values exchanged from each block
Ai , Bi The ith k-anonymous block of Alice and Bob, respectively
Wi The ith window created by the sliding window
vi Sorting key value (SKV) of ith record in the databases
ri Reference value in the ith position in the sorted reference list
sim(·, ·) Function used to calculate similarities between two reference values ri and rj, (0 ≤ sim(·, ·) ≤ 1)
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Figure 7.1: Outline of the proposed two-party private blocking protocol (taken from [192]).
The numbers given correspond to the protocol steps explained in Section 7.2.1.
dataset R that contains reference values in the same domain as the values used for
the sorting key. All values in DA and DB are sensitive, and only R is shared between
Alice and Bob. The aim of this approach is to identify candidate record pairs from
DA and DB by using the values in R without revealing any information about the
sensitive values in DA and DB. Figure 7.1 illustrates the two-party setting and the
outline of our solution, and Table 7.1 summarizes the notation we use in this chapter.
Initially local blocks are independently generated by Alice and Bob using sorted
neighborhood-based k-anonymous clustering. Each of the generated k-anonymous
blocks contains at least k database records and nr reference values (nr ≥ 1). To
identify the candidate blocks from both databases a certain number of reference val-
ues (ne) from each block are exchanged between Alice and Bob. These exchanged
reference values represent the sorting key values (SKVs) of the records in the corre-
sponding blocks. The sorted nearest neighborhood approach is applied on the list of
exchanged reference values from both databases, to find the candidate blocks from
the reference values that fall into the same window.



























































Figure 7.2: Example databases held by Alice (DA) and Bob (DB) with SKVs based on surname
attribute, and the lists of reference values (RA and RB) for Alice and Bob, respectively, used
to illustrate the protocol described in Section 7.2.1.
7.2.1 Protocol Description
In this section we describe the steps involved in our two-party sorted neighborhood
clustering (SNC)-based private blocking approach, and illustrate the protocol with
an example consisting of two small databases, as shown in Figure 7.2. The protocol
performs the following steps, as illustrated in Figures 7.2 to 7.4 (taken from [192]):
1. The first step is for the database owners, Alice and Bob, to agree upon the
attributes to be used as the sorting key, the minimum number of elements in
a block k, the size of the window w, a similarity function sim(·, ·) to compare
reference values (0 ≤ sim(·, ·) ≤ 1), and the minimum similarity threshold st
which defines if two blocks should be merged or not. The sim(·, ·) function
used here is an approximate string comparison function [29] that calculates
how similar two reference values (which are assumed to be strings) are.
2. Alice and Bob each individually selects and sorts a certain number of reference
values (nR) from the reference dataset R. We will provide details of this selec-
tion process in Section 7.2.2. The value for nR can be chosen as nR = n/k ∗ nr,
where n is the number of records in the database to be blocked, so that each
block will roughly contain nr reference values. Since Alice and Bob do this step
independently, they will end up with different lists of sorted reference values
(RA and RB, respectively). Due to the selection process, some reference values
might occur in both RA and RB.
3. Alice and Bob then individually insert their database records based on the
records’ SKVs into their sorted list of reference values. This step generates
SNC-based blocks that contain one reference value in each block and it’s cor-
responding list of SKVs which are lexicographically sorted before the reference
value (see SNC blocks in Figure 7.3). An inverted index data structure can be
used to perform this blocking efficiently.





























































































Figure 7.3: Insertion of SKVs into the list of sorted reference values to generate SNC blocks
(protocol step 3) and merging of blocks to generate k-anonymous blocks (protocol step 4),
where each block is represented by one or several reference values and contains the SKVs
that are sorted near the reference values. The reference values that are selected to represent
each block are then exchanged between Alice and Bob (protocol step 5). In this example, k = 3
and st = 0.8. Reference values are shown in italic font.
Algorithm 7.1 : Generating k-anonymous blocks (protocol step 4)
Input: R′: List of sorted reference values [r1, . . . , rnR ]
S: Set of SNC blocks (r1 : [v1, . . . , vl ])
k: Minimum number of elements in a block
st: Minimum similarity threshold
sim(·, ·): Similarity comparison function
Output: O: Set of k-anonymous blocks ((r1, . . . , rnr ) : [v1, . . . , vk ])
1: i = 0
2: while i < nR do
3: block_vals = []; ref_vals = []
4: num_vals = 0; sim_val = 0.0; j = 0
5: while (num_vals ≤ k and i + j < nR) or
(sim_val ≥ st and i + j < nR) do
6: ri = R′[i + j]; c = S[ri+j]
7: num_vals += len(c)
8: block_vals += c
9: sim_val = sim(ri+j, ri+j+1)
10: ref_vals += ri
11: j += 1
12: end while
13: O[(ref_vals )] = block_vals
14: i += j
15: end while
4. The next step is to merge the SNC blocks such that each block contains at least
k database records. This provides k-anonymous privacy characteristics, as each
record in the database can be seen as similar to at least k− 1 other records. Al-
gorithm 7.1 (which is executed independently by Alice and Bob) shows the main
steps involved in the merging of SNC blocks to create k-anonymous blocks. The
k-anonymous blocks are generated by merging the SNC blocks until the num-
ber of records in the blocks becomes (or is) at least k (lines 5-12). The similarity
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Figure 7.4: The sorted nearest neighborhood approach on the exchanged reference values
using a sliding window of size (a) w = 1 and (b) w = 2, and (on the right side) their
corresponding candidate blocks generated (protocol step 6).
between reference values can also be considered using the sim(·, ·) function. If
the similarity between two reference values in two different blocks is greater
than or equal to the minimum similarity threshold value st, then the two blocks
are merged together. This reduces the chances of missing true candidate record
pairs that have similar SKVs [52, 211]. The first block of Bob (B1) in Figure 7.3
is an example for this similarity-based merging. Though the size of the block
represented by the reference value ‘meyler’ is equal to k = 3, the next block
represented by the reference value ‘myler’ is merged with this block since the
similarity between these two reference values is greater than or equal to st
(sim(‘meyler′, ‘myler′) = 0.9 ≥ st, where st = 0.8).
5. Once the k-anonymous blocks are generated, reference values corresponding
to each block need to be exchanged between Alice and Bob. These reference
values represent each block in their databases. The number of reference values
(ne) exchanged from each block can be 1 or more (ne ≥ 1). The privacy of the
protocol depends on the number of reference values that are exchanged. The
larger this number from each block is, the higher the accuracy but the lower
the privacy. This is discussed in more detail in Section 7.3.
6. Using the exchanged reference values the candidate blocks from Alice and Bob
can be identified to generate candidate record pairs. The sorted nearest neigh-
borhood approach is used to achieve this goal, as explained in Algorithm 7.2.
The reference values from Alice and Bob are merged and sorted first (line 1)
and then the sorted nearest neighborhood method is applied on the sorted list
of reference values using a sliding window of size w to identify the candidate
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reference values that fall in the same window (lines 3-13). The value for w rep-
resents the minimum number of reference values that must be included in the
window from each database owner. The blocks represented by these candidate
reference values are determined as candidate blocks (lines 14-18). This process
is illustrated in Figure 7.4 for w = 1 and w = 2.
Algorithm 7.2 : Generating candidate blocks (protocol step 6)
Input: RA: List of Alice’s reference values [r1, . . . , rnA ]
RB: List of Bob’s reference values [r1, . . . , rnB ]
w: Size of the window
Output: C: Candidate blocks ((rA1 , r
B





1: R = RA ∪ RB; sort(R)
2: i = 0
3: while i < len(R) do
4: alice_refs = []; bob_refs = []
5: j = 0
6: while (len(alice_refs) ≤ w and i + j < len(R)) or
(len(bob_refs) ≤ w and i + j < len(R)) do
7: if R[i + j] ∈ RA then
8: alice_refs += R[i + j]
9: else if R[i + j] ∈ RB then
10: bob_refs += R[i + j]
11: end if
12: j += 1
13: end while
14: for rA ∈ alice_refs do
15: for rB ∈ bob_refs do





The candidate record pairs are generated from all the records in the correspond-
ing candidate blocks of Alice and Bob. For example, the candidate pair of blocks
(A3, B3) in Figure 7.4 generates the following candidate record pairs: (RA1, RB4),
(RA1, RB7), (RA1, RB8), (RA6, RB4), (RA6, RB7), (RA6, RB8), (RA8, RB4), (RA8, RB7),
and (RA8, RB8). A private matching and classification technique [56, 154, 174] (which
is outside and independent of our protocol) can then be applied on each resulting
candidate block individually to obtain the detailed similarities of individual record
pairs (as will be proposed in Chapters 8 and 9).
7.2.2 Selecting Reference Values
Reference values are used in our approach as a privacy technique to conduct private
blocking between two sensitive databases. Such reference values can be constructed
either with random faked values, or values extracted from a public reference dataset,
for example, all unique surnames taken from a public telephone directory or electoral
roll (such as the NC voter dataset [31], as was described in Section 5.4). The aim of
this approach is to find the candidate blocks using the reference values instead of the
actual values in the databases.
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Figure 7.5: The reference values selection method proposed in Section 7.2.2. A value in the
highest similarity pair is removed in each iteration according to its similarity with neighbors.
The list of reference values used should be effective in blocking the databases by
placing similar SKVs into the same blocks and different SKVs in different blocks. In
addition, the reference values exchanged should not be close to each other in the
lexicographically sorted list of values in a public global dataset, G, as this might
reduce the k-anonymous privacy protection, as will be discussed in Section 7.3. This
means that the reference values selected from R need to be evenly spread to represent
all blocks in the databases.
We propose a reference values selection method to select and exchange appropri-
ate reference values that are not similar/close to each other and represent all blocks.
The similarity or closeness of reference values can be calculated by using an extended
version of the Dice-coefficient similarity function [29] to compare only the first few
characters of the strings (we name this as ‘Dice-short’). We only compare the first
few characters of the reference value strings as the reference values are sorted in lex-
icographical order. Assume ri and rj are two reference values and ri is 10 characters
long and rj is 12 characters long. We only compare the first min(ri, rj)/2 = 5 charac-
ters of ri and rj to check if these two strings are not lexicographically sorted close to
each other.
Algorithm 7.3 : Selecting reference values
Input: R′: List of reference values [r1, . . . , rnR′ ]
nR: Number of reference values, nR < n′R (n
′
R = |R′|)
sim(·, ·): Dice-short similarity comparison function
Output: R′: List of selected reference values [r1, . . . , rnR ]
1: sort(R′); sim_pairs = {}
2: for i ∈ range(len(R′)− 1) do
3: sim_pairs[(R′[i], R′[i + 1])]=sim(R′[i], R′[i + 1])
4: end for
5: while len(R′) ≥ nR do
6: [ri , rj] = max(sim_pairs)
7: i = R′.getIndex(ri); j = R′.getIndex(rj)






The proposed selection method is explained in Algorithm 7.3. This is run by Alice
and Bob independently in Step 2 of the protocol. The process starts by initially select-
ing more than nR reference values from R into R′. Each pair of consecutive reference
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values in the sorted list of R′ are then compared using the Dice-short similarity func-
tion. Pruning of similar reference values from R′ is conducted in an iterative way,
such that one of the reference values in the closest or most similar pair is removed
at each iteration, depending on the similarity between their neighboring reference
values, until the number of reference values in R′ becomes nR. Figure 7.5 illustrates
this iterative pruning of similar reference values.
Further, the reference values of Alice and Bob that are sorted next to each other in
a window (in step 6 of our protocol) should be similar or close to each other in order
to be considered as true candidate blocks. Again, the Dice-short similarity function
can be used to calculate how similar Alice’s and Bob’s reference values in a window
are, to determine the corresponding blocks as candidate blocks.
7.3 Analysis of the Protocol
In this section we analyze our SNC-2P protocol in terms of complexity, privacy, and
quality of blocking.
7.3.1 Complexity
Assume the number of records in both databases is n (n = nA = nB) and nR reference
values are selected by both Alice and Bob from the reference dataset R (nR = nAR =
nBR). Sorting these nR reference values is of O(nR log nR) complexity, and inserting
the n database records into their sorted list of reference values is of O(n log nR)
complexity. Insertion of records into the sorted list of reference values in protocol
step 3 results in nR SNC blocks each represented by one reference value. Merging
the SNC blocks to create k-anonymous blocks in step 4 of the protocol requires a
loop over nR blocks, which is of O(nR) complexity, and results in an average of
(n/k) k-anonymous blocks each represented by nr reference values (nr ≥ 1) and each
containing a minimum of k database records.
Alice and Bob then exchange ne reference values (1 ≤ ne ≤ nr) from each of
their k-anonymous blocks (a total of nR reference values) in protocol step 5. The
communication complexity of this step is therefore O(nR). In protocol step 6, sorting
the exchanged reference values is of O(2nR log 2nR) complexity and applying the
sorted nearest neighborhood approach on this sorted list of reference values is of
O(2nR) complexity. The overall complexity of our approach is linear in the size of
the databases n and log-linear in the number of reference values nR used. Assuming
each block contains k records and the size of the sliding window (minimum number
of reference values a window comprises from each database owner) is w, the number
of candidate record pairs generated by our approach is (n/k)× (k2 × w) = n k w.
7.3.2 Privacy
We assume that both Alice and Bob follow the honest but curious (HBC) adversarial
model [78], in that they follow the protocol while trying to find out as much as
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possible about the data from the other party. To analyze the privacy of the protocol,
we need to evaluate what can be learned from the data they communicate with
each other during the protocol. In step 5 of our protocol, Alice and Bob exchange a
certain number of reference values (ne) from each block (no sensitive actual values in
the databases are exchanged), and this might leak some information regarding the
blocks in their databases depending on the value for ne.
• Case 1: ne = 1: Since each block consists of at least k records, revealing only
one reference value from each block guarantees k-anonymous privacy (simi-
lar to the SNC-3P approaches proposed in Chapter 6). This type of privacy
has successfully been used in previous private blocking solutions [91, 104]. k-
anonymous mapping makes it difficult to perform a frequency attack to infer
individual records in the blocks. The value for k has a trade-off between privacy
and computational complexity. A higher value for k provides stronger privacy
guarantees but more candidate record pairs will be generated. One drawback
of representing a block by one reference value only is the possible loss of some
true candidate blocks when applying the sorted nearest neighborhood method
on the exchanged reference values in step 6 of our protocol, because a single
reference value is not sufficient to represent all the SKVs in a block.
• Case 2: ne > 1: If several reference values are exchanged from a block then
k-anonymous privacy is not guaranteed. Conducting a frequency linkage at-
tack (as will be described in Section 7.4) using a global dataset G with known
values in the same domain as used for the sorting key can reveal frequency in-
formation for the reference values exchanged from the blocks. This information
can be used by an adversary to infer the frequency distribution of the sensitive
SKVs in the corresponding blocks. Assume a block is represented by reference
values r = r1, . . . , re and their frequency distribution of individual block sizes
in G is learned as f = f1, . . . , fe. Revealing only one reference value (ri) dis-
closes that there are k records sorted near ri, and thus the disclosure risk is
1/k. But revealing several reference values discloses more information, namely
that there are fi × k/∑ fi records sorted near reference value ri, i = 1 . . . e. This
reduces the k-anonymous privacy to min(f)× k/∑ fi. For example, if three ref-
erence values, r1, r2 and r3, in a block are exchanged and their individual size
frequency distribution of blocks in G is f1 = 1, f2 = 3, and f3 = 4, then this
reveals that there are k/8 records sorted near r1, 3k/8 near r2, and 4k/8 near r3.
Disclosure risk (maximum) is increased to 1/(k/8) = 8/k with the k/8 records
sorted near r1 from 1/k in case 1. Privacy is therefore reduced to k/8.
Therefore, a larger number of reference values exchanged from each block will
reduce the privacy of the protocol. At the end of private blocking, candidate blocks
are found and private linkage can be conducted on each block pair individually by
using a private matching and classification technique [56, 154, 174], which should
not reveal any sensitive information (this step is outside of our protocol).
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Figure 7.6: An attack method for the SNC-2P private blocking solution. Disclosure
risk is less when only one reference value is exchanged compared to when several ref-
erence values are exchanged from each block. For example, Ps = 1/9 for r1, r2, · · · , r9
in block b1 when one reference value is disclosed, because each record is consistent
with 9 records that are in the same block. If all three reference values (‘melar’, ‘mil-
lar’, and ‘myler’ that are assumed to have the frequency distribution of individual
block sizes of 2 : 3 : 4 in G) are exchanged, then Ps = 1/2 for two records, Ps = 1/3
for three records, and Ps = 1/4 for four records in the block b1.
7.3.3 Quality
The quality of blocking is defined in terms of effectiveness measured by pairs com-
pleteness (PC), i.e., all similar records should be grouped into the same block which
generates candidate record pairs that include all true matching record pairs, and ef-
ficiency measured by reduction ratio (RR), i.e., the number of candidate record pairs
generated should be as small as possible [30].
The size of the window w plays a major role in deciding the quality of blocking.
A higher value for w is more likely to group more nearest blocks as candidate blocks.
This results in higher PC and lower RR. The value for k also determines the PC and
RR of blocking. A higher value for k results in higher PC but lower RR. Optimal k
and w need to be set such that high values for both PC and RR are achieved while k
guarantees sufficient privacy as well.
7.4 Linkage Attack
In this section we present the frequency linkage attack using an external global
dataset G for privacy evaluation of our SNC-2P solution based on the evaluation
model proposed in Chapter 5. A private blocking protocol that reveals more informa-
tion than the number of blocks (nB) and their sizes (ti = |bi|, 1 ≤ i ≤ nB) during the
protocol, will provide more information on the distribution of blocks and their val-
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ues. Our SNC-2P protocol reveals reference values from each block, and as discussed
in Section 7.3.2, the more reference values are exchanged from a block between the
database owners the more information is disclosed about the block, as illustrated in
Figure 7.6. For example, if three reference values, ‘melar’, ‘millar’, and ‘myler’, in
block b1 that contains nine records (t1 = 9), are exchanged and their size frequency
distribution of individual blocks in G is ‘melar’ (b1_1) = 2, ‘millar’ (b1_2) = 3, and
‘myler’ (b1_3) = 4, then this reveals that there are 2t1/9 = 2 records sorted near
‘melar’, 3t1/9 = 3 near ‘millar’, and 4t1/9 = 4 near ‘myler’. The minimum block
size now becomes 2 with the two records sorted near ‘melar’, and the maximum
disclosure risk is therefore increased to DRMax = 1/2 from DRMax = 1/t1 = 1/9,
i.e., when only one of three reference values is exchanged from b1.
7.5 Experimental Evaluation
We conducted an empirical study of our SNC-2P approach on the datasets described
in Section 5.4 using the evaluation framework proposed in Chapter 5. The default
parameters were set as k = 100, st = 0.8, w = 2, and ne = 50% (this setting gives best
results in terms of all three properties of PPRL, as will be shown in Figures 7.10, 7.11,
and 7.12). nR was set to number of records/k × 10 so that each block will roughly
contain nr = 10 reference values. Different values for k, w, and ne were also used to
evaluate the performance of the SNC-2P blocking against k, w, and ne, respectively. A
combination of two attributes was used as the sorting key: given name / first name,
and surname / last name.
4,611 46,116 461,167



















(a) Total time for the blocking - OZ Cor datasets
SNC-2P
5,488 54,886 548,860



















(b) Total time for the blocking - NC Cor datasets
SNC-2P
Figure 7.7: Total time of the SNC-2P blocking approach on the (a) OZ Cor datasets, and (b)
NC Cor datasets, averaged over the results of all variations of each dataset.
Figure 7.7 shows the total blocking time required for private blocking of the SNC-
2P approach on the OZ Cor and NC Cor datasets. As can be seen from the figure, the
SNC-2P approach has an almost linear complexity in the size of the databases and is
scalable to large databases.
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Figure 7.8: A comparison of reduction ratio (RR) against pairs completeness (PC) of the
SNC-2P solution on the (a) OZ Cor-46,116 and (b) NC Cor-54,886 datasets with No-mod,
Light-mod, Med-mod, and Heavy-mod variations.
A comparison of RR and PC of the SNC-2P blocking is presented in Figure 7.8 on
the OZ Cor-46,116 and NC Cor-54,886 datasets with different levels of data modifi-
cations (corruptions). Different levels of corruptions applied to the datasets (as was
described in Section 5.4) allow to evaluate the performance of approximate matching
of our protocol in the presence of data errors. As shown in the figure, the SNC-2P
approach achieves high RR and PC when no modification is applied to the datasets,
and then the values decrease as the level of modifications increases.
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Figure 7.9: A comparison of probability of suspicion (Ps) values of the blocked datasets
generated by the SNC-2P approach and the calculated disclosure risk (DR) measures on the
(a) OZ-172,938 Mod, and (b) NC datasets.
We then present the distribution of Ps values in the masked and blocked OZ-
172,938 Mod and NC datasets by the SNC-2P blocking solution, and the DR measures
(proposed in Section 5.3.1) calculated for the frequency linkage attack (described in
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(a) Reduction ratio (RR) against w
17,294
172,938
































(c) Blocking time against w
17,294
172,938
Figure 7.10: (a) Reduction ratio (RR) (b) Pairs completeness (PC) and (c) total blocking time
of the SNC-2P approach on the OZ-17,294 and OZ-172,938 datasets, with different values for
window size (w).
Section 6.4). The lower DR results achieved by the SNC-2P blocking approach, as
illustrated in Figure 7.9, show the privacy aspects of our approach.
Figure 7.10 shows RR, PC, and total time required for blocking (averaged over
the results of both database owners over all variations of each dataset) of the SNC-2P
blocking approach with different window sizes w. As expected, PC and time for
blocking increase with w while RR decreases. This is because when w increases more
candidate blocks will be generated which results in more candidate record pairs.
Hence, the efficiency of blocking (evaluated by RR and blocking time) decreases with
w while effectiveness (evaluated by PC) increases, as discussed in Section 7.3.3. Since
there is a drastic improvement in PC when w = 2 with a smaller increase in blocking
time and a smaller decrease in RR, we choose this as the best default parameter
setting. With non-modified datasets we achieve high PC (of nearly 1.0) and with
modified datasets the value is reduced. As it turns out, there is no difference in RR
and blocking time with modified and non-modified datasets, and we therefore only
report the averaged results.
In Figure 7.11, we investigate the performance of SNC-2P solution in terms of
RR, PC, and total blocking time with different values for the privacy parameter k.
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(a) Reduction ratio (RR) against k
17,294
172,938


































(c) Blocking time against k
17,294
172,938
Figure 7.11: (a) Reduction ratio (RR) (b) Pairs completeness (PC) and (c) total blocking time
of the SNC-2P approach on the OZ-17,294 and OZ-172,938 datasets, with different values for
privacy parameter (k).
As discussed in Section 7.3.3, RR decreases with k while PC increases. As can be
seen from the figure, the SNC approach achieves high values for both RR and PC
even when k = 100. Hence, we choose k = 100 as the default parameter setting of
our approach. Interestingly, the blocking time reduces with k. This is because the
number of resulting blocks (n/k) becomes smaller as k gets larger.
Finally we study how the exchange of reference values determines the scalability,
privacy, and quality of blocking in Figure 7.12. Scalability of blocking is measured
by total blocking time and RR, and it reduces with the percentage of reference values
exchanged (Figures 7.12 (a) and 7.12 (b)). Quality of blocking (measured by PC)
significantly increases when the percentage of exchanged reference values (ne) is in-
creased from 10% to 50% with almost no reduction in RR, as shown in Figure 7.12 (b).
However, as discussed in Section 7.3.2, the privacy of the protocol (measured by the
DR measures calculated based on the linkage attack given in Section 7.4) becomes
lower with more reference values exchanged as the disclosure risk of our approach
increases with ne (see Figures 7.12 (c) and 7.12 (d)). Using the Dice-short reference
values selection method, as discussed in Section 7.2.2, increases the privacy of the
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Figure 7.12: (a) Total blocking time (b) reduction ratio (RR) and pairs completeness (PC), (c)
maximum disclosure risk values (DRMax), and (d) mean disclosure risk values (DRMean) of
the SNC-2P approach on the OZ-17,294 and OZ-172,938 datasets, when different percentage
of reference values are randomly selected (‘Random’) or appropriately selected using the
Dice-short similarity function (‘Select’), as described in Section 7.2.2, and exchanged from
each block (ne).
protocol without compromising much the quality of blocking (labeled as ‘Select’ in
the figures). The maximum disclosure risk on the 172,938 dataset is reduced to 0.24
from 0.5 with the proposed reference values selection method when ne = 50%.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed an efficient two-party private blocking technique
based on the sorted neighborhood clustering (SNC) approach that can be used to
develop scalable privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) applications. Our method
uses a combination of two privacy techniques, k-anonymous mapping and public
reference values. Experiments conducted on real-world datasets validate that our
approach is scalable to large databases while being effective in generating quality
candidate record pairs and preserving k-anonymous privacy characteristics.
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As discussed earlier, reference values play a major role in determining the privacy
of the protocol and quality of the candidate blocks generated. We introduced one
method for selecting appropriate reference values. As future work, we aim to identify
other reference values selection methods that can be used to improve the quality of
blocking without compromising privacy.
In addition, tackling the problem of finding the optimal values for the SNC-based
private blocking approaches including the privacy parameter k and the window size
w in the trade-off of the three properties of PPRL using some statistical modelling
procedure requires further research.
We also aim to study how the quality of blocking can be improved by running
the SNC approach with several iterations using different attributes as sorting keys
(similar to the traditional approach [84]) without compromising privacy of the so-
lution. Investigating how other blocking techniques, such as q-gram-based blocking
and suffix array-based blocking [29], can be used for private blocking in two-party
contexts is another direction for future research.
Chapter 8
Two-Party Reference Values-based
Private Matching and Classification
Developing efficient and two-party algorithms for approximate matching and classi-
fication in privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) has been identified as an impor-
tant research direction in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we propose a novel two-party
protocol for PPRL that addresses the three main properties of PPRL, scalability, pri-
vacy, and linkage quality. Our protocol uses the privacy technique of reference values
in a two-party setting, as described in Section 8.2. In Section 8.3 we analyze the solu-
tion in terms of the three properties, and in Section 8.5 we conduct an empirical study
in order to validate these analyses based on a linkage attack proposed in Section 8.4.
Finally, we summarize our findings in Section 8.6.
8.1 Introduction
In the absence of unique identifiers for the entities stored in databases, exact or
approximate similarity matching techniques are generally applied to the common
quasi-identifiers (QIDs, such as name, address and date of birth) for the identifi-
cation of matching record pairs from different databases [205]. Linking records by
comparing the masked QID attribute values with a standard hash-encoding crypto-
graphic technique [41, 78, 135] in a three-party protocol is a naïve solution for private
matching and classification [37, 152]. The attribute values match exactly if the corre-
sponding encoded values match, and the third party can identify exactly matching
records without knowing the actual attribute values. However, as discussed in Chap-
ter 4, a limitation of this naïve approach is that only exact comparisons of values are
possible. A small variation in an attribute value results in a completely different en-
coded value. In practical applications, the exact matching of QID values is not always
sufficient due to variations or typographical and other types of errors in real-world
data [83]. Therefore, an approach for approximate matching of values and effective
classification in PPRL is required.
There have been several approaches proposed for approximate private matching
and classification in PPRL [58, 102, 184, 194]. However, many of these approaches
require a trusted third party for linkage which is not always available in a real-
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Table 8.1: Notation used in this chapter.
DA, DB Databases held by database owners Alice and Bob, respectively
RAi , RBj A record in DA and DB, respectively
A, a Attributes common to DA and DB that are used for linking, an attribute a ∈ A
v, vi , vj An individual attribute value
r, ri , rj A reference value
blocka(·, ·) Function used to block/index attribute a
b A blocking key value (BKV): b = blocka(·)
c A compound BKV (CBKV): c = [blocka1 (·), . . . blocka|A| (·)]
sima(·, ·) Function used to calculate similarities between values in attribute a
st Minimum similarity threshold to determine a pair of values as similar, 0 ≤ st ≤ 1
sm Minimum similarity threshold to determine the similarity range [sm − 1.0]
k, d Number of bins, maximum number of bin difference to find the matching bin combinations
enc(·, h) Function and key used to hash-encode values
BIa, BLI Block Index for attribute a ∈ A, Block List Index
RLIa, SIa Reference List Index for attribute a ∈ A, Similarity Index for attribute a ∈ A
MBC, MBR, MIL Matching Bin Combinations, Matching Bins of Records, Match ID List
world application. Generally, most two-party solutions employ secure multi-party
computation (SMC)-based privacy techniques (as reviewed in Chapter 3), which are
expensive in terms of the computation and communication complexities (and there-
fore not scalable) while providing stronger privacy guarantees, in order to ensure
that the two database owners cannot learn anything from the exchanged data.
In this chapter, we address this problem by proposing a novel two-party private
matching and classification solution using efficient perturbation-based privacy tech-
niques. Our protocol is based on (1) the use of reference values that are available
to both database owners, and allow them to calculate the similarities independently
between their attribute values and the reference values; and (2) the binning of these
calculated similarity values to allow their secure exchange between the two database
owners. Our protocol also addresses the three main properties of PPRL, scalability,
linkage quality, and privacy, which makes it viable in real-world applications.
8.2 Proposed Solution
We first discuss the use of reference values for private matching and classification
in a two-party setting in Section 8.2.1, followed with Section 8.2.2 by a step by step
description of our protocol.
8.2.1 Reference Values in Two-Party Protocol
The use of reference values has previously been proposed for PPRL in a three-party
framework by Pang et al. [154]. Such reference values are assumed to be publicly
available and known to both database owners. They can be constructed either by
random faked values, or they can be extracted from an external dataset, for exam-
ple, unique names, postcodes, and suburb names extracted from a public telephone
directory. Reference values are used by the database owners to calculate the similar-
ities between their attribute values and the reference values. These similarities are
then sent to a third party that can link the records based on the triangular inequality





sim(‘amelia’, ‘amalia’) = 0.9 sim(‘amelie’, ‘amalia’) = 0.85
sim(’amelia’, ’amelie’) >= 0.75
Reference
Alice Bob
Figure 8.1: Reference value-based similar-
ity calculation in a three-party setting us-
ing the triangular inequality property of dis-
tance metrics (Adapted from [193]). The ac-
tual similarity values calculated with the ref-
erence value (sim(vi, r) and sim(vj, r)) are
sent by Alice and Bob to a third party that
can calculate the lower bound of sim(vi, vj),
as shown in Equation 8.1.
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sim(‘amelie’, ‘amalia’) = Dsim(‘amelia’, ‘amalia’) = E
Reference
BobAlice
sim(’amelia’, ’amelie’) <= 1 − d
similarity range
d = [0.8−1.0]
Figure 8.2: Reference value-based similarity
calculation in a two-party setting using the
reverse triangular inequality property of dis-
tance metrics and binning of similarity val-
ues. Binned similarity values calculated with
the reference value (sim(vi, r) and sim(vj, r))
are exchanged between Alice and Bob to cal-
culate the difference d between sim(vi, r) and
sim(vj, r), as shown in Equation 8.2.
property of the distance metrics, as explained in Equation 8.1. A reference value, r,
is the value known to both database owners Alice and Bob, while the attribute values,
vi and vj, are the sensitive values that are only known to the corresponding database
owner (vi by Alice and vj by Bob).
dist(vi, r) + dist(vj, r) ≥ dist(vi, vj)
(1− sim(vi, r)) + (1− sim(vj, r)) ≥ (1− sim(vi, vj))
1− sim(vi, r)− sim(vj, r) ≥ −sim(vi, vj)
sim(vi, r) + sim(vj, r)− 1 ≤ sim(vi, vj) (8.1)
Assume dist(vi, vj) is the normalised metric distance between two values vi and
vj (0.0 ≤ dist(vi, vj) ≤ 1.0), and sim(vi, vj) = 1.0 − dist(vi, vj) is the correspond-
ing similarity between the two values. Similarity values are assumed to be nor-
malised, such that 0.0 ≤ sim(vi, vj) ≤ 1.0. For an exact match of the two values
the similarity function results in sim(vi, vj) = 1.0 and for two totally different values
it results in sim(vi, vj) = 0.0. A distance-based similarity function mainly holds
four properties [79]: non-negativity (dist(vi, vj) ≥ 0.0), identity of indiscernibles
(dist(vi, vi) = 0.0), symmetry (dist(vi, vj) = dist(vj, vi)), and triangular inequality.
The triangular inequality property states that the direct distance between two values
vi and vj is always less than or equal to the combined distance when going through
a third value r: dist(vi, vj) ≤ dist(vi, r) + dist(vi, r). A reference value can be used as
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a third value (r) to calculate the similarity between the actual attribute values (vi and
vj). Any distance metric can be used in this approach.
In the three-party approach, the similarities between attribute values and refer-
ence values (i.e. sim(vi, r) and sim(vj, r)) are calculated individually by the database
owners, and the results are sent to a third party. The third party can calculate the
left hand side (LHS) of Equation 8.1 by calculating the combined similarity value
(sim(vi, r) + sim(vj, r)− 1). The third party then classifies all record pairs as matches
that have sim(vi, r) + sim(vj, r)− 1 ≥ st, where st is a threshold value. If the LHS of
Equation 8.1 is at least st, then obviously the right hand side (RHS) of the equation,
that is the actual similarity value sim(vi, vj) between two attribute values vi and vj,
is also at least st and therefore the pair (vi,vj) can be classified as a match. This is
illustrated in Figure 8.1. However, the results of an empirical evaluation of this ap-
proach conducted in [10] show inadequate linkage quality in terms of precision and
recall. Increasing the size of the reference list (i.e. using more than one r for similarity
calculation of a pair of vi and vj) improves the linkage quality to some extent but it
leads to long runtime.
In our two-party approach, we use the reverse triangular inequality property
of distance metrics, which is illustrated in Equation 8.2, to privately calculate the
similarity of two attribute values without exchanging the actual attribute values.
∣∣dist(vi, r)− dist(vj, r)∣∣ ≤ dist(vi, vj)∣∣(1− sim(vi, r))− (1− sim(vj, r))∣∣ ≤ (1− sim(vi, vj))∣∣−sim(vi, r) + sim(vj, r)∣∣ ≤ (1− sim(vi, vj))
1− ∣∣sim(vj, r)− sim(vi, r)∣∣ ≥ sim(vi, vj) (8.2)
From the reverse triangular inequality property, we can see that the value for
sim(vi, vj) (RHS) becomes higher and gets closer to 1.0 if and only if the values for
sim(vi, r) and sim(vj, r) (LHS) become equal to each other, with r being an value from
the reference list. This implies that if the difference between the similarity values of
two values with a value from the reference list is small, then the two values should
be similar to each other. We illustrate this approach in Figure 8.2.
The scalability property of the linkage process can be addressed by blocking the
records in the databases using a private blocking technique, as proposed in Chap-
ters 6 and 7. There have also been several other private blocking techniques proposed
in the literature [3, 56, 103, 104, 124]. For illustrative example, we consider blocking
the records based on a (phonetic) encoding function [103], such as Soundex [23]. The
database owners then use public reference lists to assign one or several reference
values for each block. These reference values are used by the database owners to cal-
culate the similarities between their attribute values and the reference values in each
block. The similarity of each attribute value in a block is calculated by comparing the
value only with the list of reference values that are in its corresponding block (this
improves linkage quality).
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Table 8.3: Matching Bin
Combinations (MBC)
Match Attribute 1 Attribute 2










Once the similarities are calculated, the database owners can conduct the linkage
by using a third party that classifies the records based on the reverse triangular
inequality of these similarities, as was done by [154]. Since blocking is applied, this
will reduce the runtime for linkage and it will be scalable to large databases. This
approach provides a scalable three-party solution for approximate matching in PPRL.
As with other three-party protocols, privacy is however the major drawback with this
three-party approach as well. If one of the database owners colludes with the third
party they can learn about the other database owner’s private data.
Our aim is to develop a two-party protocol by using public reference lists and
the reverse of triangular inequality property of distance metrics for matching and
classification. If the calculated similarities can be exchanged between the database
owners without revealing any sensitive information, then we can eliminate the need
of a third party for the linkage. Since both database owners know the public reference
list values, exchanging the calculated similarity values with each other can leak some
information about the QIDs to the database owners. Our two-party solution for this
problem is by binning the actual similarity values.
We split the similarity range (a possible range from 0.0 to 1.0) into a number of
bins k (k > 1), and each database owner stores the similarities between their attribute
values and the reference values as bin labels into which the calculated similarity
values fall. Since we compare the attribute values only with the reference values that
are in their corresponding block, the minimum similarity value will be larger than
0.0, and so we only need to bin similarities in an interval [sm, 1.0], with sm > 0.0
selected by the user. Binning the similarity range from 0.5 to 1.0 into 4 bins, for
example, is shown in Table 8.2. We will explain this example in detail further below.
We then calculate the Matching Bin Combinations (MBC) based on the binning
distance d. The binning distance determines the maximum number of bin difference
we allow for each attribute for the approximate matching of attribute values. For
example, if the binning distance is d = 1 for each attribute and we use two attributes
for the matching (and thus a total binning distance of d = 2), then the MBC would
be the ones that are given in Table 8.3. Every Matching Bin Combination in MBC is
given a unique Match ID (as shown in Table 8.3). Based on the MBC, each database
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Table 8.4: Example calculation of bins and matches
RA1 (Alice) RB1 (Bob)
Given name Surname Given name Surname
Attribute values ‘millar’ ‘ameile’ ‘miller’ ‘amelia’
Phonetic (block) values ‘m460’ ‘a540’ ‘m460’ ‘a540’
Reference values ‘myler’ ‘amalia’ ‘myler’ ‘amalia’
Similarity values 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9
Bin labels B C C D
Match IDs {1,2,3,4,5,6} {2,3,5,6,8,9} {4,5,6,7,8,9} {3,6,9}
{2,3,5,6} {6,9}
owner calculates the set of Match IDs to which each of the records in their database
corresponds to. Then these Match IDs are exchanged between the database owners.
Computing the intersection set of Match IDs and then exchanging the records that
are obtained for those common Match IDs between the database owners provide a
two-party solution for our problem.
To illustrate our approach, assume we have two records (RA1 and RB1) in two
different databases with their respective values for the attributes Surname and Given
name as (‘millar’,‘ameile’) and (‘miller’,‘amelia’), as shown in Table 8.4. Applying
the Soundex [23] phonetic-based blocking to these values results in the two blocks
‘m460’ and ‘a540’ for Given name and Surname attributes, respectively. Assume that
the reference list contains one value for each of these blocks, and they are ‘myler’ for
‘m460’ and ‘amalia’ for ‘a540’.
Comparing the attribute values with the corresponding block reference values
(using sim(·, ·)), for example, gives us the similarity values of (sim(‘millar′, ‘myler′) =
0.7, and sim(‘ameile′, ‘amalia′) = 0.8) for RA1 and (sim(‘miller′, ‘myler′) = 0.8, and
sim(‘amelia′, ‘amalia′) = 0.9) for RB1, which result in the bin combinations (B,C)
and (C,D), respectively (see Table 8.2 for the bin ranges). According to the MBC in
Table 8.3, the corresponding matches would be Match IDs {2, 3, 5, 6} for RA1 and
Match IDs {6, 9} for RB1, because the bin combination of B for attribute Surname
and C for Given name appears in Match IDs 2, 3, 5 and 6, whereas the combination
of C and D appears in Match IDs 6 and 9 only (shown in bold font in Table 8.3).
The intersection of these two sets results in Match ID 6, which is considered to
be the match combination for these two example records (i.e. the two records’ simi-
larity values calculated with the reference value for the Surname attribute are in the
interval of [B− C] = [0.626− 0.875], and for the Given name attribute they are in the
interval of [C−D] = [0.751− 1.0]), and so the two records can be classified as a match
(with a minimum total similarity of (1.0− [0.875− 0.626]) + (1.0− [1.0− 0.751]) =
0.751+ 0.751 = 1.502, calculated according to the reverse triangular inequality prop-
erty given in Equation 8.2). If the intersection list is empty, then the records do not
match.
The MBC calculated here are supersets of all the subsets of bin combinations. For
example, if we consider the bin combination of Match ID 6(B, C/C, D), the subsets of
bin combinations for this Match ID 6 are shown in Table 8.5. As shown in this table,
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Table 8.5: Subsets of bin combinations for the (B, C/C, D) combination - Match ID 6
from Table 8.3
Database owner 1 Database owner 2 Total binning
Given name Surname Given name Surname distance (d)
B C B C (0+0) = 0
B C B D (0+1) = 1
B C C C (1+0) = 1
B C C D (1+1) = 2
B D B C (0+1) = 1
B D B D (0+0) = 0
B D C C (1+1) = 2
B D C D (1+0) = 1
C C B C (1+0) = 1
C C B D (1+1) = 2
C C C C (0+0) = 0
C C C D (0+1) = 1
C D B C (1+1) = 2
C D B D (1+0) = 1
C D C C (0+1) = 1
C D C D (0+0) = 0
if the combination (B, C/C, D) is a match, then all the subsets of this combination
can also be considered as matches, since they all have a binning distance of 2 or
less. This improves the privacy aspect of our approach, because there can be many
possible matching combinations (16 in this example) for one Match ID.
This parametric solution requires the number of bins k to be determined before
the linkage. The selection of k is crucial for the performance of the protocol as the
three main properties of PPRL, privacy, scalability and linkage quality, depend on
this parameter. The larger the number of bins the smaller the range of each bin
is, which results in higher accuracy of the protocol. But the smaller the number
of bins the lower the computational complexity is, as the number of candidates of
matching bin combinations is reduced, and the more secure the protocol is due to
the higher range of bins. So the number of bins must be carefully chosen. We will
experimentally investigate how these three properties are affected by the value for
the parameter, the number of bins (k), in Section 8.5.
8.2.2 Protocol Specification
In this section we illustrate the steps (1 to 9) of our protocol (which we call 2P-
Bin) in detail using an example consisting of two small databases, as shown in Fig-
ure 8.3, with Given names and Surnames used as the linkage attributes. Assume two
database owners, Alice and Bob, with their respective databases DA and DB, wish to
identify which of their records RAi ∈ DA and RBi ∈ DB have an overall similarity
sim ≥ st, in order to classify them as matches. The notation used throughout this
chapter is summarised in Table 8.1. Figures 8.3 to 8.13 (taken from [191]) illustrate
the steps of our protocol.




































Figure 8.3: Example databases held by Alice (DA) and Bob (DB) with Surname and
Given name attributes, used to illustrate the protocol described in Section 8.2.2.
Alice’s BI for Surname










Bob’s BI for Surname















Figure 8.4: The Block Indexes (BIs) of Alice and Bob for the Surname and Given name
attributes. The BIs are generated in step 2 of the protocol as the databases are loaded,
and are used in step 5 to build the similarity index.
1. Alice and Bob agree upon (1) a list of attributes A to be used for the linkage (2)
a blocking function (phonetic [103] is used in this example) blocka(·) for each
attribute a ∈ A, used to generate blocking key values (BKV) b; (3) a similar-
ity function sima(v, r), used to calculate the numerical similarity for a pair of
values v and r, where v is an attribute value and r is a reference value, such
that for an exact match (v = r) sima(v, r) = 1.0 and for two totally different
values sima(v, r) = 0.0; (4) a minimum similarity threshold sm, which deter-
mines the start range of the first similarity bin; (5) the number of bins k to
be used; (6) a binning distance d, used for finding the candidates of Match-
ing Bin Combinations (MBC) for each attribute; (7) a hash-encoding function
enc(·, h) and a corresponding hash key h, used to encode the Compound BKVs
(CBKVs), reference lists, and finally the matching records before they are being
exchanged between the database owners. This hash-encoding function can for
example be the HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code) function [116],
as described in Section 4.2.1.3. To simplify the illustration we do not apply any
hash-encoding function in the example.
2. Alice and Bob each read their databases and independently build their local
Block Index (BI) data structures for each linkage attribute, and a Block List In-
dex (BLI) data structure by blocking their databases using the blocking function
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Figure 8.5: The Block List Index (BLI) of Alice and Bob and the intersection list of
BLIs. Exchanging the BLIs in order to calculate the intersection list of the BLIs can
reveal some information to a database owner about the other database owner’s data.
























Sorted compound blocks 
Individual blocks
Figure 8.6: The compound blocks c in the sorted intersection list of BLIs and the
individual blocks b for each linkage attribute. The intersection list of BLIs is sorted
and the individual blocks are found in step 3 of the protocol. The compound blocks
are sorted and given index numbers which will be needed in step 7 of the protocol.
blocka(·), as illustrated in Figures 8.4 and 8.5. The BI data structures are im-
plemented as inverted indexes [206]. The index keys are the unique encodings
/ keys of a linkage attribute (the BKVs), and the corresponding lists contain
the actual attribute values in a block (that have the corresponding encoding).
The BLI data structure is implemented as a nested inverted index where the
keys are the unique encodings of the first linkage attribute and the index lists
are again inverted indexes with keys being the unique encodings of the second
linkage attribute and the index lists are the lists of unique encodings of the
third linkage attribute, for example if the number of linkage attributes is three.
The nested inverted indexes for two linkage attributes are shown in Figure 8.5.
3. Alice and Bob exchange their BLI data structure with each other. This com-
munication is encrypted, for example using public key encryption [171], such
that only Alice and Bob can decrypt each other’s values. Once the BLIs are ex-
changed, Alice and Bob can generate an intersection list of BLIs, as illustrated










Reference List Index for Surname Reference List Index for Given name
Figure 8.7: The Reference List Index (RLI) for Surname blocks and Given name
blocks. In the example, we use one reference value per block. RLI is generated
in step 4 of the protocol.
in Figure 8.5. Exchanging the BLIs to find out the intersection list, which is
the list of compound blocks c (individual blocks b for each linkage attribute
are grouped together to generate the compound block c) that are common to
both databases, might leak some information about each other’s data. In order
to overcome this, a secure set intersection protocol can be used that enables to
find the intersection list of BLIs securely [1, 114]. This is discussed in detail in
Section 8.3.2. Alice and Bob then sort the intersection list of BLIs and find the
common individual blocks b for each linkage attribute separately, as illustrated
in Figure 8.6.
4. The next step is to generate the Reference List Index (RLI) which contains lists
of reference values, one list for each individual block b in the intersection list of
BLIs (shown in Figure 8.5). The RLI can be generated by both parties together,
for example one could generate reference lists for odd blocks and the other
for even blocks, or one for the first attribute blocks and the other for second
attribute blocks. This is shown in Figure 8.7. Exchanging the RLI between the
database owners would not reveal any private information, as the RLI contains
publicly known reference values (no sensitive private values). In our example,
we assume the number of reference values generated for each block is 1. If
more than one reference value is used, then the average of similarities with all
the reference values is calculated.
5. Alice and Bob then build their Similarity Index (SI). For each unique individual
block b in the intersection list of BLIs, they calculate the similarity of each
unique attribute value in that block (which is stored in their BI as generated in
step 2) with the list of reference values of that block (which is retrieved from the
RLI). Figure 8.8 illustrates this for the running example. For example, Alice’s
‘m460’ block for Surname attribute contains two values (‘millar’ and‘myler’)
and the reference value for this block is ‘malar’. Therefore, the similarities
between (‘millar’ and ‘malar’), and (‘myler’ and ‘malar’) are calculated as 0.8
and 0.7, respectively, and stored in Alice’s SI for Surname.
6. In the next step the database owners build the bins with their similarity ranges
and the Matching Bin Combinations (MBC), as illustrated in Figure 8.9. The
similarity range between sm and the complete similarity (i.e., 1.0) is split into
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Figure 8.8: The Similarity Index (SI) which contains the similarities between at-
tribute values and their corresponding reference values calculated using the edit
distance [148] approximate string comparison function, rounded to one digit, along































































Matching Bin Combinations 
Given
name
Figure 8.9: The bins of similarity and the Matching Bin Combinations (MBC) used
for the running example. The bins and their ranges are agreed upon by the database
owners in step 1 of the protocol. In this example, the number of bins is k = 5
and the similarity range is from 0.5 to 1.0. The MBC are calculated based on the
bins and the binning distance d. In this example, d = 1. The bin combinations (in
MBC) are generated only for one compound block (the first compound block, i.e. the
compound block with index number of 0 in Figure 8.6). Based on this, the Match IDs
are calculated using Equation 8.3 for bin combinations in all the compound blocks.
k bins. Based on the bins and the binning distance d, the bin combinations in
MBC are generated with their corresponding Match IDs.
7. Alice and Bob go through their database and build their local Matching Bins of
Records (MBR) data structure, as shown in Figure 8.10. The MBR data structure
contains unique combined blocking key values (CBKVs) of linkage attributes
and for each unique CBKV, c, it contains (a) a list of bin labels for each of
the attribute values (which are retrieved from SI, as generated in step 5), (b) a
list of Match IDs that correspond to this combination of bin labels (which are
































































































Figure 8.10: The Matching Bins of Records (MBR) of Alice and Bob. For each of the
unique tuple of encoding values (CBKVs), it contains the combination of Surname
and Given name attribute values with their corresponding bin labels, a list of Match
IDs, and a list of record identifiers that contain the combination. The MBR is gener-
ated in step 7 of the protocol. The Match IDs are calculated only for the records that
belong to the compound blocks that are in the intersection list of BLIs. The records
RA3, RA4 and RB6 in this example belong to the compound blocks of [‘m460’,‘g400’],
[‘p360’,‘r163’], and [‘s530’,‘r163’], respectively, which are not in the intersection list of
BLIs in Figure 8.6. In other words, these compound blocks are not common in both
databases and therefore they cannot be matches.
retrieved from MBC, as generated in step 6) by using Equation 8.3, and (c) a list
of record IDs that contain this unique tuple of attribute values.
Match ID = (compound_block_index_number× number_o f _candidates_in_MBC)
+match_ID_in_MBC (8.3)
It is important to note that the MBC data structure (shown in Figure 8.9) is
calculated only for one compound block because all the compound blocks will
have the same set of candidates of matching bin combinations. Based on this,
the Match IDs can be calculated for bin combinations in all the compound
blocks. The compound blocks in the intersection list of BLIs have unique index
numbers (as shown in Figure 8.6). For example, consider the compound block
of c=[‘p360’,‘g400’] in Figure 8.6. The index number of this compound block is
2. The number of candidates in the MBC is 16 in our example (see Figure 8.9).
A record with the bin combination of ‘D’ for Surname and ‘E’ for Given name
attributes (in the first compound block) corresponds to Match IDs 12 and 16 in
the MBC (Figure 8.9). Using Equation 8.3, the Match IDs for a record (RA5)
with the same bin combination (of ‘D’ and ‘E’ for Surname and Given name
attributes, respectively) in the compound block of c=[‘p360’,‘g400’] (with index
number of 2) would be calculated as (2× 16+ 12) and (2× 16+ 16), which are
equal to 44 and 48 (the Match IDs for RA5 in Alice’s MBR in Figure 8.10).
8. Once the MBRs are generated, Alice and Bob retrieve the list of unique Match
IDs from their MBR. They then exchange their list of Match IDs (MILs) with
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Bob’s MIL 
12 16 27 31 47 58 59 64636260
Alice’s MIL 
12 16 23 24 27 28 44 48 63
12 16
Intersection list of MILs 
27 63
Figure 8.11: The Match ID List (MIL) of Alice and Bob that contains the list of Match
IDs found in their records and the intersection list of MILs. The MIL is generated in
step 8 of the protocol.
Alice’s matches Bob’s matches 


















Figure 8.12: The matches of Alice and Bob for the corresponding match IDs in the
























Figure 8.13: The accumulator generated by Alice and Bob which contains the match-
ing record pairs of Alie and Bob, and their similarity range. The accumulator is
generated in step 9 of the protocol.
each other and find the intersection list of the MILs, which contains the Match
IDs that are common in both databases. This step is illustrated in Figure 8.11.
For example, the match IDs 44 and 48 (continuing the above example) are not
in common in both databases and therefore the record RA5 is not a match with
any of the records in Bob’s database.
9. In the final step, as illustrated in Figures 8.12 and 8.13, both Alice and Bob
identify the records of the matches that are corresponding to the Match IDs in
the intersection list of MILs. An accumulator is built for storing these matching
records, as shown in Figure 8.13.
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8.3 Analysis of the Protocol
In this section we analyze our 2P-Bin protocol in terms of complexity, privacy, and
linkage quality.
8.3.1 Complexity
We assume both databases contain n (n = nA = nB) records, m = |A| attributes
are used for linking the records, and each linkage attribute contains ua = u unique
values (1 ≤ a ≤ m). We also assume that each attribute generates nB blocks by
applying the blocka(·) functions to block their databases. It is obvious that for large
databases it commonly holds that m  nB ≤ u  n. In step 1, the agreement of
the parameters and functions between Alice and Bob has a constant communication
complexity. Reading the databases in step 2 and building the local BI data structures
and the BLI data structure are O(n) computation complexity, if m, nB and u are very
small compared to n, because building the BI and BLI data structures are O(m× u)
and O(m× nB), respectively.
The exchange of the BLIs in step 3 requires the communication of m× nB values
for each party, and with m, the number of linkage attributes, being comparatively a
very small constant, this results in an O(nB) communication complexity. Assuming
each BLI contains nB compound blocks (m × nB individual blocks), calculating the
intersection of the two BLIs is O(nB log nB) computation complexity.
We assume the number of reference values used for each individual block in the
intersection list of the BLIs is on average nR. In step 4, the total number of reference
values to be generated and exchanged is m × nB × nR. With nR and m being very
small compared to nB, this step requires O(nB) computation and communication
complexities. In step 5, assuming each list (or block) in the BI that was generated
in step 1 contains on average u/nB attribute values, each of the m × nB individual
blocks requires (u/nB)× nR similarity calculations, and thus a total of m× u× nR.
Again with m and nR being very small, the computation complexity of step 5 is O(u).
Candidates of Matching Bin Combinations are calculated for one compound block
based on the number of bins k, the similarity range (which includes the minimum
similarity value sm and the maximum similarity value 1.0), and the binning distance
d, (0 ≤ d ≤ k) for each attribute. For each of the candidates a unique Match ID is
given. This can be used to calculate the Match IDs for any bin combinations in any
compound block using Equation 8.3. The number of candidates is given by (k− d)m
for one compound block and thus the computation complexity is O((k− d)m).
In step 7, building the MBR by reading the n records requires a total of O(n) com-
putation complexity. In the next step Alice and Bob exchange the lists of unique Match
IDs that are corresponding to the bin combinations found in their records. This is
O((k− d)m× nB), because a maximum of (k− d)m candidates of bin combinations are
calculated for one compound block and with the total number of compound blocks
being nB, this step results in O((k− d)m × nB) communication complexity. Finding
the intersection of these two lists requires O((k − d)mnB log (k − d)mnB). Finally,
§8.3 Analysis of the Protocol 109
the generation of the accumulator to store the matches using the Match IDs in the
intersection list requires a computation complexity of O((k − d)m × nB), because a
maximum of (k− d)m × nB Match IDs can be found in the intersection list.
Overall, the communication and computation complexities of our protocol are
linear in the size of the databases O(n) and the number of blocks O(nB), but they
are of exponential complexity in the number of attributes m and bins k, O(km). The
complexity of our protocol therefore depends on the value of k and the number of
linkage attributes m.
8.3.2 Privacy
The protocol assumes that both Alice and Bob follow the honest but curious (HBC)
adversarial model [78], in that the parties are curious and they try to find out as much
as possible about the other party’s data while following the protocol. The protocol is
secure in this adversarial model if and only if both parties have no new knowledge
at the end of the protocol above what they would have learned from the output of
the matched record pairs. We analyze the privacy of our protocol by discussing what
the two parties can learn from the data they communicate with each other during
the protocol.
There are mainly two steps where we have to consider the privacy aspect in our
protocol. One is the exchange of the BLIs (that contain compound blocks) in step 3
which might leak some information regarding the compound block values in each
party’s database to the other party. Using a secure set intersection (SSI) protocol
to find out the intersection set of the compound blocks in both databases (without
revealing any additional information about the blocks that are not in common to
either party) will solve this problem. There are two major types of SSI protocols that
are commutative encryption [1] and homomorphic encryption [114].The encryptions
of both types of SSI protocols have a linear communication complexity. Since the
exchange of the BLIs is O(nB) (as was discussed in Section 8.3.1), using a SSI protocol
for this step would be feasible.
The second privacy issue in our protocol is at the step of exchanging the Match
IDs (step 8) to find the intersection list that contains the Match IDs of Matching Bin
Combinations that are common to both databases. The privacy of this step depends
on the number of bins k. If k is large then the range of each bin is low and thus the
number of unique attribute values that fall in each bin will become smaller. This re-
sults in higher probability of suspicion (Ps) values (i.e. lower privacy). So the smaller
the value for the number of bins the higher the privacy of our protocol.
8.3.3 Linkage Quality
Evaluating the quality of our protocol is crucial since we use the bins of similarity
values instead of the actual similarity values for the approximate matching of at-
tribute values. In this section, we analyze the quality of our protocol in terms of
efficiency measured by recall (i.e. how many true matches are retrieved by the clas-
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Probability of suspicion:
bin exchange             Ps = 1/3 
similarity exchange   Ps = 1/2
Reference value:
amilia
0.6 − 0.69   B
0.5 − 0.59   A
0.7 − 0.79   C
0.8 − 0.89   D
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Figure 8.14: An attack method for reference values-based private matching and classification
solutions (taken from [190]). The similarity of value ‘amelia’ (0.85) matches with two global
values in GM while the bin of similarity (D) matches with three global values and thus the
Ps is reduced to 1/3 from 1/2.
sification model) and effectiveness measured by precision (i.e. from the record pairs
that are classified as matches how many are true matches).
The quality of linkage depends on the number of bins k. If k is large, then the
range of each bin is small which results in more specific ranges of similarity values,
and thus the number of false matches and false non-matches will be smaller, resulting
in higher precision. However, if we increase k and thus decrease the range of each bin
above a certain value, then the number of false non-matches will begin to increase,
because the number of missed matches, classified incorrectly as non-matched pairs
(false non-matches), increases. This reduces the recall of the approach with increasing
k. Therefore, the larger the number of bins used the higher the precision but lower
the recall of our protocol.
Bins of similarities used in our protocol only provide similarity ranges (but not
the exact similarities), and therefore ranking of which pairs are more similar than
others is not possible with this approach.
8.4 Linkage Attack
A frequency linkage attack method for reference values-based private matching and
classification solutions is explained in Figure 8.14 for one example database value
(‘amelia’). An adversary (Alice, Bob, and / or Carol - we only consider insider attacks
in this thesis, as was described in Section 5.2) having access to a global dataset G
can compute the number of matching values ng in GM that have the same similarity
or bin of similarity with the same set of reference values to calculate the probability
of suspicion Ps. DR measures can then be calculated using the Ps values for each
masked value in DM. As illustrated in Figure 8.14, the exchange of bins of similar-
ity reduces the probability of suspicion and thus increases the privacy guarantees
compared to revealing the actual similarity values to a third party, as proposed in
the three-party solution [154] (assuming the third party might collude and / or it
might have information about the reference values used). In addition, the number
of bins used in this 2P-Bin solution determines the privacy of this approach. If the
number of bins k is large, then the similarity range of each bin becomes smaller, and
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Figure 8.15: (a) Total linkage time (b) F-measure and (c) DR measures of the 2P-Bin approach
on the OZ-17,294 and OZ-172,938 datasets, with different values for the number of bins
parameter (k).
this results in a smaller number of global values ng in GM that match with a specific
bin value. Therefore, the larger the number of bins used the lower the privacy of the
solution but higher the quality of linkage. Also, the privacy of this solution depends
on the number of attributes used to link records. If more number of attributes are
used, then the number of combinations with the same bin values in GM will become
smaller and thus the probability of suspicion will be increased with more attributes.
8.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present the results of the empirical study of our 2P-Bin approach
conducted on the datasets described in Section 5.4 using the evaluation framework
proposed in Chapter 5. The default parameters were set to k = 6 (this gives best
results in terms of all three properties of PPRL, as shown in Figure 8.15), and st = 0.8.
The similarity range was set as sm = 0.5 to 1.0. Different values for k in the range
of [4, 6, 8, 10, 12] were also used to evaluate the performance of the 2P-Bin solution
against k. All four attributes in the datasets were used as linkage attributes.
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(d) Total time for record linkage - NC Cor datasets
2P-Bin
2P-Bin, Mod
Figure 8.16: (a) Total linkage time, and (b) total communication size of the 2P-Bin approach
on the OZ datasets, (c) total linkage time on the OZ Cor datasets, and (d) total linkage time
on the NC Cor datasets averaged over the results of all variations of each dataset.
Figure 8.15 presents the results of the scalability, quality, and privacy of the ap-
proach for different number of bins k. The linkage time is calculated for different
number of bin values to evaluate the scalability of the protocol and how it is in-
fluenced by the value for k. As shown in Figure 8.15(a), the linkage time increases
with k, because the complexity of our protocol depends on the value for k (as was dis-
cussed in Section 8.3.1). As expected, the quality of linkage (calculated by F-measure)
increases with k. As we discussed in Section 8.3.3, although the number of false
matches decreases with k, the number of true matches missed (false non-matches)
increases with k due to smaller bin ranges. This leads to a consistent F-measure with
increasing k after certain point. We achieved a high F-measure of 1.0 on the No-mod
datasets. Privacy evaluated by the DR measures for the linkage attack presented in
Section 8.4 for different k is given in Figure 8.15(c). The disclosure risk increases with
k which reduces the privacy of the protocol with increasing k.
Figure 8.16 shows the total linkage time and communication size required for pri-
vate matching and classification of the 2P-Bin approach on different datasets. As can
be seen from the figure, the 2P-Bin approach is efficient and is also scalable to large
datasets. As expected, the computation complexity (shown in Figures 8.16(a), 8.16(c),
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Figure 8.17: A comparison of precision against recall of the 2P-Bin solution on the (a) OZ
Cor-46,116 and (b) NC Cor-54,886 datasets with No-mod, Light-mod, Med-mod, and Heavy-
mod variations.
and 8.16(d)) of our approach is linear in the size of the datasets, and it increases with
the number of attributes m used for the linkage (see Figure 8.16(a)). Most of the steps
in our protocol depend on the number of linkage attributes m and the number of bins
k used. However, the linkage performed with only one attribute takes longer time
than with two, three and even four attributes, especially on larger datasets (as can
be seen from Figure 8.16(a)). All the steps performed after the step of calculating the
intersection list of the BLIs (step 3) are dependent on this intersection list. With only
one linkage attribute, there are many common values that exist in both databases and
thus the intersection list of the BLIs will be larger than when several attributes are
used. As a result, the calculation of similarities of these attribute values, the genera-
tion of the Matching Bins of Records, and building the accumulator take longer time
with one linkage attribute only than performing the linkage with several attributes.
As can be seen from Figure 8.16(b), the communication complexity of our proto-
col is linear or sub-linear in the size of the datasets. It increases with the number of
attributes m used for linkage. With a smaller number of attributes used, the commu-
nication complexity tends to be more sub-linear, while with all four attributes used
it becomes linear in the size of the datasets.
The computation and communication complexities of our approach on the mod-
ified datasets are lower than on the non-modified datasets, as shown in Figure 8.16.
The reason is with modified datasets the number of similar attribute values that fall
into the same block will be smaller, which results in a smaller number of similarity
calculations compared with non-modified datasets.
A comparison of precision and recall of the 2P-Bin protocol is presented in Fig-
ure 8.17 on the OZ Cor-46,116 and NC Cor-54,886 datasets with different levels
of data modifications (corruptions). Different levels of corruptions applied to the
datasets (as was described in Section 5.4) allow us to evaluate the performance of ap-
proximate matching of our protocol in the presence of data errors. As shown in the
figure, our 2P-Bin approach achieves high precision and recall when no modification
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Figure 8.18: Disclosure risk of the 2P-Bin solution against the number of bins (k) used on
the OZ-17,294 No-mod and Mod datasets with (a) one attribute and (b) two attributes used.
is applied to the datasets, and then the values decrease as the level of modifications
increases, as one would expect. Recall drops quite drastically with the level of mod-
ifications, because the number of matches missed by the classification due to errors
and other variations introduced (false non-matches) increases more than the number
of false matches.
Next we evaluate the privacy of our approach using the disclosure risk measures
presented in Section 5.3.1, calculated for the frequency linkage attack (proposed in
Section 8.4) under the worst case assumption of G ≡ D. Figure 8.18 shows how dis-
closure risk increases with the number of bins (k) and the number of attributes used
to link records (linkage attributes) in the 2P-Bin solution. Since we used the original
dataset D as the global dataset G, the number of global values that match a certain
masked value is very small (resulting in high disclosure risk values). However, this
worst case scenario provides a baseline for empirical privacy evaluation of solutions.
Disclosure risk values in the modified datasets are lower than the values in the
non-modified datasets, because the number of global matches becomes smaller with
modified (by data errors and variations) values. Interestingly, in the modified dataset
the mean disclosure risk with two attributes decreases with k. This is because with
modified datasets, the number of global matches ng in GM with the same bin values
as the bin values in DM for both attributes becomes zero with larger number of bins,
and thus all the N global values in GM can be considered as possible matches, which
decreases the disclosure risk. Small variations in the attribute values would make a
frequency linkage attack more difficult.
Linkage quality (measured by precision) against privacy (measured by DRMean)
for different number of bins is shown in Figure 8.19. As can be seen from Figures 8.18
and 8.19, the 2P-Bin provides more privacy at the cost of quality loss on the modified
datasets compared to non-modified datasets.
Finally, we studied how a private blocking solution combined with our 2P-Bin
private matching and classification solution influences the scalability, quality, and
privacy of the process. We evaluated the 2P-Bin private matching and classification
§8.6 Summary 115
























Quality-privacy plot against bin size (k) - OZ-17,294
No-mod
Mod
Figure 8.19: Privacy and linkage quality plot of the 2P-Bin solution for different number of
bins (k = [4, 6, 8, 10, 12]) used on the OZ-17,294 No-mod and Mod datasets.
Table 8.6: Blocking combined with the 2P-Bin private matching and classification
solution on the OZ-17,294 Mod dataset.
No blocking Phonetic SNC-2P
Time (seconds) 622.7531 10.5247 11.6744
Precision 0.0001 1.0000 0.9443
Recall 0.9993 0.5059 0.8447
F-measure 0.0002 0.6719 0.8917
DRMean 0.0006 0.5888 0.2637
DRMark 0.0002 0.5885 0.3066
solution with no blocking, Soundex [23]-based phonetic blocking (a standard block-
ing approach that has been used in non-PPRL, as described in Chapter 2), and our
SNC-based private blocking proposed in Chapter 7. In Table 8.6, we present the total
time required for blocking and linkage, linkage quality results, and the DR measures
in the worst case setting (G ≡ D) of our 2P-Bin solution with these three block-
ing scenarios. As the results show, when no blocking is applied the DR values are
very low. However, it requires significantly longer linkage time compared to when
a blocking technique is applied. Phonetic-based blocking requires shorter time than
our SNC-based blocking, though privacy and linkage quality results are compara-
tively better with the SNC-based approach. Phonetic-based blocking provides lower
privacy guarantees.
8.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a novel two-party protocol for scalable and ap-
proximate privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) by using reference values and
binning the similarity ranges for secure calculation of the similarities between at-
tribute values. Our protocol is linear in the size of the databases to be linked which
allows scalability to large databases. This has been validated in our experimental
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evaluation where we performed the linkage on different datasets of up to a size of
nearly two million records. However, our protocol is a parametric solution which
depends on the number of bins k.
As shown in the experimental evaluation k plays a major role in determining the
three main properties of PPRL, which are scalability, linkage quality, and privacy. A
specific future research avenue is to tackle the problem of finding the optimal value
for k. As similar to the previous chapters, the selection of reference values is a crucial
step to achieve high linkage quality while providing sufficient privacy protection,
which requires additional work in this direction. In our current implementation,
we used the Levenshtein edit distance based string comparison function [148] to
measure the similarity between two strings. Another extension to our current work
is to compare the performances of the protocol when different approximate string
comparison functions are used.
Chapter 9
Two-Party Bloom Filter-based
Private Matching and Classification
Similar to the previous chapter, in this chapter we propose a novel two-party private
matching and classification algorithm for privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL)
that uses one of the efficient privacy techniques, namely Bloom filter-based encod-
ing. Our protocol conducts iterative classification of record pairs into matches and
non-matches, as selected bits of the Bloom filters are exchanged across the database
owners. We describe the protocol in Section 9.2 and analyze in terms of complexity,
linkage quality, and privacy in Section 9.3. We then conduct an empirical study with
respect to these analyses in Section 9.5 based on a linkage attack presented in Sec-
tion 9.4. Finally, we summarize our findings and discuss future work in Section 9.6.
9.1 Introduction
Several approaches have been proposed to deal with PPRL over the past two decades
[58, 102, 184, 194]. As we reviewed in Chapter 3, most of these approaches either
use computationally expensive secure multi-party computation (SMC)-based privacy
techniques [41, 78, 135] or they require a trusted third party (which might not al-
ways be available in a real application) to perform the linkage using efficient data
perturbation-based privacy techniques. Developing efficient and practical algorithms
for private matching and classification in PPRL applications is one of the important
research directions identified in Chapter 4.
Among different perturbation-based privacy techniques that have been applied
in PPRL solutions, the Bloom filter-based encoding [17] is an efficient technique that
can provide adequate privacy guarantees if effectively used. A Bloom filter is an
array of bits of length l, where all the bits are initially set to 0. k independent hash
functions, h1, h2, . . . , hk, each with range 1, . . . l, are used to map the elements of a
set into the Bloom filter by setting the corresponding bit positions to 1. Bloom filters
have previously been used in several three-party and multi-party PPRL solutions.
Schnell et al. [174] were the first to propose a method for approximate matching
in PPRL using Bloom filters. In their work, the attribute values of each record in
the databases to be linked are concatenated into one string, and the q-grams (sub-
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Figure 9.1: Mapping of strings into Bloom filters and calculating their Dice coefficient
similarity (taken from [193]).
strings of length q) of these strings are mapped into Bloom filters using k independent
hash functions. This method of encoding is known as cryptographic longterm key
(CLK) [175]. The Bloom filters are then sent to a third party and the Dice coeffi-





where c is the number of common bit positions that are set to 1 in both Bloom filters
bA and bB (common 1-bits), xA is the number of bit positions that are set to 1 in bA,
and xB is the number of bit positions that are set to 1 in bB. The Dice coefficient is
used since it is insensitive to many matching zeros in long Bloom filters [174]. For
example, mapping the bigrams (q = 2) of the two string values ‘peter’ and ‘pete’ into
l = 14 bits long Bloom filters using k = 2 hash functions and calculating the Dice
coefficient similarity of the two Bloom filters are illustrated in Figure 9.1.
The approach is efficient because of the use of Bloom filters and it supports ap-
proximate matching of values as well, rendering it applicable to real-world condi-
tions. However, as with other three-party protocols, collusion between the parties is
a major privacy drawback of this approach [174]. Recent research in PPRL has anal-
ysed the weaknesses of Bloom filters using constraint satisfaction cryptanalysis [122],
and novel solutions based on random sampling of bits from field-level Bloom filters
have been proposed to improve the privacy of Bloom filter-based PPRL [56, 175].
Our aim is to develop a two-party protocol for PPRL using Bloom filters. We
propose a protocol that eliminates the need of a third party by adopting an iterative
method for revealing selected bits in the Bloom filters between the database owners
and classifying record pairs into matches and non-matches in an iterative way such
that the pairs that are unlikely to correspond to matches are removed before reveal-
ing more bits for those pairs. An iterative strategy was introduced in a previous
two-party exact matching solution [14] for PPRL where characters of hash-encoded
values are iteratively revealed until they are identical for a certain length. The use of
iterative method would prevent revealing more information for pairs that are highly
likely to be non-matches. We use the cryptographic longterm key (CLK) [175] based
Bloom filter encoding for our two-party solution in this chapter and we will compare
different encoding methods (which we will discuss in Section 9.3.3) in Chapter 10.
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Table 9.1: Notation used in this chapter.
DA, DB Databases held by database owners Alice and Bob, respectively
SA, SB Lists containing tuples of linkage attributes’ values for each record in DA and DB, respectively
bA, bB A Bloom filter, one for each record in DA and DB, respectively
OA, OB Lists of record IDs and number of 1-bits for each record in DA and DB, respectively
C, Ci List of candidate record pairs, list of candidate record pairs at iteration i
st Minimum similarity threshold value to classify a record pair as a match
sl Minimum acceptable similarity threshold value to add noise
sr Minimum similarity threshold value to reveal bits in an iteration
l Length of Bloom filters
h1 . . . hk , k Hash functions used to map a set of elements into a Bloom filter, number of hash functions
q, i Number of characters that make a q-gram, iteration i, i > 0
r, ri Number of bit positions revealed, number of bit positions revealed in iteration i
ti Total number of bit positions revealed so far up to iteration i, ti = ∑i ri
x, xA, xB Number of 1-bits, number of 1-bits in bA and bB, respectively
xi , xAi , x
B
i Total number of 1-bits revealed so far up to iteration i,
total number of 1-bits revealed in bA and bB so far up to iteration i, respectively
rmin, rmax , zmax Minimum number of bits that can be revealed in an iteration, maximum number of
total bits to be revealed, maximum number of noise bits that can be added or removed
cmin, ci Minimum number of common 1-bits required in both Bloom filters bA and bB
to be classified as a match, total number of common 1-bits revealed from both
Bloom filters bA and bB so far up to iteration i
d Difference between xA and xB
dmax Maximum difference between xA and xB to be classified as a match
sim(·, ·) Function used to calculate the similarity of two Bloom filters bA and bB (Dice coefficient)
9.2 Proposed Solution
Similar as in the previous chapters, we assume two database owners, Alice and Bob,
with their respective databases DA and DB, participate in the protocol. We divide
the steps of our two-party Bloom filter-based protocol (2P-BF) into three main phases,
which are the preparation phase, the length filtering phase, and the iterative classi-
fication phase. The notation we use is summarized in Table 9.1. Figures 9.2 to 9.7
(taken from [188]) illustrate the steps of the protocol.
9.2.1 Preparation Phase
In the initial preparation phase the database owners prepare their data to be used in
the protocol. The steps of this first phase are:
1. Alice and Bob agree upon a bit array length l; k hashing functions h1 . . . hk; the
length (in characters) of grams q; the similarity function sim(bA, bB) to measure
the similarity of two Bloom filters bA and bB; a minimum similarity threshold
value st, above which a pair of records is classified as a match; the maximum
number of bit positions they are willing to reveal to each other rmax (rmax ≤ l);
and a set of attributes A (linkage attributes) that are used to link the records.
2. Alice and Bob each stores the tuples of the linkage attributes’ values (a1, · · · , am)
in a list, SA and SB, respectively, for each of the records in their databases.
3. For every tuple s in SA, Alice performs the following steps:
(a) Alice converts each attribute string ai in s (1 ≤ i ≤ m) into a set of q-grams.
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Figure 9.2: Example Bloom filters held by Alice and Bob for the records in their
databases DA and DB, respectively, and the number of 1-bits in each of their Bloom
filers along with the record identifiers stored in OA and OB, respectively.
(b) Alice maps these q-gram sets into a Bloom filter bA (of that record) of length
l using the hash functions h1 . . . hk. All the attribute values (a1, · · · , am in
s) of a record are mapped into one single Bloom filter.
4. Alice also counts for each Bloom filter the number of bit positions that are set
to 1 (1-bits), xA, and stores this number along with the identifier of the record
into its list OA, as illustrated in Figure 9.2 for the example Bloom filters.
5. For every tuple of attribute values s in SB, Bob performs steps 3 and 4.
9.2.2 Length Filtering Phase
The second phase of our protocol aims to remove non-matching record pairs using a
length filtering method on the Bloom filters. The output of this phase is a set of can-
didate record pairs (C) generated with their corresponding value for the minimum
number of common 1-bits they require (cmin) to be potentially classified as a match.
We use the Dice-coefficient (Equation 9.1) as the similarity function sim(·, ·) to com-
pare two Bloom filters, as it is insensitive to many zeros in Bloom filters [174]. How-
ever, any q-gram-based similarity function can be used [29]. Algorithm 9.1 shows the
main steps involved in this phase.
1. Alice and Bob exchange the number of 1-bits in each of their Bloom filters along
with their record identifiers or randomly generated unique ID numbers (lists
OA and OB, respectively). They then generate all the record pairs (|DA| × |DB|
if no blocking function is applied, see Section 9.2.4 for how this can be im-
proved) along with the number of 1-bits (xA and xB), as illustrated in Figure 9.3.
2. In order to consider a record pair as a possible match, the difference between
the number of 1-bits in their Bloom filters d = |xA − xB| should be less than
or equal to the maximum bit difference dmax, which can be calculated as below.
Assume xA ≤ xB and all the bit positions set to 1 in bA are also set to 1 in bB
(c = xA). This worst case assumption gives the lower bound of the similarity
coefficient (st) and the upper bound of bit difference (dmax). The value for dmax


























































































































Figure 9.3: Record pairs that are likely to be non-matches are pruned (length filtering)
according to the number of 1-bits, xa and xb, using Equation 9.2, as shown in the left
table. Candidate record pairs generated after the length filtering phase are shown in
the right table, with the minimum number of common 1-bits required to be classified
as a match, cmin, according to the values of xA and xB, calculated using Equation 9.3.
st is set to 0.8. The minimum value of all cmin, min(cmin), is 4 which will be used as
the value for r1 in the first iteration (i = 1).
can be calculated given the minimum similarity coefficient threshold st and the
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≥ st
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A record pair must exhibit at most dmax difference between the 1-bits in their
Bloom filters in order to be considered as a possible match (according to the
similarity threshold value st). All the pairs that have a larger 1-bit difference
than dmax can be removed without proceeding further, since they cannot be
matches. For example, if st is set to 0.8, then the difference between 1-bits in
two Bloom filters must be at maximum half the value of the smaller value for
the 1-bits in the two Bloom filters (0.5×min(xA, xB)) in order to be classified as








≥ 810 ⇒ d ≤
0.5xA1 . Alice and Bob store only the record pairs that have |xA − xB| ≤ dmax, as
illustrated in Figure 9.3.
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Algorithm 9.1 : Length filtering (phase 2)
Input: OA: List of record IDs and number of 1-bits (rA, xA) from Alice
OB: List of record IDs and number of 1-bits (rB, xB) from Bob
st: Minimum similarity threshold
Output: C: List of candidate record pairs with their
minimum number of common 1-bits required (cmin)
1: C = [ ]
2: for (rAi , x
A
i ) ∈ OA do
3: for (rBi , x
B
i ) ∈ OB do
4: xmin = min(xAi , x
B
i )
5: d = |xAi − xBi |
6: dmax = 2xmin(1−st)st
7: if d ≤ dmax then
















3. Alice and Bob now calculate the minimum number of common 1-bits required
for a record pair to be classified as a match, cmin, for each pair of the remaining
candidate records, as illustrated in Figure 9.3. This is calculated for each pair
using the values for xA, xB and st as shown in Equation 9.3, where b·c denotes
the rounding to the next lower integer value. The resulting candidate record
pairs with their values for xA, xB, and cmin are stored in the Candidates Index
data structure, C (as shown in the right table in Figure 9.3), which will be used












9.2.3 Iterative Classification Phase
The main task of a record linkage process is the classification of record pairs [29].
The iterative classification phase is where we classify record pairs into matches, non-
matches, and possible matches. This classification needs to be done in such a way
that no information about the attribute values that were mapped into Bloom filters is
being revealed to the two database owners, with the exception of some information
regarding the matches.
We assume that Alice and Bob are prepared to reveal rmax bit positions to each
other in an iterative way without compromising the sensitive values in their Bloom
filters, where rmax is the maximum number of bits in Bloom filters that the database
owners agree to reveal (rmax ≤ l). The number of bits to be revealed in each iteration,
ri, is a crucial parameter to be set as it provides a trade-off between privacy and
computational efficiency of the protocol. There are two possible extreme cases.

















































































































Candidate Record Pairs − Iteration 1











Figure 9.4: Bloom Filters of Alice and Bob with t1 = 4 (r1 = min(cmin) = 4) bits
revealed after the first iteration. The calculated values for c1 are used to calculate the
value for r2 for the next iteration, r2 = min(cmin − c1) = 2.
1. Revealing all the rmax bits in one iteration, which is very fast but is not secure
since all the rmax bit positions are revealed for all the Bloom filter pairs including
non-matches as well. This might allow Alice and Bob to re-identify certain
values of non-matches from the revealed bit patterns based on a linkage attack,
as will be explained in Section 9.4.
2. Revealing the rmax bits in rmax iterations where only 1 bit position is revealed in
each iteration. This would be the best case for preserving privacy as it removes
the non-matches in an iterative way before revealing the rest of the bit positions.
This approach is however not scalable to large databases, especially with long
Bloom filters, as each iteration requires communication between the database
owners.
Hence, a method to reveal the optimal number of bits, ri, in each iteration is
required. We propose a method to calculate this optimal number by finding the
smallest value of the minimum number of additional common 1-bits required to
classify a pair as a match in each iteration among all the record pairs. The record
pair that requires the smallest number of additional common 1-bits among all the
other pairs has a privacy risk if more bit positions are revealed than the minimum
number of common 1-bits it requires.
Assume ci is the total number of common 1-bits revealed so far up to iteration i.
The value for min(cmin− ci−1) (i > 0) is calculated to be used as the value for ri in the
ith iteration, with cmin as calculated in Equation 9.3. For example, in the first iteration
(i = 1), min(cmin) (c0 = 0) will be used as the value for the number of bit positions to
be revealed, r1. After r1 bit positions are revealed in the first iteration, the value for
(cmin − c1) will be calculated for each of the remaining record pairs to calculate the
value for r2 = min(cmin − c1) in the second iteration, and then min(cmin − c2) will be
used as the value for r3 in the third iteration, and so on.
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Figure 9.5: Bloom Filters of Alice and Bob with t2 = 6 (r2 = 2) bits revealed after the
second iteration. The calculated values for c2 are used to calculate the value for r3
for the next iteration, r3 = min(cmin − c2) = 1.
A B Alice’s BF Bob’s BF Classmin 2 A Ax − x   3 x − x   B B3
Candidate Record Pairs − Iteration 3
c    − c min 3c    − c 
1 1 1

































































Figure 9.6: Bloom Filters of Alice and Bob with t3 = 7 (r3 = 1) bits revealed after the
third iteration. The calculated values for c3 are used to calculate the value for r4 for
the next iteration, r4 = min(cmin − c3) = 1.
A B Alice’s BF Bob’s BF Classminc    − c 3 x − x   A A4 x − x   B B4
Candidate Record Pairs − Iteration 4
1 1 1
























































Figure 9.7: Bloom Filters of Alice and Bob with t4 = 8 (r4 = 1) bits revealed after
the fourth iteration. The pairs that are still classified as possible matches (the pair
of records RA3 and RB2 in this example) will need to be re-processed with different
hash functions. rmax = 8 in our example.
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Algorithm 9.2 : Iterative classification (phase 3)
Input: C: Candidate record pairs from phase 2
rmax : Maximum number of bits to be revealed in Bloom filters
Output: M: Set of record pairs classified as matches
N: Set of record pairs classified as non-matches
P: Set of record pairs classified as possible matches
1: M = [ ]; N = [ ]; P = C
2: while P 6= [ ] do
3: i = 1; t = 0
4: while t ≤ rmax do
5: ri = min(cmin − ci−1)
6: t = t + ri
7: for (bA, bB) ∈ P do
8: xA = number of 1-bits in bA
9: xB = number of 1-bits in bB
10: cmin = number of common 1-bits in bA and bB
11: reveal_bits(r) {A function to reveal bits from Bloom filters}
12: xAi =total number of 1-bits revealed in b
A
13: xBi =total number of 1-bits revealed in b
B
14: ci =total number of common 1-bits revealed in bA and bB
15: if ci ≥ cmin then
16: M+= (bA, bB)
17: P-= (bA, bB)
18: else if ci < cmin and (cmin − ci) > (l − t) then
19: N+= (bA, bB)
20: P-= (bA, bB)
21: else if ci < cmin and (cmin − ci) ≤ (l − t) then
22: if ((xA − xAi ) < (cmin − ci)) or
((xB − xBi ) < (cmin − ci)) then
23: N+= (bA, bB)






30: for (bA, bB) ∈ P do
31: Do_rehash(P) {Restart the protocol from phase 1}
32: end for
33: end while
The iterative classification phase is done as follows (Algorithm 9.2 provides an
overview of these steps):
1. Among all the (cmin − ci−1) values for all the unclassified pairs of records, the
minimum value, min(cmin − ci−1), is taken as the lower bound of the number
of bits to be revealed in the next iteration. Alice and Bob both will exchange
ri = min(cmin − ci−1) same bit positions from each of their Bloom filters. For
example, if r1 = min(cmin − c0) = min(cmin) = 4, then the first 4 bit positions
are exchanged in the first iteration, as shown in Figure 9.4. The total number
of bit positions revealed so far up to iteration i is ti = ∑i ri.
From the exchange of ti bit positions, three possible cases can occur with each
record pair.
• Case 1: Record pairs which have cmin or more than cmin out of ti bit
positions set to 1 in both Bloom filters (bA and bB) (ci ≥ cmin). These
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pairs are classified as matches, because the similarity of these pairs is
sim(bA, bB) ≥ st as explained in Equation 9.3.
• Case 2: Record pairs which have some or none of the ti bit positions set
to 1 in both Bloom filters bA and bB (ci < cmin) and the number of ad-
ditional common 1-bits required (cmin − ci) is greater than the number of
remaining unrevealed bit positions (ci < cmin and (cmin − ci) > (l − ti)).
These pairs are classified as non-matches, because the remaining number
of unrevealed bits is not sufficient to be ci ≥ cmin.
• Case 3: Record pairs which have some or none of the ti bit positions set to
1 in both Bloom filters bA and bB (ci < cmin) and the number of additional
common 1-bits required (cmin − ci) is less than or equal to the number of
remaining unrevealed bit positions (ci < cmin and (cmin − ci) ≤ (l − ti)).
These record pairs are classified as possible matches, as there can be more
common 1-bits in the unrevealed bits to be ci ≥ cmin.
2. After having ti bit positions revealed in iteration i, all the pairs that are classified
as matches and non-matches (cases 1 and 2) can be removed from the set of
candidate record pairs C. Only the pairs that are classified as possible matches
(case 3) will be taken to the next iteration.
Based on the revealed bit positions, Alice and Bob calculate the new values for ci,
xAi , and x
B




i can also be used to prune more
non-matches from the pairs of records that were classified as possible matches.
Record pairs which have (cmin − ci) < (xA − xAi ) or (cmin − ci) < (xB − xBi )
can be classified as non-matches and pruned. For example, if 2 more 1-bits are
left unrevealed in bB (xB − xBi = 2) after revealing 4 bit positions in the first
iteration, and (cmin − ci) is 3 which means at least 3 more common 1-bits are
required for the record pair to be classified as a match from only 2 1-bits in
bB (which is impossible), then this record pair can be removed at this iteration
without participating in the next iteration and revealing more bits for this non-
matching pair. Record pair RA3 and RB3 in Figure 9.4 is such a case.
3. For the pairs that are classified as possible matches (case 3), Alice and Bob repeat
the steps until rmax bit positions are exchanged in an iterative method (rmax is
set to 8 in our running example).
4. The record pairs that are still classified as possible matches in the last step, after
rmax bit positions have been revealed, need to be encoded (re-hashed) into new
Bloom filters by different k hash functions (lines 30-32 in Algorithm 9.2).
9.2.4 Improving Efficiency
In the length filtering phase, we remove record pairs that have a difference between
the number of 1-bits larger than a certain value, depending on the minimum simi-
larity threshold value st before starting the iterations, as explained in Section 9.2.2
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(following Equation 9.2). This reduces the number of candidate record pairs to be
processed in the iterative classification phase.
Blocking techniques [30] can be applied before performing the linkage (for ex-
ample, phonetic-based blocking [103] or our SNC-based private blocking approaches
presented in Chapters 6 and 7) such that similar records are grouped together. This
further reduces the number of candidate record pairs, because only the pairs that are
in the same block will be considered as candidate record pairs. Alice and Bob each
individually applies a private blocking function to their databases (using another set
of quasi-identifier attributes or part of the linkage attributes as the blocking keys)
to privately identify the list of common blocks in both databases or to generate the
resulting candidate record pairs from both databases.
The iterative pruning of candidate record pairs using Bloom filters allows remov-
ing pairs that have higher probability of being non-matches before exchanging more
bit positions. The aim of our iterative method is to prune the record pairs that are
classified as non-matches or matches and thereby reduce the number of unclassified
pairs (possible matches) in each iteration as much as possible. We proposed to re-
veal min(cmin − ci−1) bits in each iteration. Experiments conducted on real-world
datasets (see Section 9.5) show that although many bits are being revealed in the first
few iterations, only a small number of bits are being revealed in the later iterations
which requires many iterations to run and thus makes the process not scalable to
large datasets.
To overcome this problem, we propose a method for revealing more bits when the
number of bits to be revealed becomes very small, without compromising privacy.
Assume ti bits have been revealed so far up to iteration i, among which ci common
1-bits have been found in a record pair which needs cmin − ci more common 1-bits
in both Bloom filters in order to be classified as a match. If cmin − ci is very small
and hence we can classify the pair as a match even if no more common 1-bits are
found in the later iterations, then this pair will not be at a privacy risk if more bits
are revealed in the next iteration (because it has already been considered as a match).
The question now arises what is the maximum value for cnon = cmin − ci that can be
ignored to classify pairs as matches without accuracy loss.
st − sr = 2(cnon)xA + xB
rmin = min(cnon)
ri = min(ri, rmin) (9.4)
We introduce another similarity threshold value, sr, to calculate the value for the
minimum number of bits that can be revealed for each pair in an iteration, rmin, as
shown in Equation 9.4. This basically expands the calculation of value ri in line 5
of Algorithm 9.2 as below. Among the values for cnon for all the pairs, the smallest
value is taken to be used as the value for the minimum number of bits that can be
revealed in all the pairs of Bloom filters in an iteration, rmin = min(cnon).
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If ri becomes less than rmin in an iteration, especially in later iterations, then rmin
bits will be revealed. It is important to note that the similarity threshold to reveal, sr,
is only used to calculate the value for rmin while the similarity threshold st is used
to classify the pairs. This approach improves the efficiency (and thereby scalability)
of the protocol significantly without compromising the privacy of the non-matched
record pairs. This is empirically evaluated in Section 9.5.
9.3 Analysis of the Protocol
In this section we analyze our 2P-BF approach in terms of complexity, privacy, and
linkage quality.
9.3.1 Complexity
We assume both databases contain n (n = nA = nB) records, the average number of
q-grams in each record is nq, the number of hash functions used to map q-grams of
a record into a Bloom filter is k, and the length of Bloom filters is l. In phase 1 (the
preparation phase) of our protocol, the agreement of the parameters and functions
between Alice and Bob has a constant communication complexity. Hash-mapping the
nq q-grams in each of their n records into Bloom filters using k hash functions has a
computation cost of O(n ∗ nq ∗ k) hash operations for each.
Alice and Bob then exchange in the second phase (i.e., the length filtering phase)
their OA and OB lists, respectively, that contain n records with their record identifiers
and the number of 1-bits in the records’ Bloom filters. This has a communication
complexity of O(n), and computing the number of 1-bits differences between each
pair of records from Alice and Bob for length filtering (as explained in Section 9.2.2)
is of O(n2) computation complexity.
The length filtering phase reduces the number of candidate pairs by pruning
potential non-matches based on their lengths (number of 1-bits). Further applying
a private blocking protocol (such as phonetic based [103] or our SNC-based private
blocking presented in Chapters 6 and 7) can reduce more number of candidate pairs
by grouping similar records into the same block.
In the third iterative classification phase, Alice and Bob iteratively exchange bits
from (at most) each of their n Bloom filters of l length (if no blocking or length
filtering is applied). The computation cost of this phase is O((n ∗ l)2) bit comparisons,
while the communication cost is O(n ∗ l). The communication complexity of this
protocol is therefore linear in the size of the databases.
9.3.2 Privacy
As in all three previous chapters, we assume that both Alice and Bob follow the honest
but curious (HBC) adversarial model [78], in that the parties are curious and they try
to find out as much as possible about the other party’s data while following the
protocol. In this section, in order to analyze the privacy of our solution, we discuss
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what the two parties can learn from the exchanged data between them during the
iterative protocol. In the length filtering phase (Section 9.2.2), Alice and Bob exchange
the number of 1-bits in their Bloom filters, OA and OB, respectively. This might
leak some information regarding the presence of uncommon (infrequently occurring)
shorter or longer tuples of linkage attribute values in their databases that are mapped
into the Bloom filters (not the actual attribute values of tuples). This can be overcome
by noise addition or simulation techniques, as will be described further below.
In the iterative classification phase (Section 9.2.3), they iteratively reveal bits from
their Bloom filters to each other. The amount of privacy provided by any Bloom
filter based PPRL protocol depends on the number of hash functions used (k) and
the length of the Bloom filter (l) [122, 174]. The values for k and l have to be carefully
chosen as these values provide a trade-off between the quality of the classification
and privacy. The higher the value for k/l, the higher the privacy (as empirically
validated by Kuzu et al. [122]) and the lower the quality of linkage, because the
number of q-grams mapped to one single bit increases, which leads to lower linkage
quality but makes it harder for an attacker to infer the possible combinations.
The privacy of our iterative protocol depends mainly on the number of bits re-
vealed and how they are revealed. We propose to reveal ri = min(cmin) bits in each
iteration i without compromising privacy and complexity. Assume the minimum
number of bits required to be revealed in order to re-identify the revealed bit pattern
based on a linkage attack using an external dataset (as will be described in Sec-
tion 9.4) is ta. The privacy characteristics provided by our protocol (which will be
empirically evaluated in Section 9.5) are:
1. Non-matching record pairs are removed in the earlier iterations when only a
small number of bits ti have been revealed (ti < ta), which therefore cannot be
used to re-identify records using a linkage attack (Figures 9.16(a) and 9.19).
2. More bits are revealed for pairs that are more likely to be matches (Figure 9.19).
3. When a sufficient number of bits ta are revealed for a linkage attack (in iteration
i), the remaining unclassified pairs have a minimum similarity, as calculated in









where cmin, ci, xA, and xB are calculated for every pair p in the set of candidate
pairs Ci in iteration i.
Pruning candidate record pairs that have a higher probability of being classified
as non-matches (based on cmin calculated in Equation 9.3) at early iterations improves
the privacy of the protocol, since the non-matches are removed without revealing
more bits in the next iterations. Only the pairs that have a higher probability to
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be classified as matches, exhibit a higher probability of a linkage attack when the
number of revealed bits increases. We will empirically evaluate this in Section 9.5. In
addition, hash-mapping several attribute values from each record into one compound
Bloom filter (CLK encoding [175]) makes it harder for an attacker to infer individual
attribute values that correspond to a revealed bit pattern.
The security parameter rmax, which is the maximum number of bits to be revealed
in the Bloom filters, is agreed upon by the two database owners. This parameter
determines the privacy of the protocol. For any given Bloom filter length l, a larger
value of rmax results in lower privacy but more record pairs are being classified as
matches and non-matches, while a smaller value of rmax will lead to a smaller number
of record pairs being classified but with a higher level of privacy. The database
owners can individually simulate a linkage attack (as will be described in Section 9.4)
on their own databases to calculate the probability of suspicion with the number of
bits revealed in order to agree upon an appropriate value for rmax. This is empirically
explained in Section 9.5.
Depending on the data and the distribution of 1-bit patterns, another privacy
issue to be considered with our protocol is that revealing some bits (that have com-
paratively high sensitive information due to a small number of q-grams that are
mapped to those bits) are susceptible to a linkage attack. We propose two methods
for overcoming the problem of revealing the rare or sensitive bits in Bloom filters that
can be attacked with higher probability.
1. Adding noise: Noise can be added to Bloom filters by converting 1s into 0s and
0s into 1s individually by the database owners in the preparation phase in order
to perturb their datasets. Noise bits can either be added randomly or they can
be selectively added depending on the sensitivity of the bits. In the selective
noise addition method, bits that have high frequency (occur in many Bloom
filters) and that have more q-grams mapped to them can be added (by setting 0s
to 1s), and bits with low frequency and that have a smaller number of q-grams
mapped to them can be removed (by setting 1s to 0s) from the Bloom filters.
This is similar to the approach by Durham [56], where bit frequency ranges are
examined to eliminate sensitive bits from the field-level Bloom filters that can
be mapped back to less than a certain number of fields, when composing the
record-level Bloom filters. Privacy is improved by removing less frequent bits,
while the loss of quality that occurs due to the noise addition is reduced by
adding high frequent bits.
The question is how many noise bits need to be added or removed in order
to increase the privacy without compromising linkage quality and complexity.
When adding noise three cases can occur. The first is when the bits added
or removed (flipped 0s to 1s and 1s to 0s, respectively) by the two database
owners lead to the same number of additional matching 1-bits at the same
positions (common 1-bits), which results in almost the same similarity value.
The second case is where only some of the flipped bits are matching with the
already existing bits in the other database owner’s Bloom filters, and thus the
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number of additional common 1-bits introduced by the noise bits is lower than
the total number of noise bits added by the database owners. The third case
occurs when the added noise bits do not match with any existing 1-bits and
thus no additional common 1-bits are introduced by the noise bits.
In both the second and third cases, the new similarity value decreases because
of the noise bits. However, the third case is the worst case and needs to be
considered in determining the similarity threshold value. The database owners
must agree on a minimum acceptable lower bound of the similarity threshold,
sl , with sl < st. If the values for xAmin, x
B
min, st, and sl are known, then the
maximum number of noise bits that can be added by the database owners,
zmax, can be estimated under the worst case (the third case described above,
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Figure 9.8 shows the maximum number of noise bits (zmax) that can be indi-
vidually added to each Bloom filter by the database owners to perturb the bit
distribution in Bloom filters against the minimum similarity threshold value
that is acceptable (sl) without much quality loss in the classification results.
The maximum number of noise bits linearly increases when the minimum sim-
ilarity threshold value decreases.
2. Simulation attack: The database owners can each individually simulate the
protocol and attack their own database before exchanging the values in order
to identify if there exist any sensitive bits that map only to a small number of
q-grams. Based on that, they can either change the values for k, l, and q, or
they can agree on an appropriate value for the security parameter rmax. The
bit distribution in Bloom filters (based on the number of q-grams mapped) in
a real Australian telephone database (OZ dataset, as described in Section 5.4)
with 17,294 records, for example, shows that an average of 22 q-grams (q = 2)
and a minimum of 14 q-grams are mapped to one single bit when k = 30 and
l = 1000, while when k = 30 and l = 200 the bit distribution has a minimum of
88 and an average of 101 q-grams mapped to the bits (Figure 9.9). The number
of q-grams mapped to one bit decreases with l while it increases with k.
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Figure 9.8: Maximum number of noise bits
zmax that can be added against the minimum
lower bound sl of the similarity threshold
value, with st = 0.8.
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Figure 9.9: Bit distribution (number of q-
grams mapped to the bits) in Bloom filters in
the OZ-17,294 dataset for different values of l
and k. The numbers shown are mean values.
9.3.3 Linkage Quality
Similar as with the three-party Bloom filter-based solutions [56, 174, 175], our 2P-BF
approach’s linkage quality is dependent on the Bloom filter parameterization and
the encoding method (as will be discussed further below). In order for a string s1’s
Bloom filter b1 to be considered as a match with another string s2’s Bloom filter b2, the
bit positions that are set to 1 in b1 when hash-mapping the sub-strings (q-grams) of s1
into b1 using k hash functions, must have been set to 1 in b2 as well. However, there
can be false positives due to collisions between bits (i.e., two different q-grams of s1
and s2 are hash-mapped into the same bit and classified as a match). Equation 9.7
shows the probability f that a classification of two Bloom filters into a match (s1
matches with s2) becomes a false positive. From the equation, we can see that the
probability of false positive depends on the length of Bloom filters (l), the number of
hash functions k, and the number of elements nq (q-grams) in the string [144]. This
probability of false positives f provides privacy in privacy-preserving solutions at
the cost of linkage quality loss. Therefore, the parameter values (l and k) have to be
chosen carefully to balance this trade-off between privacy and linkage quality.
f = (1− e−knq/l)k (9.7)
Several Bloom filter encoding methods have been proposed in the literature [56,
174, 175]. As discussed in Section 9.1, hash-mapping the q-grams of all the linkage
attribute values of a record into one Bloom filter is known as cryptographic longterm
key (CLK) [174, 175] encoding.
Durham [56] studied this approach in detail by using record-level Bloom filter
encoding (RBF) to improve the quality of linkage based on the weights of the link-
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Local Database DM
r1 = ’smitth amelia’
Probability of suspicion:
Ps = 2/4 = 0.5 (matches: smitth, smitthe)
Ps for r1 when revealing the whole Bloom filter:
Ps for r1 in iterative classifcation (left to right):
Figure 9.10: An attack method for Bloom filter-based private matching and classification
solutions (taken from [190]). As the membership theory states [122], all the bit positions that
are set to 0 in the Bloom filter of record r1 must also be set to 0 in the Bloom filters in GM that
are possible matches to r1. Hence, in the shown example two of four global values’ Bloom
filters (‘smitth’ and ‘smitthe’) in GM match with the Bloom filter of r1 and therefore Ps = 1/2.
In the iterative classification approach, Ps increases with more bits revealed.
age attributes. In her approach, first the attribute values (q-grams) are hash-mapped
into different Bloom filters (field-level Bloom filters). Then bits are selected from
each of the attributes’ (field-level) Bloom filters according to their weights calculated
based on Fellegi and Sunter’s agreement and disagreement weights [65] (more bits
are selected from attributes with higher weights) and frequencies (bits with certain
frequencies are not included to improve privacy) in order to compose the RBF. Ran-
dom shuffling of bits is also used by the database owners in order to hide the order
of bits in the Bloom filters (RBF) from the third party (however, it is is not applicable
in two-party solutions).
In a hybrid encoding we can combine both CLK and RBF (which we call CLKRBF)
to select different numbers of hash functions k for different attributes according to
their weights and map them into the same Bloom filter of length l. Having different
numbers of hash functions for different attributes based on weights provides more
linkage quality as with RBF [56], and mapping them into the same Bloom filter im-
proves privacy due to collisions between bits as with CLK [175]. In Chapter 10 we
will empirically evaluate and compare these encoding methods in our 2P-BF solution
with respect to the linkage quality and privacy.
9.4 Linkage Attack
In order to check if a q-gram qj(qj ∈ s, 1 ≤ j ≤ nq) is a member of a Bloom filter b,
all the k integer values (positions in the Bloom filter) returned by the hash functions
hi(qj), 1 ≤ i ≤ k should be set to 1 in b [122]. If at least one of the bits (returned
integers) is set to 0 in b, then qj cannot be a member of b.
A simple example of the linkage attack method and the calculation of DR mea-
sures for Bloom filter-based private matching and classification is presented in Fig-
ure 9.10. The main idea of a cryptanalysis attack [122] is that if a bit position is set
to 0 in a Bloom filter, then all the possible matches (members or sub-strings of the
string which is mapped to this Bloom filter) must not independently set the specific
bit position to 1, as proven in [122]. In our 2P-BF, the probability of suspicion (Ps)
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Figure 9.11: (a) Total linkage time, and (b) total memory size required for the 2P-BF ap-
proach on the OZ datasets, (c) total linkage time on the OZ Cor datasets, and (d) total linkage
time on the NC Cor datasets averaged over the results of all variations of each dataset.
increases with the number of bits revealed, as shown in Figure 9.10. We did not
consider error bounds in our attack methods that allow for approximate matching
errors. Developing attack methods for randomized masking [67] with error bounds
in Bloom filter-based PPRL solutions is left out for future work.
9.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present the results of the empirical study of our 2P-BF approach
conducted on the datasets described in Section 5.4 using the evaluation framework
proposed in Chapter 5. Following previous work [174], we set the values for the
Bloom filter parameters as l = 1000, k = 30, and q = 2. The minimum similarity
threshold to classify was set to st = 0.8 and the threshold to reveal bits was set to
sr = 0.77. All four attributes in the datasets were used as linkage attributes.
Figure 9.11 shows the total linkage time and memory size required for private
matching and classification of the 2P-BF approach on different datasets. The result
figures exhibit an almost linear complexity trend in the size of the databases which
makes the protocol scalable to large databases.
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Figure 9.12: A comparison of precision against recall of the 2P-BF solution on the (a) OZ
Cor-46,116 and (b) NC Cor-54,886 datasets with No-mod, Light-mod, Med-mod, and Heavy-
mod variations.




































































Figure 9.13: Total number of bits revealed at each iteration (a) without the similarity
threshold to reveal, sr, and (b) after introducing the threshold sr (as described in
Section 9.2.4) on the OZ datasets. The values for the similarity thresholds were set as
st = 0.8 and sr = 0.77.
A comparison of precision and recall of the 2P-BF protocol is presented in Fig-
ure 9.12 on the OZ Cor-46,116 and NC Cor-54,886 datasets with different levels of
data modifications (corruptions). Different levels of modifications applied to the
datasets (as was described in Section 5.4) allow us to evaluate the performance of
approximate matching of our protocol in the presence of data errors. As shown in
the figure, the 2P-BF approach achieves high precision and recall when no modifica-
tion is applied to the datasets, and then recall drastically decreases while precision
slightly increases as the level of modifications increases. This is because the number
of false non-matches increases while the number of matches decreases due to the
modifications applied.
As discussed in Section 9.2.4, the number of bits revealed in the later iterations is
very small and therefore it takes more iterations to classify all the record pairs into
136 Two-Party Bloom Filter-based Private Matching and Classification


























Figure 9.14: Reduction ratio of classified
pairs at each iteration on the OZ datasets.



























Figure 9.15: Recall of matches at each itera-
tion on the OZ datasets.
matches and non-matches (see Figure 9.13(a)). With the proposed method of using a
second similarity threshold, sr = 0.77, this has been significantly improved, as shown
in Figure 9.13(b). The total number of iterations required to classify all the record
pairs is reduced 6-fold (from 300 to 50 iterations on the largest dataset - OZ-172,938)
with the proposed approach using a second threshold sr = 0.77.
The reduction ratio (RR) of record pairs with unknown match status after clas-
sifying record pairs as ‘matches’ and ‘non-matches’ at each iteration is shown in
Figure 9.14. As can be seen from the figure, our approach shows a high increment
rate in the reduction ratio after the first few iterations. The recall ratio (as shown in
Figure 9.15) is almost 1.0 for the datasets with no modifications (‘No-mod’). It is high
(nearly 0.8) with modified datasets as well (a total of 8 edits per record that results in
almost 50% modifications in the corresponding q-grams), which explains the aspect
of fault-tolerance to data errors by performing approximate matching.
The privacy characteristics of this protocol (as discussed in Section 9.3.2) are em-
pirically evaluated in Figure 9.16(a) based on the attack method proposed in Sec-
tion 9.4 using the Australian telephone database (OZ) as the global dataset. This
study empirically validates that the probability of a linkage attack increases with the
number of bits revealed, and the maximum probability of an attack (maximum dis-
closure risk) becomes greater than 0.05 (i.e. > 1/20) only after 800 bits have been re-
vealed. However, when 800 bits are revealed, most of the non-matching record pairs
have already been removed (as can be seen from Figure 9.19), and the minimum sim-
ilarity value of the remaining record pairs is nearly 0.7 (illustrated in Figure 9.16(b)),
which assures that the privacy of non-matches with similarity less than 0.7 is not
compromised with the iterative pruning approach.
We also tested noise addition techniques into the Bloom filters to perturb the
bit distributions (as discussed in Section 9.3.2) that improve privacy against linkage
attacks at the cost of quality loss. The minimum accuracy loss threshold was set to
sl = 0.78, so that a maximum of zmax = 6 noise bits can be included (see Figure 9.8).
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Figure 9.16: (a) Disclosure risk values against the number of bits revealed on the
OZ-17,294 dataset and (b) the minimum similarity value of unclassified record pairs
at each iteration on the OZ datasets.




















(a) Mean disclosure risk at each iteration 
























(b) Recall of matches classified at each iteration 




Figure 9.17: (a) Disclosure risk and (b) recall of matches at each iteration for noise
addition techniques on the OZ-17,294 No-mod dataset.
Noise bits are added or removed (flipped) either randomly (‘random’, i.e. bits are
flipped with the probability of zmax/l) or selectively according to the sensitivity of the
bits (‘selective’, i.e. bits with a smaller number of q-grams mapped to them are highly
sensitive compared to bits with a larger number of q-grams mapped and thus they
are less likely to be flipped). As shown in Figure 9.17, the noise addition techniques
reduce the disclosure risk significantly at the cost of some loss in recall. When no
noise is added disclosure risk increases with bits revealed, since more information
is revealed with more bits and thus a smaller number of global values match with
longer bit patterns. However, when noise bits are added into or removed from the
Bloom filters the number of global values that match with the perturbed bit patterns
becomes zero with more bits, and thus the disclosure risk decreases as more bits are
revealed. Disclosure risk is reduced more with the selective noise addition technique
than with the random noise addition at the cost of similar loss in recall.
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Figure 9.18: Percentage of remaining unclassified record pairs in the class of possible
matches against different values of rmax on the OZ-172,938 and NC datasets.
Table 9.2: Blocking combined with the 2P-BF private matching and classification
solution on the OZ-1,730 Mod dataset.
No blocking Phonetic SNC-2P
Time (seconds) 173.92 6.6233 15.1179
Precision 0.9208 1.0000 0.9972
Recall 1.0000 0.7680 0.9504
F-measure 0.9588 0.8688 0.9732
DRMean 0.0010 0.9909 0.0217
DRMark 0.0000 0.9908 0.0046
Figure 9.18 shows the percentage of remaining record pairs that are unclassified
after rmax bits have been revealed from the Bloom filters for different values of rmax.
Around 50% of record pairs are classified into matches and non-matches when 50%
(rmax = 500, l = 1000) of the bits have been revealed, and when rmax = 800 only
15% of pairs remain unclassified (in the class of possible matches which need to be
re-hashed with different Bloom filter parameters in order to re-conduct the iterative
classification process, as was explained in Section 9.2.3).
As can be seen from Figure 9.19, many non-matches are being classified in the
first few iterations and then matches are being classified more towards the middle
and later iterations. The overall RR of candidate record pairs is thus high (as shown
in Figure 9.19(c)), while the recall ratio of matches being classified is also high (as
was shown in Figure 9.15).
Finally, similar as in the previous chapter, we studied how a private blocking
solution combined with our 2P-BF private matching and classification solution de-
termines the three properties of scalability, quality, and privacy. We evaluated the
2P-BF private matching and classification solution with no blocking, Soundex [23]-
based phonetic blocking (a standard blocking approach that has been used in non-
PPRL, as described in Chapter 2), and our SNC-based private blocking proposed in
Chapter 7. In Table 9.2, we present the total time required for blocking and linkage,
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(b) Total number of non-matches classified at each iteration
































(c) Total number of possible matches classified at each iteration






















(d) Number of matches classified at each iteration

























(e) Number of non-matches classified at each iteration
Figure 9.19: (a) Total number of record pairs classified as matches, (b) non-matches,
(c) possible matches, and (d) number of record pairs classified as matches, and (e)
non-matches at each iteration on the OZ datasets.
linkage quality results, and the DR measures in the worst case setting (G ≡ D) of
our 2P-BF solution with these three blocking scenarios. As the results show, when
no blocking is applied the DR values are very low. However, it requires significantly
longer linkage time compared to when a blocking technique is applied. Phonetic-
based blocking requires shorter time than our SNC-based blocking, though privacy
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and linkage quality results are comparatively better with the SNC based approach.
Phonetic-based blocking provides lower privacy guarantees.
9.6 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a practical two-party private matching and clas-
sification solution for privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) by addressing the
three main challenges, which are scalability to large databases, high linkage quality
results, and sufficient privacy characteristics. With the appropriate determination of
values for the parameters, the experimental studies conducted on real-world datasets
show that our proposed two-party protocol can perform efficient linkage with high
linkage quality while providing adequate privacy characteristics.
Learning other advanced Bloom filter encoding methods to improve the linkage
quality without compromising the privacy in this two-party protocol is one interest-
ing direction for future work. Another avenue of future work is to develop efficient
linkage attack methods with approximation of error bounds for privacy evaluation
of Bloom filter-based private matching and classification solutions.
As we identified in Chapter 4, conducting a comprehensive empirical study of dif-
ferent PPRL solutions is an important avenue of research in PPRL. In the next chapter,
we will empirically compare and evaluate our proposed solutions with some of the
state-of-the-art solutions using our evaluation framework proposed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 10
Comparative Evaluation
We have addressed some of the shortcomings identified in Chapter 4 by proposing
novel and practical solutions for privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) in Chap-
ters 6 to 9. In this chapter, we comparatively evaluate the proposed solutions with
some of the state-of-the-art solutions using the evaluation framework proposed in
Chapter 5. We first present the comparative empirical evaluation results of several
private blocking solutions in Section 10.2, and then we present the results of private
matching and classification solutions in Section 10.3. Finally, we discuss our findings
in Section 10.4 and summarize our evaluation in Section 10.5.
10.1 Introduction
Developing novel algorithms for viable real-world PPRL applications that address the
three key challenges (or properties) of PPRL, which are scalability, linkage quality,
and privacy, is an important research problem in PPRL. We have proposed several
novel algorithms in Chapters 6 to 9 for PPRL addressing the three challenges.
The general pipeline of the PPRL process of two data sources is outlined in Fig-
ure 10.1. We described the steps of this process and their challenges in a privacy-
preserving setting in Chapter 2. The scalability challenge of PPRL can be addressed
by using two-step algorithms, where in the first step (Step 1 in Figure 10.1) a block-
ing or indexing technique is applied to reduce the number of candidate record pairs
that need to be compared [30]. These candidate record pairs are then compared and
classified into matches and non-matches in the second step (Step 2 in Figure 10.1)
using approximate and effective private matching and classification techniques (ad-
dressing the linkage quality challenge). Privacy is addressed by applying a masking
function (as described in Chapter 5) to the linkage attributes and / or blocking keys
in such a way that besides the record pairs classified as matches no other sensitive
information is revealed to any internal or external parties, using privacy techniques
as detailed in Chapter 4.
We proposed efficient private blocking solutions (three-party and two-party) based
on the sorted neighborhood clustering in Chapters 6 and 7. We then proposed two
different two-party solutions for private matching and classification in PPRL in Chap-















Figure 10.1: A general outline of the privacy-preserving record linkage pipeline of
two databases (taken from [190]).
mapping [72, 182], reference values [154], Bloom filters [17], and random noise [108]
are used in these proposed solutions. In addition, the use of efficient perturbation-
based privacy techniques reduces the computation and communication complexities
of the algorithms and thus improves the scalability.
In the following, we compare and evaluate our proposed solutions with some of
the state-of-the-art solutions using our evaluation framework (which was proposed
in Chapter 5) in terms of all three properties of PPRL. Figures 10.2 to 10.13 and
Tables 10.3 and 10.4 present the results of our empirical study (taken from [190]). We
prototyped all the solutions in Python version 2.7.3 (as detailed in Section 5.6), and
all the experiments were conducted on the datasets described in Section 5.4.
10.2 Private Blocking Techniques
We comparatively evaluated the scalability, quality, and privacy of the following six
private blocking approaches: our sorted neighborhood clustering (SNC)-based three-
party private blocking solutions proposed in Chapter 6 (labelled as SNC-3PSim for
similarity-based merging and SNC-3PSize for size-based merging); our SNC-based
two-party private blocking solution proposed in Chapter 7 (labelled as SNC-2P);
Karakasidis et al.’s [104] three-party private blocking based on k-nearest neighbor
clustering and reference values (labelled as k-NN); Durham’s [56] Hamming-based
locality sensitive hashing three-party private blocking (labelled as HLSH); and Kuzu
et al.’s [124] two-party private blocking based on hierarchical clustering and differ-
ential privacy (labelled as HCLUST). We reviewed the details of k-NN, HLSH, and
HCLUST in Chapter 3 (named as Kar12 on Page 31, Dur12 on Page 30, and Kuz13
on Page 31, respectively).
We used parameter settings for the k-NN, HLSH, and HCLUST methods in sim-
ilar ranges as used by the authors of these private blocking techniques.
• For k-NN, k was set to 3 and the minimum similarity threshold was st = 0.6.
• In the HLSH method, the number of iterations was set to µ = 40, the number
of hash functions was k = 30, the length of Bloom filters was l = 1, 000 bits,
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Figure 10.2: A comparison of scalability (evaluated by total blocking time) of the six private
blocking approaches on the OZ datasets.
and the number of bits to be sampled from the Bloom filters at each iteration
was φ = 45.
• In the HCLUST method, the number of clusters was set as one tenth of the
number of records in the dataset, the differential privacy parameter e = 0.3,
and the fake records tolerance parameter wn was set as the number of records
in the datasets to be linked.
• The default parameters for the SNC-based approaches were set as minimum
block size k = 100, minimum similarity threshold st = 0.8, and window size
w = 2 (as discussed in Sections 6.5 and 7.5).
Figure 10.2 shows the scalability of private blocking approaches to different sizes
of the OZ datasets measured by total blocking time (averaged over the results of all
parties over all variations of each dataset). As can be seen from the figure, the SNC-
based approaches (SNC-2P, SNC-3PSim and SNC-3PSize) require shorter time than
the other approaches and are scalable to large databases. k-NN and HCLUST take
significantly longer blocking time than HLSH and the SNC-based approaches.
The efficiency of blocking (scalability) measured by reduction ratio (RR) and the
effectiveness of blocking (quality) measured by pairs completeness (PC) of the six
private blocking approaches are compared on the OZ-172,938 Mod and NC datasets
in Figure 10.3. SNC-2P achieves the highest PC at the cost of some reduction in
RR, while the other approaches comparatively have lower PC with RR being almost
1.0. HLSH performs better by achieving high values for both RR and PC. These
scalability and quality values for the private blocking approaches are mapped into
a RR and PC plot, as shown in Figure 10.4, to compare the solutions in the trade-
off of scalability (efficiency) and quality (effectiveness) of blocking. As the figure
clearly shows, the HLSH approach achieves high values for both scalability and
quality, following the SNC-2P approach. The k-NN blocking approach achieves
comparatively lower values for both properties.
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Figure 10.3: A comparison of reduction ratio (RR) and pairs completeness (PC) of the six
private blocking approaches on the OZ-172,938 Mod and NC datasets.




























































Figure 10.4: Reduction ration (RR) against pairs completeness (PC) of the six private block-
ing approaches on the (a) OZ-172,938 Mod and (b) NC datasets. The best solutions are the
ones closest to the upper right corner.
Finally, the privacy protection of the solutions are evaluated using the disclosure
risk measures presented in Section 5.3.1. Due to time and memory constraints, we
used the original dataset as the global dataset (G ≡ D) for privacy evaluation under
the worst case assumption. The size of blocks generated by the six private blocking
approaches are compared on the OZ-172,938 Mod and NC datasets in a box-and-
whisker plot in Figure 10.5. The SNC-based approaches and HCLUST have lower
variances between the block sizes which make a frequency attack using block sizes
more difficult. The HLSH approach generates overlapping blocks of smaller sizes
and the variance between block sizes is comparatively very high. It is important to
note that if the third party (in three-party solutions) does not have any information
regarding the parameters used and / or if it does not collude with any of the database
owners, then trying to mount a frequency attack even with variant block sizes is non-
trivial, because the third party does not know the parameter values (that can be used
to mount a frequency attack using a global dataset) and therefore learning the actual
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Summary of the block sizes generated by the six approaches
Figure 10.5: A comparison of block sizes generated by the six private blocking approaches
on the OZ-172,938 Mod and NC datasets.
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Figure 10.6: A comparison of the distributions of probability of suspicion (Ps) values of the
blocked datasets generated by the six private blocking approaches on the (a) OZ-172,938 Mod
and (b) NC datasets.
blocking key values (BKVs) in the masked datasets is difficult.
Figure 10.6 shows the distributions of probability of suspicion (Ps) values (similar
to the examples illustrated in Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6) in the OZ-172,938 Mod and NC
datasets blocked by the six private blocking approaches. The records in the datasets
are sorted according to their ps values. The median line in the blocked datasets
(which is used to calculate the median Ps and consequently the median disclosure
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Table 10.1: Disclosure risk (DR) measures of the six private blocking approaches.
Best values in each row are shown in bold font.
Dataset DR SNC-2P SNC-3PSim SNC-3PSize HCLUST k-NN HLSH
OZ-172,938 Max 0.4999 0.0085 0.0086 0.0896 0.4999 1.0000
Mean 0.0008 0.0037 0.0036 0.0036 0.0085 0.0067
Med 0.0015 0.0059 0.0031 0.0043 0.0096 0.0092
RIG 0.4690 0.5603 0.5613 0.5365 0.6049 0.9387
NC Max 0.4999 0.0087 0.0087 0.0278 1.0000 0.4999
Mean 0.0007 0.0037 0.0036 0.0033 0.0085 0.0015
Med 0.0017 0.0062 0.0068 0.0038 0.0050 0.0017
RIG 0.5118 0.6028 0.6031 0.5784 0.6483 0.8870
risk DRMed) is marked by a vertical dotted line in the figures. SNC-2P generates the
lowest probability of suspicion curve on both datasets. However, its maximum Ps
goes higher compared to SNC-3PSim, SNC-3PSize, and HCLUST approaches.
A comparison of disclosure risk (DR) measures (DRMax, DRMean, and DRMed cal-
culated from the probability of suspicion values Ps, as shown in Figure 10.6 and ex-
plained in Section 5.3.1.1, and relative information gain RIG calculated as explained
in Section 5.3.1.1) of the six private blocking approaches on the OZ-172,938 Mod
and NC datasets is given in Table 10.1. SNC-2P has the lowest values for DRMean,
DRMed, and RIG measures. However, DRMax is relatively higher than SNC-3PSim,
SNC-3PSize and HCLUST approaches. The disclosure risk values for the HLSH and
k-NN approaches are higher compared to the other approaches, with DRMax being
1.0 or 0.5 where there exists a block with a single or two BKVs.
The trade-off between privacy (measured by DRMax, DRMean, DRMed, and RIG)
and quality (measured by PC) of private blocking solutions is illustrated in Fig-
ure 10.7 for all six private blocking approaches on the OZ-172,938 Mod and NC
datasets. SNC-2P provides the highest PC with reasonably lower DR. Next follow
the SNC-3PSim, SNC-3PSize, and HCLUST approaches, which perform better com-
pared to the k-NN and HLSH ones by achieving higher PC with lower values for DR
measures.
10.3 Private Matching and Classification Techniques
In this section, we empirically evaluate the following private matching and classi-
fication solutions: our two-party private matching and classification solution based
on reference values and binning proposed in Chapter 8 (labelled as 2P-Bin); our
two-party Bloom filter-based private matching and classification solution proposed
in Chapter 9 with Schnell’s cryptographic longterm (CLK) encoding [175] (labelled
as 2P-BF CLK); Durham’s record level Bloom filter (RBF) encoding [56] (labelled as
2P-BF RBF); and our hybrid encoding of CLK and RBF proposed in Chapter 9 (la-
belled as 2P-BF CLKRBF). For the 2P-Bin [191] solution, the number of bins was
used in the range of k = [4, 6, 8, 10, 12] and the minimum similarity threshold was set
to st = 0.8. As in previous work [174, 175], the default parameters for the 2P-BF [188]
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Figure 10.7: A comparison of disclosure risk measures (DRMax, DRMean, DRMed, RIG)
against pairs completeness (PC) of the six private blocking approaches on the OZ-172,938
Mod (left column) and NC (right column) datasets. The best solutions are the ones closest to
the upper left corner.
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Table 10.2: Bloom filter parameterization for CLK, RBF, and CLKRBF methods.
First name Last name City Postcode
CLK hash functions (k) 30 30 30 30
CLK length (l) 1, 000 1, 000 1, 000 1, 000
RBF hash functions (k) 30 30 30 30
Agreement weight 2.5834 2.8908 1.2415 2.0852
Disagreement weight −1.3757 −1.1752 −0.7708 −0.3543
Range (weight) 3.9591 (32%) 4.0660 (33%) 2.0123 (16%) 2.4395 (19%)
Average q-grams (g) 5.0762 5.3255 7.7592 3.9861
Dynamic BF length [59] 223 233 334 173
RBF length [59] (l) 668 689 334 397
Weight 32% 33% 16% 19%
CLKRBF hash functions (k) 29 30 15 17
CLKRBF length (l) 1, 000 1, 000 1, 000 1, 000
based solutions were set as the number of hash functions k = 30, the length of Bloom
filters l = 1, 000, q = 2, and the minimum similarity threshold st = 0.8. Weights, l for
each attribute in the RBF method, and k for each attribute in the CLKRBF method
on the NC dataset are given in Table 10.2. Soundex-based phonetic blocking [23] was
employed in all these solutions to reduce the number of candidate record pairs.
We first compared the three Bloom filter encoding methods of CLK, RBF, and
CLKRBF in our 2P-BF solution. As Figure 10.8 illustrates, the RBF encoding requires
more iterations to converge but achieves a higher recall of matches compared to the
CLK method that completes the task in a smaller number of iterations. The hybrid
CLKRBF method achieves a higher recall in a smaller number of iterations. The
minimum similarity value of record pairs that remain unclassified shows that the
CLK and CLKRBF encoding methods have a minimum similarity of 0.5 (i.e., non-
matches with less than 0.5 similarity are removed) when half of the iterations are
completed, while the RBF encoding requires three quarter of iterations to classify
pairs so that the remaining pairs have a minimum of 0.5 similarity value.
We also investigated the distribution of bits (number of q-grams mapped to the
bits) in Bloom filters, and frequencies of bits in the NC dataset by the three encoding
methods (CLK, RBF, and CLKRBF) for the 2P-BF solution in Figure 10.9. A min-
imum of 24 bigrams are mapped to every bit in the Bloom filters by the CLKRBF
encoding method, while with the CLK and RBF methods a minimum of 10 and
15 bigrams are mapped, respectively (Figure 10.9(a)). Every bit with the CLKRBF
method appears in at least 100, 000 records in the NC dataset, which is significantly
larger than the minimum number of records a bit appears with the CLK and RBF
methods (Figure 10.9(b)). These results reveal that the CLKRBF encoding provides
higher privacy than the other two encoding methods, because higher value for the
number of bigrams mapped to a bit and higher frequency of a bit make a frequency
linkage attack more difficult.
From the results shown in Figures 10.8 and 10.9, it can be seen that the CLKRBF
encoding method outperforms the other two encoding methods in the 2P-BF solution
by achieving higher linkage quality, and better privacy in terms of bit distribution
§10.3 Private Matching and Classification Techniques 149












































































































Figure 10.8: (a) The percentage of bits revealed, (b) reduction ratio (RR) of compared record
pairs, (c) recall of matches, and (d) minimum similarity value of unclassified record pairs
at each iteration for CLK, RBF, and CLKRBF encodings in the 2P-BF solution on the NC
dataset.




























(a) Summary of the bit distribution in Bloom filters - NC dataset





























(b) Summary of the bit frequencies in Bloom filters - NC dataset
Figure 10.9: Summary of (a) number of bigrams mapped to bits in the Bloom filters and (b)
frequencies of bits in the NC dataset for the 2P-BF solution with different encoding methods.
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(a) Disclosure risk against number of bits revealed in 2PBF 
 using different datasets as the global dataset
Max, G = full OZ
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(b) Disclosure risk measures of SNC-3PSim, SNC-3PSize, and k-NN 
 blocking using different datasets as the global dataset
Figure 10.10: A comparison of (a) disclosure risk values of the 2P-BF solution against num-
ber of bits revealed, and (b) disclosure risk values of private blocking solutions, on the D =
OZ-17,294 dataset using G ≡ D and G = full OZ database.
and pruning of non-matches.
The experiments described above assumed the worst case setting of global dataset.
Since we used the original dataset as the global dataset (G ≡ D) in this worst case,
the number of global values ng in GM that match a certain masked value in DM
is very small, which results in high disclosure risk values. Ideally, a global dataset
would not necessarily be equivalent to the original dataset and would have many
combinations of different attribute values resulting in lower disclosure risk values,
as was discussed in Section 5.5. Testing the privacy of the 2P-BF technique and sev-
eral private blocking techniques such as SNC-3PSim, SNC-3PSize, and k-NN on
the OZ-17,294 dataset using a global dataset that is the full Australian telephone
database (containing around 6.9 million records) provides much lower (around 2.5
magnitudes) disclosure risk results compared to the results in the worst case setting
of G ≡ D, as shown in Figure 10.10.
Figure 10.11 shows the scalability to different sizes of datasets (calculated by total
linkage time) of the four private matching and classification techniques (2P-Bin, 2P-
BF CLK, 2P-BF RBF, 2P-BF CLKRBF) on the OZ datasets. Bin size was used as k = 6
for the binning-based approach (2P-Bin) and all four attributes in the OZ datasets
were used as linkage attributes for all four techniques. The 2P-Bin approach requires
shorter linkage time and is efficient than the 2P-BF based approaches (2P-BF CLK,
2P-BF RBF, 2P-BF CLKRBF). However, the disclosure risk is higher and the linkage
quality is lower for the 2P-Bin approach compared to the 2P-BF based approaches, as
will be compared in Figure 10.12. All three variations of the 2P-BF based approaches
require similar linkage time. The CLKRBF encoding method is faster than the CLK
and RBF encoding methods as it requires a smaller number of iterations to converge
compared to the other two encoding methods (which we discussed in Figure 10.8).
A comparison of disclosure risk measures (DRMax, DRMark, DRMean, DRMed)
against linkage quality (calculated by F-measure) of the four private matching and
classification techniques on the OZ-17,294 Mod dataset is given in Figure 10.12. The
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Figure 10.11: A comparison of scalability (measured by linkage time) of the four private
matching and classification techniques on the OZ datasets.
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Figure 10.12: A comparison of disclosure risk measures ((a) DRMax, (b) DRMark, (c) DRMean,
and (d) DRMed) against linkage quality (measured by F-measure) of the four private matching
and classification approaches on the OZ-17,294 Mod dataset. The best solutions are the ones
closest to the upper left corner.
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2P-Bin solution leads to higher disclosure risk values (i.e. lower privacy) and lower
linkage quality than the 2P-BF based approaches. In 2P-BF approaches, as can be
seen from Figures 10.11 and 10.12, the CLKRBF encoding method performs better
by achieving high F-measure, providing low disclosure risk, and requiring shorter
linkage time than the other two encoding methods.
10.4 Discussion
The empirical evaluation of several private blocking and private matching and clas-
sification solutions using the proposed evaluation framework provides a compre-
hensive view of the performances of these solutions with regard to the three main
properties of privacy, quality, and scalability.
The empirical results of private blocking solutions on the NC dataset and private
matching and classification solutions on the OZ-17,294 Mod dataset are summarized
in Tables 10.3 and 10.4, respectively, in terms of the three properties, scalability, qual-
ity, and privacy. We calculated overall scores (using Equation 5.9 on page 62 with
α = 0.33 and β = 0.33) based on different combinations of measures to compare the
viability of PPRL solutions with respect to all three properties (as was discussed in
Section 5.3.4). Different scores are calculated with different combinations of measures
for the three properties, as presented in Tables 10.3 and 10.4.
For private blocking solutions we calculated the following four scores: score 1 is
an average of RR, PC, and DRMax, score 2 is an average of RR, PC, and DRMean, score
3 is an average of RR, PC, and RIG, and score 4 is an average of time, PC, and DRMean.
The scores calculated for the private matching and classification solutions are: score
1 is an average of time, F-measure, and DRMax, score 2 is an average of time, F-
measure, and DRMark, and score 3 is an average of time, F-measure, and DRMean. We
used equal weights for all measures in the calculation of scores. Scores with different
weights would provide the ranking of solutions in the preferred context depending
upon the application and / or user requirements. However, scoring is a cumbersome
task that requires domain and application knowledge to determine the appropriate
weight for each aspect.
The comparison results of the six private blocking solutions presented in Ta-
ble 10.3 show that SNC-2P outperforms the other solutions in terms of all the mea-
sures except DRMax (and thus except score 1). The HLSH is faster and achieves
higher RR and PC compared to the other four approaches, however the DR and RIG
measures are higher (i.e. lower privacy). SNC-3PSim and SNC-3PSize are faster as
well with lower values for DR and RIG and achieve moderately higher RR and PC
values. The k-NN and HCLUST require longer runtime though the other aspects
provide moderate results.
Among the four private matching and classification solutions compared in Ta-
ble 10.4, the 2P-BF based approaches provide higher linkage quality results than
the binning based approach (2P-Bin), while the DR measures are also lower (which
means privacy is higher compared to the 2P-Bin approach). However, the 2P-Bin
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Table 10.3: Comparison of the six private blocking approaches on the NC dataset.
Best values in each row are shown in bold font. Four different scores are calculated as
averages of the measures for the three properties of scalability, quality, and privacy.
Measures marked with (+) have a positive impact on the overall score (i.e., high
values are better) and measures with (-) have a negative impact (i.e., low values are
better).
SNC-2P SNC-3PSimSNC-3PSize HCLUST k-NN HLSH
Time (-) 1044.02 2.6439 4.5502 95225.82 47075.76 1098.73
(normalized, see Section 5.3.3) 0.0109 0.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.4943 0.0115
RR (+) 0.9901 0.9993 0.9994 0.9985 0.9992 0.9988
PC (+) 0.9924 0.9546 0.9454 0.9538 0.9264 0.9609
DRMax (-) 0.4999 0.0087 0.0087 0.0278 1.0000 0.4999
DRMean (-) 0.0007 0.0037 0.0036 0.0033 0.0085 0.0015
RIG (-) 0.5118 0.6028 0.6031 0.5784 0.6483 0.8870
Score 1: RR, PC, DRMax 0.8275 0.9817 0.9787 0.9748 0.6419 0.8199
Score 2: RR, PC, DRMean 0.9939 0.9834 0.9804 0.9830 0.9724 0.9861
Score 3: RR, PC, RIG 0.8236 0.7837 0.7806 0.7913 0.7591 0.6909
Score 4: Time, PC, DRMean 0.9936 0.9836 0.9806 0.6502 0.8079 0.9826
Table 10.4: Comparison of the four private matching and classification approaches
on the OZ-17,294 Mod dataset. Best values in each row are shown in bold font. Three
different scores are calculated as averages of the measures for the three properties of
scalability, quality, and privacy. Measures marked with (+) have a positive impact on
the overall score and measures with (-) have a negative impact.
2P-Bin 2P-BF CLK 2P-BF RBF 2P-BF CLKRBF
Time (-) 11.2641 48.6865 39.8932 25.1866
(normalized, see Section 5.3.3) 0.0000 1.0000 0.7650 0.3720
Precision (+) 1.0000 0.9995 0.9997 0.9997
Recall (+) 0.5059 0.7719 0.7721 0.7720
F-measure / F (+) 0.6719 0.8711 0.8713 0.8712
DR Max (-) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
DR Mark (-) 0.2886 0.0166 0.0214 0.0143
DR Mean (-) 0.2887 0.0198 0.0119 0.0086
Score 1: Time, F, DRMax 0.5573 0.2904 0.3687 0.4997
Score 2: Time, F, DRMark 0.7944 0.6181 0.6950 0.8283
Score 3: Time, F, DRMean 0.7944 0.6171 0.6981 0.8302
solution is efficient and requires much shorter linkage time compared to others. The
2P-BF with the CLKRBF encoding outperforms all others in terms of overall scores.
Figure 10.13 maps score 2 of the six private blocking solutions on the NC dataset,
and score 3 of the four private matching and classification solutions on the OZ-17,294
Mod dataset into three-dimensional (3D) plots. Such a graphical representation of
evaluation results allows us to analyze where a solution is placed in terms of the
three properties of privacy, quality, and scalability and to compare different solutions.
These 3D plots are better suited for interactive exploration or visualization than static





























































(a) 3D plot of private blocking 
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Figure 10.13: Three dimensional plots showing the comparison of (a) score 2: RR, PC, and
DRMean of the six private blocking approaches, and (b) score 3: time, F-measure, and DRMean
of the four private matching and classification approaches (right). The best solutions are the
ones closest to the front upper right corner.
10.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation and comparison of
our proposed PPRL algorithms with several existing state-of-the-art techniques on
large real-world databases using our evaluation framework proposed in Chapter 5.
The experimental results on the datasets used show that our proposed algorithms
perform better compared to several other existing solutions in terms of all three
properties of PPRL: scalability, linkage quality, and privacy. Such large scale em-
pirical study using our proposed evaluation framework allows extensive evaluation,
analysis, and comparison of different PPRL solutions with respect to the three prop-
erties of PPRL.
Further work is required on large scale empirical evaluation [36] on other real
datasets or realistic synthetic datasets generated using our GeCo tool [35, 183] in or-
der to justify and generalize these empirical results. Investigating efficient and inter-
active linkage attacks for privacy evaluation, and approximation with error bounds
in the linkage attacks would be another direction for future research.
Chapter 11
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we have addressed several shortcomings in the area of privacy-preserving
record linkage (PPRL). These shortcomings have been identified by characterizing ex-
isting approaches using our taxonomy of PPRL techniques proposed in Chapter 4. In
this chapter we summarize our contributions (in Section 11.2) and discuss directions
for future research (in Section 11.3). Finally we conclude our work in Section 11.4.
11.1 Introduction
Based on our taxonomy proposed in Chapter 4 we characterized existing techniques
that have been developed for PPRL in the last two decades (existing techniques are
reviewed in Chapter 3). The taxonomy contains five main topics, namely privacy as-
pects, linkage techniques, theoretical analysis, evaluation, and practical aspects, each
of which contains three dimensions (resulting in a total of fifteen dimensions). The
characterization of existing techniques along these fifteen dimensions of our taxon-
omy (in Table 4.1 on page 42) allowed us to identify gaps in existing approaches and
research directions. We formulated research questions along the five main topics of
our taxonomy based on this study and addressed some of the identified gaps in our
thesis. The addressed research questions among the identified gaps and the remain-
ing questions for future work are presented in Figure 11.1. The research questions are
numbered in the form of x.y, where x (1 ≤ x ≤ 5) denotes the main topic and y de-
notes the research question under each topic. We will next summarize the addressed
gaps in Section 11.2 and discuss the gaps left for future research in Section 11.3.
11.2 Summary of our Contributions
The contributions of our work to address the shortcomings identified in the existing
PPRL literature (as represented in Figure 11.1 by darker boxes with solid lines) are
listed below:
1.1. Efficient two-party PPRL: We have addressed this question by developing two-
party algorithms for PPRL based on efficient perturbation-based privacy tech-
niques including k-anonymous mapping [72, 182], reference values [154], and
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Figure 11.1: A summary of gaps identified in the existing PPRL research in Chapter 4
that have been addressed in this thesis, and future research questions. The research
gaps represented by darker boxes with solid lines have been addressed in this thesis,
while the lighter boxes with dotted lines are left for future work.
Bloom filters [17]. In Chapter 7, we proposed an efficient two-party private
blocking technique based on k-anonymous sorted neighborhood clustering (ad-
apted from the efficient three-party private blocking developed in Chapter 6);
and in Chapters 8 and 9 we proposed efficient private matching and classifica-
tion techniques based on reference values and Bloom filters, respectively.
1.2. Efficient privacy techniques: This question has been addressed in our solutions
(proposed in Chapters 6 to 9) by replacing the expensive (in terms of computa-
tion and communication complexities) SMC-based privacy techniques with effi-
cient perturbation-based privacy techniques such as k-anonymous mapping [72,
182], reference values [154], binning [132], random noise [108], and Bloom fil-
ters [17]. Empirical evaluation studies conducted on real-world datasets have
shown that our approaches based on these perturbation techniques provide
sufficient privacy guarantees while achieving high linkage quality.
2.1. Efficient private blocking: We have investigated the efficient blocking tech-
nique of sorted neighborhood approach [52, 84] in a privacy-preserving con-
text for efficient private blocking (three-party and two-party) in Chapters 6
and 7. The comparative empirical evaluation conducted on real-world datasets
in Chapter 10 validates the efficiency of our approach compared to several other
existing private blocking solutions, including the k-nearest neighbor clustering-
based approach [104], the Hamming-based locality sensitive hashing approach
[56], and the hierarchical clustering-based approach [124].
4.1. An evaluation framework for PPRL: We have presented a comprehensive eval-
uation framework for PPRL (in Chapter 5) that contains numerical and nor-
malized measures for the three key challenges of PPRL, which are scalability,
linkage quality, and privacy. We used this framework to empirically evaluate
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several private blocking and private matching and classification solutions for
PPRL using real-world and synthetic datasets in Chapter 10. The empirical re-
sults have validated that our framework allows extensive evaluation, analysis,
and comparison of different PPRL solutions on the same scale with respect to
all three challenges of PPRL.
4.2. Privacy measures: We have proposed a novel set of disclosure risk measures
(in Chapter 5) according to an evaluation model for privacy evaluation of PPRL
solutions. The proposed disclosure risk measures provide a statistical summary
of disclosure risk of revealing a masked dataset to an internal adversary, based
on a linkage attack using an external global dataset with known values. The
experiments conducted in Chapters 6 to 10 using our disclosure risk measures
for privacy evaluation have shown that the proposed measures provide a prac-
tical way of quantifying the amount of privacy provided by a PPRL technique
and allow for comparison with other techniques in terms of privacy provision.
5.1. Realistic (synthetic) datasets: We have developed an effective synthetic data
generator and corruptor tool [35, 183] that models real-world data character-
istics (such as data errors, variations, and attribute dependencies) in order to
synthetically generate and / or corrupt datasets exhibiting similar character-
istics as real data. We have used two real-world databases (OZ - Australian
telephone database and NC - North Carolina voter registration database, as
detailed in Section 5.4) for the empirical study of our solutions in Chapters 6
to 10. While the NC database contains real duplicate records with errors and
variations, the OZ database does not contain any duplicate records. We there-
fore applied several corruption functions from our data corruptor to generate
duplicate records for the OZ datasets with errors and variations, and to syn-
thetically corrupt both the OZ and NC datasets. Such synthetically corrupted
datasets allowed us to evaluate the quality of approximate matching of our pro-
posed solutions in Chapter 6 to 10 in the presence of data errors and variations.
5.3. Comprehensive PPRL evaluation: We have conducted a comprehensive evalu-
ation of several PPRL solutions in Chapter 10 using our evaluation framework
proposed in Chapter 5. This study provided us with a baseline to compara-
tively evaluate and discuss different PPRL solutions with respect to the three
properties (or challenges) of PPRL. Conducting such extensive experimental
studies is one avenue of research that is highly beneficial to better understand
the characteristics of different PPRL techniques and their applicability in real-
world contexts.
11.3 Future Work
We now discuss several open research questions that are left to future work. These
research questions (as represented in Figure 11.1 by lighter boxes with dotted lines)
are:
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1.3. PPRL on multiple databases: A main research gap we identified through the
taxonomy is efficient PPRL of databases from multiple (more than two) data
sources. PPRL on multiple databases introduces additional challenges with re-
spect to complexity, linkage quality, and privacy [36]. Complexity increases
significantly with multiple parties in terms of both computational efforts and
communication size. Second, private matching and classification on multiple
databases is challenging due to similarity calculations of multiple values. How
to efficiently calculate the similarity of multiple values using approximate com-
parison functions in PPRL is an open question. Finally, the risk of privacy
breaches increases with multiple parties due to possible collisions between a
subset of parties with the aim to learn about another (subset of) party’s pri-
vate data. Despite these challenges, PPRL on multiple databases is useful and
required in many real-world applications (as was described in Section 1.2).
1.4. PPRL for other adversarial models: Another limitation of most of the existing
PPRL approaches is the assumption of the honest but curious (HBC) adver-
sarial model which is not suffice in many real-world applications, because it
is suitable only when the parties essentially trust each other. The malicious
adversarial model, on the other hand, provides strong privacy guarantees by
assuming dishonest parties, but it is computationally expensive and is therefore
difficult to be adopted in practice. Limited work has been done in PPRL for the
malicious adversarial model [69, 128, 145]. Future work is required in devel-
oping PPRL solutions under appropriate models such as the covert model [8]
or accountable computing [95]. The covert model guarantees that the honest
parties can detect the misbehavior of an adversary with high probability [8],
while the accountable computing model provides accountability for privacy
compromises by the adversaries without excessive complexity and cost that in-
cur with the malicious model [95]. Transforming perturbation privacy-based
HBC PPRL protocols into these models and proving privacy of solutions under
these models are difficult which necessitate further research.
2.2. Distributed PPRL: Distributed PPRL would help improving the scalability
property of PPRL by parallelising computations among different computational
resources. Initial work on parallelism in PPRL based on locality sensitive hash-
ing using the MapReduce framework [50] has been done by Karapiperis and
Verykios [107]. Investigating how parallelism can improve the scalability of
our proposed algorithms without compromising privacy is one challenging yet
interesting avenue for future research.
2.3. Matching different data types: Developing approximate comparison functions
for private matching of different data types such as numeric, date, time, ge-
ographic, and other complex types of data in PPRL is a beneficial next step
of research in order to improve the quality of linkage. However, calculating
similarities of such data without revealing their actual values is a challenge. In
addition, techniques are required that deal with missing attribute values.
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2.4. Advanced classification: Another important research question with regard to
improving linkage quality is how the advanced classification techniques that
have been developed for record linkage (such as machine learning-based [16,
25, 62], graph-based [85, 147], collective [15, 100], and group-based [153] tech-
niques) can be efficiently employed in a privacy-preserving context. More ef-
forts are required in this direction of research to improve the quality of linkage
in PPRL applications [36].
3.1. Theoretical privacy assessment: Many PPRL solutions that have been pro-
posed in the literature lack in theoretical assessment of privacy provided by
those solutions. Therefore, more attention is required towards this direction.
We have partially addressed this gap by analyzing the privacy of our proposed
solutions in Chapter 6 to 9 in terms of what can be learned by the internal
adversaries (parties involved in the protocols) from the data they communicate
among them during the protocols. However, conducting an extensive analysis
of privacy regarding different types of attacks by using a standard set of nota-
tions (similar to the big-O notation [155] used for complexity analysis) would
be a constructive research direction in PPRL.
4.3. Clerical review in PPRL: Clerical review of unclassified record pairs (pairs that
have been classified as possible matches by a private matching and classifica-
tion technique) with manual efforts is difficult in PPRL, since the actual values
of record pairs cannot be revealed to human expert(s) to enable the process
of reviewing and decision making. How semi-supervised active learning tech-
niques [6] for clerical review can be efficiently and effectively applied in PPRL
applications is an open research question [36].
5.2. A language for PPRL: The final research gap that is left for future work is
a language for PPRL. Researchers have used various languages, datasets, and
measures to evaluate their PPRL algorithms. Crucially, there is currently no
overarching framework available that allows researchers to implement and in-
tegrate their novel algorithms to PPRL based on a standard language which
can then be evaluated comparatively. Developing a language for PPRL with
abstract modules for each of the steps in the PPRL process would provide a
key standard to model different PPRL approaches, which would be valuable
for PPRL researchers.
11.4 Conclusions
In this thesis we have presented comprehensive research in scalable and approximate
privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL). First we conducted an extensive survey
of existing PPRL techniques based on our taxonomy of PPRL. This taxonomy covers
fifteen dimensions of PPRL along which existing techniques have been characterized.
Based on this analysis, we have identified several shortcomings in existing PPRL for
research directions and contributed to address some of the identified gaps.
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The primary contributions of this work are scalable and approximate PPRL solu-
tions in a two-party context (without the need of a third party to perform linkage and
therefore no collusion between parties is possible) using efficient privacy techniques.
We have proposed novel solutions for private blocking, and for private matching
and classification in two-party PPRL, that address the three crucial properties of
PPRL, which are scalability, linkage quality, and privacy. Specifically, we have pro-
posed two efficient private blocking techniques (three-party, and two-party adapted
from three-party) based on sorted neighborhood clustering [52, 84] to improve the
scalability property; and two effective private matching and classification solutions
based on reference values [154] and Bloom filters [17], respectively, that provide high
linkage quality for approximate matching. Efficient data perturbation-based privacy
techniques (in terms of computation and communication complexities compared to
the SMC-based techniques) including k-anonymous mapping [72, 182], reference val-
ues [154], binning [132], Bloom filters [17], and random noise [108] have been used
in our proposed solutions.
Another major contribution of our work relates to the evaluation of PPRL algo-
rithms. Since a general framework for evaluation of PPRL has been missing in the
literature, we have proposed an evaluation framework for PPRL with a standard set
of measures for all three properties of PPRL. In this framework, we have also pre-
sented a novel set of disclosure risk measures for privacy evaluation (which has been
another key gap in the existing literature) based on an evaluation model using an
external global dataset. We have empirically evaluated all our proposed solutions on
real and synthetically corrupted (with realistic data characteristics) datasets using our
evaluation framework. We have also conducted a comprehensive and comparative
evaluation of our proposed solutions and several other state-of-the-art solutions. The
empirical results validate that our approaches perform equal or superior compared
to several existing approaches by addressing all three properties of PPRL.
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